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SUMMARY
There are multiple players that participate in forming policies to determine the
security of content on the Web. These players include web applications that deter-
mine who can access their content, users of these applications desiring control over
security policies that determine sharing of their contributed content, and the client-
side software such as web browsers that have mandatory enforcement of their security
policies. The current web security policies do not satisfy the end-to-end security re-
quirements imposed by this multi-player environment. For example, while average
users desire control over security policies that determine sharing of their contributed
content, the applications still control what access control policies are available to the
users for controlling access to that content. Moreover, even if web security policies
are improved to satisfy the new requirements, their enforcement still leaves much
to be desired in the current web infrastructure. Existing mechanisms are ineffective
in enforcing security and privacy policies in the evolving web environment thereby
undermining the security of content on the Web.
In this dissertation, we explore ways to improve end-to-end security for web access
by design and analysis of effective web security policies and enforcement frameworks.
Our contributions cover end-to-end security solutions that are aligned with the multi-
player setup of Web 2.0 and include a framework for users to specify security policies,
a platform to enforce user policies for third-party applications, an analysis of browser
policy issues, and a mechanism to provide improved end-to-end security/integrity
guarantees.
We advocate the use of user-defined access control for the user-centric Web 2.0
xiii
environment and develop a generalized framework, called xAccess, for a user to spec-
ify policies on how data seekers can access the user’s data in the context of web
applications. xAccess is analogous to the single sign-on mechanism, however, instead
of providing login capability, it provides the user with a single point for defining his
access control models and policies for one or multiple applications. We subsequently
extend our enforcement mechanism to develop a framework for application platforms
to enforce user-defined policies with third-party applications, in particular to con-
trol flow of data. We use social networking as representative application and design
a novel framework, called xBook, for building social networking platforms that uses
information flow control models to enforce user’s privacy policies.
We evaluate client-side security by performing a systematic analysis of the in-
coherencies in current browser security policies. Given that wide-scale adoption of
any new browser policy, even if it is for improving security, is marked with concerns
for backward compatibility, we also present the results of a large-scale compatibility
study to analyze the cost of, and thus ultimately motivate, the adoption of secure
browser policies.
Any meaningful security on the web browser platform cannot be ensured without
achieving end-to-end security between a users web browser and web sites. Although
HTTPS can help achieve end-to-end security by preventing man-in-the-middle at-
tacks, it does not satisfy the requirements of web applications that desire improved
performance at the cost of reduced security guarantees. To this end, we develop a
new protocol, HTTPi, which offers only end-to-end authentication and integrity and
seamlessly enable caching at intermediate servers (such as CDN servers and cache
proxies). We subsequently propose mechanisms that allow web applications to place





The advent of “Web 2.0” [66,101] has changed the requirements for systems currently
deployed on the Web, not only stretching the capabilities of the current infrastruc-
ture but also outstripping the current security and privacy protection mechanisms.
Traditionally, web applications used to be the main providers of web content that was
consumed by the end users. One of the biggest developments driving Web 2.0 is that
the average users have become substantial contributors of web content, whether it is
in the form of blogs, personal pictures or social interactions.
As a consequence of this change, multiple web participants (herein called web
players) now drive the formation and enforcement of security policies that determine
the end-to-end security of content on the Web. First, the web application hosted on
a server determines who can access its content. Second, the client-side software such
as web browsers have mandatory enforcement for their security policies. Finally, the
average users contributing web content also desire more control over security policies
that determine sharing of their content.
The trust relationships between these web players define the security requirements
of the web content. While a user trusts his own web browser and the web application
that he is accessing, he has no trust in other users of the application (note that
users are unknown to each other by default). From the application’s point of view,
trust exists for the user’s browser where the application is rendered, but no trust
is placed in other web applications. The network is always considered untrusted by
all the web players. Any end-to-end solution to security must effectively maintain
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these trust relationships to have any security guarantees. However, the existing web
infrastructure lacks the ability to effectively enforce security in line with the changing
Web 2.0 requirements.
Traditionally, the web application’s content was delivered explicitly to different
users that did not involve any sharing of user content, therefore user-user trust rela-
tionship was correctly maintained. Since web application provided the content, the
access control policies on this content was defined by the application. However, the
access control mechanisms in current web applications do not align with the user-
centric Web 2.0 setting: even if the content is provided by the users, the applications
still control what access control policies are available to the users for controlling ac-
cess to that content. As a result, users do not have much control over defining their
own user-user trust relationships. To further stretch the security requirements, ap-
plication development has become much more distributed with a growing number of
users acting as developers for third-party applications. Web applications, in turn,
are acting as programming platforms allowing developers to run third-party content
on top of their frameworks. One such example is Facebook that became a platform
in 2007. These third-part applications add another spectrum of trust relationship
for the user who is contributing content, since these applications, by default, are not
trusted by the user.
At the client side, web browsers have also gradually evolved from being an ap-
plication that views static pages to a rich application platform to render dynamic
content, such as maps. Techniques such as AJAX [48, 62] allow web applications
to retrieve data from the server asynchronously in the background without interfer-
ing with the display and behavior of the existing page. Other mechanisms such as
client-side mashups [37, 136] allow multiple, mutually distrusting web site principals
to co-exist and interact within the browser. Since Web 2.0 applications have more
active interactions within the browser as compared to their earlier counterparts, it
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creates new challenges for the browsers to satisfy the trust relationship between two
distrusting web applications. However, current browser policies have been developed
in an ad-hoc and piecemeal fashion to accommodate for the new features (such as
mashups) and as a result, many trapholes exist in the current browsers that lead to
security vulnerabilities and breach of trust for the user and the applications.
Even with sound mandatory browser security policies, the authenticity of the con-
tent provider and the integrity of its content are often at question since much of the
Web is delivered over the untrusted network using HTTP rather than HTTPS. Con-
sequently, network attackers can carry out man-in-the-middle attacks and undermine
browsers access control, even when browsers flawlessly implement their access con-
trol mechanisms. The web applications are limited in their availability of options,
with HTTPS providing security but suffering from performance overheads and lack
of in-networking caching, and HTTP that supports in-networking caching with no
security guarantees. With demand for improved user’s experience growing, web ap-
plications often opt for performance over security by using HTTP and thus undermine
the end-to-end security for web access.
1.2 Dissertation Overview
Through our analysis of new design goals and discovery of new security challenges
introduced by Web 2.0, we suggest the following thesis statement:
Existing web security policies and enforcement frameworks do not satisfy
the end-to-end security requirements of Web 2.0. Mechanisms that col-
lectively consider the three web players–the user, the web browser and the
application–to specify, evaluate and enforce security policies, can signifi-
cantly improve end-to-end security for web access.
Therefore, the focus of this dissertation is on how new tools and frameworks
can be effectively designed to aid the protection of web systems by acting as policy
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specification and enforcement points. This has culminated in four pieces of unique
contributions.
First, we develop a generalized and application-independent framework, called
xAccess [122], for a user to specify policies on how data seekers can access the user’s
data in the context of web applications. A simple example of such user-specific policies
for a blogging application is that of a blogger defining different access to his blog for
personal friends and office colleagues. Another user of the same application may
only desire public or private access for his blog entries. Our framework provides an
abstract base model to which the user’s access control policies can be mapped: this
single, unified abstraction allows the modeling of a wide range of access control policies
specified by different users of an application. From a user’s perpective, xAccess is
analogous to the single sign-on mechanism, but instead of providing login capability,
it provides the user with a single point for defining his access control models and
policies for one or multiple applications. For a web application, it provides a single
abstraction that can support multiple access control models and policies that are
individually specified by its users. xAccess is a powerful tool that gives users freedom
to change their access control model or policies at any time; such a change requires
no changes in the underlying applications.
Second, we develop a framework for application platforms to support user-defined
control for data sharing with third-party applications. One fitting example of such
web applications is social networking that has recently transformed from being a
service provider to a platform for running third party applications [80]. Users have
typically trusted their platform application with personal data, and have assumed
that their privacy preferences are correctly enforced. However, they are now being
asked to trust each application they use in a similar manner. This has left the user
information vulnerable to accidental or malicious leaks by these applications [67,92].
We use social networking as representative application and design a novel framework,
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called xBook [121], for building social networks that protect users’ privacy in the
presence of untrusted third-party site extensions. In contrast to user-user access
control protection, privacy protection against third-party applications has additional
challenges. Since untrusted running code is involved, our mechanism has to control
not only what the third-party applications can access, but also what these applications
can do with the data that they are allowed to access. For this purpose, we use
information flow models to control what untrusted applications can do with the data
they receive. We implement a proof-of-concept prototype of xBook, and evaluate its
practicality by developing sample applications using its APIs.
Third, we conduct a systematic analysis of the incoherencies in current browser
security policies [123]. One example of such policies is that current browsers support
certain features that allow applications to have access to resources belonging to the
user or to enable them to trick the user into perform unintended action. By uncovering
such trapholes, we aim to enumerate all possibilities of data leaks from the browser
and suggest policies to prevent these leaks. Given that wide-scale adoption of any
new browser policy, even if it is for improving security, is marked with concerns for
backward compatibility, we perform a large-scale compatibility study to analyze the
cost of, and thus ultimately motivate, the adoption of secure browser policies.
Finally, meaningful security on the web browser platform cannot be ensured with-
out achieving end-to-end security between a user’s web browser and web sites. Al-
though HTTPS can help achieve end-to-end security by preventing man-in-the-middle
attacks, its universal adoption by web sites is hindered by its performance cost and
its inability to be cached at intermediate servers (such as CDN servers and cache
proxies). As our fourth contribution, we observe that only end-to-end authentication
and integrity are required for the browser platform to enforce its access control re-
liably. Without end-to-end confidentiality, content can be cached. To this end, we
propose a new protocol, HTTPi [124], which offers only end-to-end authentication
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and integrity and seamlessly works with the existing web caching infrastructure. We
also propose mechanisms that allow web applications to place integrity policy re-
quirements on the content embedded on their sites. HTTPi performs content signing
while perserving progressive content loading supported by browsers. Because content
signing can be done offline, HTTPi incurs negligible overhead over HTTP. HTTPi
fills the gap between HTTP and HTTPS effectively by providing the right level of se-
curity required by many web applications, while allowing the applications to achieve
improved network performance.
1.3 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. We present the design of our user-
centric xAccess framework in Chapter 2. We demonstrate the viability of our design
by means of a platform prototype. We discuss the usability and performance of this
framework, and also provide example applications to demonstrate how developers can
utilize the framework.
Chapter 3 discusses the design and implementation of the xBook framework for
building privacy-preserving social networking applications. We demonstrate how
xBook uses information flow models to control what untrusted applications can do
with the information they receive. The usability of the platform is evaluated by de-
veloping sample applications using the platform APIs. We also discuss both security
and non-security challenges in designing and implementing such a framework.
Chapter 4 presents a systematic analysis of the current state of browser access
control policies and describes several incoherencies in these policies that result in
possible data leaks from the browsers. We subsequently suggest improved security
policies to prevent such leaks.
Chapter 5 covers the design of the HTTPi protocol, which offers only end-to-
end authentication and integrity and seamlessly works with the existing web caching
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infrastructure. It also discusses a mechanism that allows web applications to specify
and enforce their access control policies. We analyze the security and performance of
the protocol and discuss new access control policies associated with HTTPi.
Finally, we discuss related work in Chapter 6 followed by conclusions in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER II
USER-CENTRIC WEB APPLICATION POLICIES
With the advent of Web 2.0 technologies, web application development has become
much more distributed with a growing number of users acting as developers and
sources of online content. In particular, many users are contributing more and more
contents, by providing their personal information on social networks or by adding
information in the form of blogs, reviews, etc.
While the trend is towards more user-contributed data, the mechanisms to define
the access control policies on user-contributed data are still under the control of
the web applications. Consider the example of social networks such as Facebook.
Users contribute data in the form of their profile information, by loading pictures,
or by posting messages in each other’s profiles. The mechanism to control access to
the users’ data is determined by the social networking web site; in most cases, it is
limited to a small number of pre-defined access categories such as private, public or
to providing access only to the users’ friends. As a result, the users are forced to
use alternate means to protect their privacy in today’s applications, for example, by
maintaining multiple blogs [85]. Moreover, users have to understand and subsequently
remember the access control policies and customized rules for each web application,
which can be a cumbersome task considering the number of applications used by a
typical user.
Even if a web site or application wants to change its access control mechanism
to satisfy the needs of its users, there are major obstacles. First, the diversity in
the user population and the variety of the data contributed by each user means that
developing a mechanism that caters to the need of every user might not be feasible.
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Second, even though the privacy expectations that users desire are easy to state,
there is still a large gap between users’ mental models and the policy languages of
the current access control systems provided by the applications [36].
We argue that the users are the ones best suited to decide the semantics and
importance of their own data. Thus, we need to provide users the freedom and utility
to define the access control policies specific to their data, and enable web applications
to enforce these potentially diverse policies.
In this work, we propose a unified framework for providing access control in web
applications that provides users with a wide range of access control options to satisfy
their own individual privacy requirements and is independent of any application.
The framework is unified in the sense that it provides the user with a single point for
defining his access control models and policies for one or multiple applications. This
is akin to a single sign-on mechanism [18] that enables specification of access control
instead of providing login capability. In our design, the users have the flexibility to
define their own policies to control the privacy of the data contributed by them. A
simple example of such user-specific policies for a blogging application is that of a
blogger defining different access to his blog for personal friends and office colleagues.
Another user of the same application may only desire public or private access for his
blog entries. Our framework provides an abstract base model to which the user’s
access control policies can be mapped: this single, unified abstraction allows the
modeling of a wide range of access control policies specified by different users of an
application. Note that the goal of this work is not to propose a new access control
model, but to develop a unified system that gives users an ability to define customized
access control policies for all their applications at a single point.
We demonstrate the viability of our design by implementing a prototype system,
called xAccess. xAccess has two components, one that runs on the client side as an
extension to the user’s browser and another component that is hosted on the server
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of the web application. A user desiring access control for his data defines his policies
using an interface provided by the xAccess extension. The extension translates these
user policies to categories in our base access control model. Our model is based
on the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) scheme, so these categories translate to
specific roles in the model. xAccess also provides an interface to apply the user-
defined policies to any granularity of data desired by the owner, for example, to
protect individual blog entries, particular personal information, or specific photos.
Furthermore, xAccess also allows specific words or phrases within a blog to be tagged
with user-defined categories, thereby allowing data owners to control access to specific
information, such as someone’s name in a blog entry. Only a user who wants to control
access to his data is required to install the xAccess’ browser extension; the extension
is not needed by any other user who is seeking access to the owner’s data. For the
rest of the chapter, we use the term owner to denote an individual providing data
and seeker to denote a person who wants access to the owner’s data.
The server-side component of xAccess uses the access categories of the base model
to determine whether a particular access should be granted. Our model not only con-
trols access to the read operation, but also supports access control to other operations
like write or download. In a blogging application, the server-side component filters a
blog considering the categories attached to various parts of the blog. By default, a
reader is only presented with the public entries of an owner’s blog. Further access is
granted only after the owner’s policy specifies a category label for the reader and the
access is limited to that category. In a wikipedia application, the owner can similarly
restrict write operation to his wiki entry by attaching appropriate write permission
to the entry.
One of the strengths of xAccess’s abstract model is that it allows other access
control models to be incorporated into our framework. This is a desirable feature,
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because we expect other current and future access control models to facilitate devel-
opment of more diverse user policies closer to an owner’s mental model. Our base
model is generic and can simulate a wide range of such models (Section 2.2.2). For
example, in the blogging application, new models such as Content Based Access Con-
trol (CBAC) [69] can support policies like “only people mentioned in the blog should
see the blog”. Our framework supports such models, thereby supporting more di-
verse user policies, without requiring any change to our base model and without any
modifications to the web application.
2.0.1 Limitations of Current Designs
The current access control design of web applications enforces an application-specific
single security policy for every user of that application. However, there are different
degrees of intimacy between an individual and any other user desiring access to his
data, but the current designs are too coarse to capture these distinctions. In most
current access control systems, the owner of data has no say in defining the granularity
of access allowed.
These coarse-grained policies might result in undesired access or undesired re-
strictions. For example, users on Flickr only have the option to assign their office
colleagues to the category of family, friends, or public. Assigning them public access
would prevent them from viewing some of the “professional” pictures posted by the
user. On the other hand, giving them friends access would allow them to see any
pictures accessible to friends, which might not be desirable for some users. On the
flip side, some users might not want to share some of the professional pictures with
a few or all of their friends or family due to confidentiality constraints. The web
application is ill-equipped to decide the access granularity required by a particular




Figure 1: Application architecture for: (a) current frameworks. (b) xAccess frame-
work.
to provide the right level of access to other users in the system. Most web applica-
tions currently employ limited number of access control categories with little or no
flexibility in adding new user-specific categories.
The web application is also restricted in terms of the access control mechanism it
uses. In the current setting, most applications provide a single access control model for
all users of the application (Figure 1(a)). For example, Facebook uses access control
lists to evaluate access to a user’s profile, photos, messages, etc. This mechanism
is common for all the users, independent of individual requirements. Additionally,
the mechanism is more-or-less fixed and there is no incentive for web applications to
change the model unless there is a huge user base vouching for that change. As a
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result, new innovative mechanisms such as CBAC [38] might take years before being
adapted by the web applications. Even if some applications are more proactive to the
change, it does not hold true for most web applications.
2.0.2 Our Contributions
Our framework design allows an owner to keep a single access control model that can
be utilized for one or multiple web applications (Figure 1(b)). However, the owner
also has the option to use different models for different applications. For example, the
framework empowers the owner to deploy access control mechanisms like MAC [115] or
CBAC [69] allowing him flexibility in writing his own access control policies. From any
web application’s prospective including the ones that currently do not employ access
control, one-time installation of our framework enables the application to support
different access control models for different owners.
Our work makes the following contributions:
• We propose a novel design of an unified access control framework for supporting
diverse user-defined access control policies that empowers the users to choose
their own models and their own access granularity. We also show that our model
is generic to allow simulation of a number of popular access control models on
top of our framework, and provides enormous flexibility to the users in making
access control decisions about the data owned by them.
• We develop a proof-of-concept system, called xAccess (extended Access), that
provides a set of APIs that can be used to integrate generalized access control
capability into web applications.
• We demonstrate the viability of our framework by developing a sample blogging
application as our base example and subsequently integrating access control into
the application using the xAccess APIs. We also show real-world deployment
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Figure 2: xAccess Architecture and workflow scenarios.
potential of our framework by integrating xAccess into a popular open-source
wikipedia application. Our sample web applications are available online [16,23].
Chapter Organization. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We
present an overview of the xAccess framework in Section 2.1. We present the base
model for access control in xAccess in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents the implemen-
tation details and evaluation of xAccess. We discuss the advantages and limitations
of xAccess in Section 2.4, followed by conclusions in Section 2.5.
2.1 The xAccess Framework
xAccess is a framework for enabling web applications to capture and model data
owners’ privacy policies and to enforce such policies via access control on data seekers.
xAccess is designed to be general and adaptive so that it can be used for a wide variety
of web application scenarios and more importantly for different access control models
implied by owners’ diverse policies. More specifically, xAccess only requires one-time
installation at the server side; after this initial installation, no change is required at
the server and owners are free to change their policies via a client side component at
any time. Furthermore, xAccess provides a generalized access control model, based on
the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model [56,116], to represent policies specified
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either in the form of user-defined access classifications (such as private, friends, family,
etc.) or in the form of other access control models (such as MAC [115], DAC [114],
CBAC [69], etc).
Figure 2 shows a high-level design of the xAccess framework. There are two parts
of the xAccess platform, one that is hosted on the server-side and the other that runs
on the client-side as an extension to the data owner’s web browser.
On the client side, the xAccess extension provides a layer of abstraction that
enables its RBAC-based generalized access control model (which we call base model)
to directly represent policies specified in terms of user-defined access categories as
well as convert policies specified using other access control models. As we will show
in Section 2.2.2, widely used access control models, including Discretionary Access
Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Role Based Access Control
(RBAC), can be constructed on top of the base model in xAccess. These models are
simulated in xAccess by setting various parameters of the base model using the APIs
provided by xAccess.
xAccess provides multiple avenues for a data owner to express his access control
requirements. First, it provides the owner with a capability to define access categories
directly into the base model via xAccess’ browser extension. Second, it enables the
owner to extend xAccess’ base model by deploying other access control models of his
choice, such as CBAC, as a layer above xAccess. When deployed, such a model is
coupled with xAccess into the browser extension allowing the owner to write his access
control policies using the interface (or language) provided by the deployed model
(Figure 2). We expect such model transformations to be made available by third-
party developers providing the end users with easy-to-use interfaces to specify their
access control policies, while keeping them oblivious to the implicit transformation to
xAccess’ base model. In comparison to the end users, we assume that such developers
would be better equipped to correctly develop such interfaces. The user interface
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provided by xAccess forms part of the browser’s chrome and does not modify an
application’s code. It supports access control for both structured information (such
as well-defined fields in a user’s personal profile) and unstructured data (such as
blogs). The xAccess extension only needs to be installed at the owner’s web browser,
and is not required for any other user only seeking access to the owner’s data.
On the server side, the xAccess component receives and stores the mapping of en-
tities (both subjects and objects) with their corresponding categories that are passed
from the client to the application’s server. The xAccess component is a separate
module on the server side; it is only invoked by the web application when required
to filter content that is access controlled (Figure 2). The amount of modifications
required to integrate xAccess into an application is negligible (3–5 lines of API calls).
The enforcement of access control is done by the server side component of xAccess,
which serves all users of the application and in effect realizes their corresponding
access control models. Since the translation of user-specific access control models
to xAccess’ base model is done at the client side and only the access categories
corresponding to the base model are presented to the server, this greatly simplifies
the access control enforcement at the server side. xAccess’ server-side component
uses a simple matching algorithm to decide if a requesting subject (seeker) is allowed
to access an owner’s data object. The algorithm uses categories of the subject and
the object in making such a decision. We present details of this algorithm when we
introduce our model in Section 2.2.1.
In our current design, the server side of xAccess is invoked as a set of API calls
made by the web application. An alternate design would be to deploy xAccess as a
proxy that filters data before passing it to the user’s browser. The difference from
our current design is subtle and a detailed comparison is not the focus of our work.
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2.2 User-Centric Access Control
In this section, we present the generic access control model that underlines our xAccess
framework. We call this the base model. It has the following design goals:
• Generalization. Since one of the goals of the xAccess framework is to allow
data owners to specify their access policies, which can be very diverse, the base
model should be able to accommodate a wide range of access control models.
That is, it should allow policies defined using different access control models
to be expressed or simulated in the base model. It should also model policies
expressed in terms of access categories, as commonly used in web application
scenarios.
• Minimum modification requirements. A web application should only re-
quire one-time, minimal modifications at the time of deployment of xAccess.
Once the application deploys the xAccess framework, it should require no fur-
ther changes to the application even if a data owner changes his access model
at any later time.
• Backward compatibility. Even after deploying the xAccess framework, an
application should still support users with no xAccess component installed on
the client-side. In other words, the fall-back mechanism of xAccess should be
the same (default) behavior of the application when no xAccess is deployed.
In order to achieve these goals, we designed xAccess to be policy neutral. The
base model in xAccess provides an abstraction of the essential elements of any access
control policy, which would at the minimum include the access categories or role
hierarchies, and the constraints and administration of user-role and role-permission
assignments. We next describe the base model, and show how it enables diverse user
policies to be modeled and enforced in the xAccess framework.
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2.2.1 The Base Model
We constructed our model by customizing the Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
model for our user-centric paradigm. The central idea of RBAC is that permissions
are associated with roles and users are made members of appropriate roles thereby
acquiring the roles’ permissions. Roles are created for the various job functions in
an organization, and users are assigned roles according to their responsibilities and
qualifications. The roles are assigned by the system administrator of the organization.
RBAC allows for the specification and enforcement of a variety of protection policies,
which can be tailored on an enterprise-by-enterprise basis. The RBAC framework
provides administrators with the capability to regulate who can perform what actions,
when, from where and in what order.
The goal of the xAccess framework is to provide protection to user data in ac-
cordance with the access control defined by the data owner. In this regard, user’s
contributed data (i.e., user profile, blogs, photos, etc.) for a particular web applica-
tion represents a habitat that corresponds to an organization in the RBAC model.
In our model, we associate the administrator privileges for the access control over
any data items to the owner of those items. The data owner defines the roles for his
“system” because he is the one who knows the “responsibilities and qualifications” of
various individuals, acting as users of the application, from his personal connections
to people. For example, a data owner knows who his family members are in real life
and how much each person can be trusted with his data. In other words, a role in our
model signifies a real-life relationship of the data owner. This relationship could be
in the form of family, friends, business colleagues, public or any others role specific
to the data owner. Such roles might vary from user to user. There is many-to-many
mapping from roles to users; this also shows similarity to the the real world, where
an individual might have multiple friends or family members, or a friend could also
be part of the family thereby assuming both roles.
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Figure 3: Example role hierarchy in xAccess. Text in italics represents corresponding
permissions.
In RBAC, a role signifies a set of operations that can be performed by that role.
In our model, these operations can take limited forms depending on the application.
In most cases, the operation would be limited to data read, allowing a data owner
to control the confidentiality of his data. Some typical applications include social
networks and blogs. In other cases, the data owner might want to assign write per-
missions to the data contributed by him. Wikipedia is one application that falls into
this category. Providing access control for other operations such as direct download,
remote execution, etc. is also feasible in our system, if such operations are supported
by the application.
The xAccess framework tracks and enforces access control using a labeling sys-
tem defined based on the existing RBAC models [56, 116]. Subjects represent the
users requesting data access and objects represents the data entities that are being
requested. Both subjects and objects correspond to roles in the xAccess framework.
Subjects are associated with roles when the request for access is granted by the
web application on behalf of the data owner. The objects are assigned roles when
data is entered into the application by the data owner, e.g., by uploading new photos,
writing new blog entry, adding new profile information, etc. A data owner can update
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roles of both subjects and objects anytime at his own discretion.
Role Hierarchy. Roles can have overlapping responsibilities and privileges, that
is, users belonging to different roles may need to perform common operations on some
objects. For example, a best friend should be able to read the data accessible to a
friend’s role. To efficiently satisfy such requirements, our model includes specification
of role hierarchies. An example of a role hierarchy within xAccess is shown in Figure 3.
In this example, the role Private “contains” the roles of Best Friend and Family.
This means that members of the role Private are implicitly associated with the
operations, constraints, and objects of the roles Best Friend and Family without
the administrator having to explicitly list their attributes for the Private role. The
most powerful roles are represented at the top of the diagram with the less powerful
roles being represented at the bottom. That is, the roles on the top of the diagram
contain the greatest number of operations, constraints, and objects. As shown in
Figure 3, not all roles have to be related. The roles Friend and Family are not
hierarchically related but they can contain some or all of the same roles.
xAccess allows new constraints to be added into the model at any stage. Con-
straints are set of rules that are mandated over any role assignments and hierarchy
definitions. They define a broad scope of what is acceptable in the xAccess model.
For example, a user may want to enforce a rule that none of his office colleagues can
be on his family list. This ensures that information about his family activities or
family pictures are kept hidden from his office colleagues. Accordingly, a constrain
can be added using the xAccess APIs that enforces that no user can be assigned the
twin roles of Family and Office Colleague at the same time.
Note that xAccess enforces no restriction on what roles can be defined. It only
provides a framework that can be utilized to define roles and role hierarchies that
can effectively simulate the access control model underlying the user-defined access
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Algorithm 1 Access Control Algorithm of xAccess.
INPUT S: subject, O: object, REQ OP : operation requested
if application supports REQ OP on O then
Rs ← getRoles(S)
Ro ← getRoles(O)
for all r ∈ Rs do
for all r′ ∈ Ro do
if r  r′ and REQ OP ∈ getOperations(r) then






DENY S with REQ OP access to O
Figure 4: Pseudo code of the algorithm to check if the Subject S can perform
operation REQ OP on Object O. REQ OP can be in the form of read or write on
any other application-specific operation. getRoles(x) returns the roles corresponding
to the entity x and getOperations(y) returns the permissions for the role y. r  r′
represents the role hierarchy where role r is higher than (or contains) role r′.
control policies. Section 2.2.2 will discuss how our base model can simulate the com-
monly used access control models, thereby enabling a generic access control system
for diverse user and application needs.
The server-side framework of xAccess stores the roles for both subjects and objects
associated with each user, the hierarchy of roles, as well as the corresponding allowed
operations such as read or write for each role. It also enforces the access control
rules on behalf of the data owner. Figure 4 shows a simplistic view of the algorithm
used in the xAccess framework to evaluate whether or not to grant access to the
seeker for the requested data item or resource. As can be observed, a subject can
perform a specific operation (read, write, etc.) on an object only if the operation is
supported by the application and allowed by the access control rules of the object’s
owner. lThe simplicity of this algorithm demonstrates the value of our design where
a single algorithm is able to effectively cover a wide range of access control models
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used by different data owners.
2.2.2 Expressiveness of the Base Model
One of the requirements of the xAccess framework is that it should allow users (or
third-party developers acting on behalf of the users) to choose their own access control
models. In order to fulfill this requirement, the xAccess base model should be generic
enough to capture the functionality of the chosen access control model. In other
words, the abstractions in the base model should be expressive enough to enforce a
wide range of access control models.
For most current web pages, access control is enforced by just customizing the
access levels or categories and by providing partial order to such categories. For
example, in Facebook such categories are friends, friends of friends, private, etc.
These simple policies can be directly modeled by the base model and the default
interface provided by xAccess. However, we anticipate that future web applications
may require more elaborate access control policies.
In this section, we leverage previous research [70,102,114] to demonstrate that our
RBAC-based model can be used to simulate few traditional and most commonly used
models: Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and
Lattice Based Access Control (LBAC) [51, 115]–and their variants. We supplement
these findings by additional discussion on how some newer models such as Content
Based Access Control (CBAC) [69] are realized within xAccess. A more formal dis-
cussion of such simulation is out of scope of this thesis and is left as future work.
2.2.2.1 DAC
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a means of restricting access to objects based
on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls are
discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access permission is capable
of passing that permission on to any other subject. Sandhu et al. demonstrated that
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several variations of DAC can be simulated via the RBAC model. The basic idea
behind the DAC to RBAC construction is to simulate the owner-centric policies using
roles that are associated with each object [114]. In the xAccess framework, the owners
have discretion to transfer certain controls (read, write or execute) to other users. In
our default setup, transfer of controls is allowed only if the original owner provides
ownership permission to other users. Depending on his own requirements, the owner
can create additional permissions to restrict transfer to only specific controls.
2.2.2.2 MAC / LBAC
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) refers to a system of access control that assigns
security labels or classifications to objects and allows access only to subjects with
distinct levels of authorization or clearance. In contrast to DAC, where a subject can
pass permissions to access an object to other subjects, no such propagation is allowed
in the MAC model. These controls are enforced by the security administrator of the
base system.
Lattice Based Access Control (LBAC) is a special type of MAC where a lattice
is used to define the levels of security that an object may have and that a subject
may have access to. A subject is only allowed to access an object if the security
level of the subject is greater than or equal to that of the object. For example, in
the xAccess system, a user can give different levels of access to top friends, friends or
family. Based on how the lattice is constructed, LBAC can be used for confidentiality,
integrity, or both.
Osborn et al. have demonstrated that the LBAC model can be simulated using
RBAC [102]. Since our base model is a customized form of RBAC, any variations of
the MAC model can be transformed to our base model. In our model, an owner acts




Content Based Access Control (CBAC) is a type of access control in which access to
an object is partially or entirely based on the content of the objects in the system [38,
113]. CBAC allows users to specify a single, intuitive access control policy based on
object features and then automatically applies that policy to new objects as they
are created. CBAC utilizes techniques from natural language processing [113], image
processing [38] and machine learning to perform this task. Essentially, it provides
the necessary bridge between a user’s intuitive access control policy, such as “Parents
should not see my party pictures”, and the policy enforcement.
CBAC is currently an open research project, with efforts to improve its practical
acceptability to a variety of applications [69]. The advantage of CBAC is that it
reduces the burden of managing the access control policies for the users – the users
just need to provide high-level policies and CBAC controls the policy enforcement
with no further intervention required from the user.
The advantage of our xAccess framework is that it allows CBAC to be integrated
into a web application easily using our abstractions. It would also enable easy integra-
tion of CBAC into the application at any time in the future, i.e., whenever users think
that it is viable enough for their purposes. Note that xAccess places no guarantee or
control over the correctness of CBAC; the users are empowered to decide whether or
not to use the CBAC systems. An alternative to our approach in the current systems
is that the applications themselves switch to the CBAC model. However, applications
have to cater to the need of all its users to consider a new technology and hence might
take much longer to switch to the new CBAC model. Furthermore, switching to a
new model again limits all users of the application to that model.
To deploy CBAC on top of our xAccess framework, the implementation of CBAC
needs to convert high-level user policies in their model to lower level roles, subjects
and objects in the xAccess model. For example, let us consider a simple CBAC policy
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“Only my friends can see my party pictures”. First, the CBAC implementation uses
image processing to determine which pictures are from “parties” and tag all such
pictures with a “friend” role. The user could have approved a list of individuals to
be added in the friend role. More advanced implementations of CBAC can analyze
the user’s data to infer the friend’s list of the user based on who talks with whom.
Since the CBAC policies can be effectively implemented using RBAC, we can infer
that the CBAC model can be simulated using the xAccess system.
2.2.3 Access Control Lifecycle in xAccess
We can now summarize the process by which any access control model defined by a
data owner by means of the client (browser) component of the xAccess framework is
mapped to the enforcement of access control at the server.
1. In the absence of any access control model specified by the user, xAccess uses
its own base model by default. The xAccess browser extension presents a user
interface to the data owner for defining his access preferences directly into our
model. This interface allows the data owner to create roles and the correspond-
ing role hierarchy. Alternatively, the data owner may choose to deploy his own
access control model over xAccess (Figure 2). Such models implement their ac-
cess control logic by defining roles and roles hierarchies using the APIs provided
by xAccess’ browser extension. Orthogonally, the implementation of these mod-
els can provide their own interface for the owner to define the model-specific
policies. We believe that user-friendly interfaces can be developed by third par-
ties to allow easy configuration of access control policies, which is both intuitive
and easy to understand for the users; the usability aspect of such interfaces is
beyond the scope of this work.
2. For each data entity – both structured and unstructured – input by a data
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owner to an xAccess-compatible web application, the data owner has the op-
tion to attach a category. Such categories are pre-defined based on the access
control model specified in Step 1. For the default base model, these categories
correspond to the set of defined roles. If any other access control model is used,
any category attached to a subject or an object is transformed to its corre-
sponding role in the base xAccess model. For example, the CBAC model allows
user policies like “My parents should not see my party pictures”. The CBAC
system has the capability to determine if a particular picture is a party picture
based on the its pixel contents [69]. A typical CBAC interface provided to a
picture’s owner would allow him to upload the picture to the web application.
The CBAC system accordingly tags the picture by passing a role mapped to
the “party picture” category to the xAccess extension. Finally, the mapping of
the entities with their corresponding roles is passed to the application’s server
to be stored by the server-side component of xAccess.
3. Any user of a particular web application can view the default public information
(i.e., public profile, public blog, etc.) of all other users. However, in order to
access non-public information, the seeker sends a request for access to the owner
of that information. This logic is internal to the application and is similar in
most typical applications.
4. A data owner sees all the access requests from other users, and associates cat-
egories to each requesting user according to the access control model and the
categories chosen by him in Step 1. The assignment of roles to the requesting
users is conveyed to the server-side of xAccess. Again, this procedure is aligned
with most existing applications where a user needs approval from a profile’s
owner before accessing the profile.
5. The requesting seeker can now access the data of another user (the data owner)
26
in accordance with the roles assigned to him. The access control enforcement
is done by the xAccess component on the server side using the algorithm given
in Figure 4.
6. A data owner can modify the category of any of the objects contributed by
him and any of the subjects approved by him, effectively changing the access
allowed to these subjects.
2.3 Evaluation
2.3.1 Prototype System and Applications
We developed a working prototype of the xAccess system, which includes the server-
side platform code and APIs for integrating the access control framework into the
web applications. We also implemented the labeling model that provides the required
abstraction at the server so that any access control model implemented at the browser
side for the data owner can be enforced. Our xAccess platform consists of about 2500
lines of JavaScript code.
We demonstrate the viability of our approach by means of two sample applications.
First, we developed a blogging application in-house that stores the profile information
for users and provide them the functionality to write their personal blogs. Second,
we use a popular open-source wikipedia application, called mediawiki, to show the
applicability of our system directly to existing applications. By default, these appli-
cations have open access with any user logged into the application being able to view
the profile and data (blogs/wikis) contributed by other users. In order to show the
feasibility of our approach, we integrated the xAccess platform into the server side of
these applications. This integration represents one-time installation of our xAccess
framework for any application supporting the generic access control models. We also
showed that such an integration incurs minimal changes to the existing code of the
applications; the change comprises of few xAccess API calls to filter the data being
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Table 1: Set of xAccess APIs for integrating the generic access control model.
filterString(seekerID,
ownerID, string)
filters the string text according to the access con-
trol model of ownerID to give assess to seekerID
isAccessAllowed(seekerID,
ownerID, op)
verifies if seekerID is allowed to perform the op-
eration op on ownerID’s data
setSubjectRole(ownerID,
userID, role)
assigns the role for userID in ownerID’s list
setObjectRole(ownerID,
objectID, role)
assigns the role for objectID in ownerID’s list
setRoleHierarchy(ownerID,
roleHierarchy)
updates the role hierarchy for ownerID on the web
server
passed to the user.
On the browser side, we developed a sample proof-of-concept access control model
and user interface that allows a user to design his own customized hierarchy of ac-
cess control. The sample model is developed as a browser extension and has been
tested for Firefox 3.5. Using the extension, users can perform addition, deletion or
modification of new categories of access and customize the hierarchy graph of these
defined categories. Our proof-of-concept model uses the xAccess APIs (given in Ta-
ble 1) to map these user-defined categories to the abstractions used at the server side.
The example blogging application and the wikipedia application integrated with our
xAccess framework can be accessed online at [23] and [16] respectively.
To handle unstructured data such as blogs and wikis, our extension allows users
to attach a category by selecting text on their browser window. This enables the user
to select complete or part of the blog or the wiki. A new identifier tag is attached to
the selected text and the corresponding identifier to category mapping is stored.
Figure 5 shows a partial overview of our server-side implementation by means of
our blogging application example. In this example, a user user1 has three subjects,
namely alice, bob and charlie, which the user has assigned categories of Friend,
Family and Private, respectively. He has defined the role hierarchy for his system
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Figure 5: Blog example with sample xAccess API implementation.
as given in Figure 3. xAccess stores numbered representation for the role hierarchy
in its database. Taking an example, role Private (represented as 1) has two children
Best Friend and Family, labeled as 1 ∧ 1 and 1 ∧ 2, respectively. By separately
storing the role hierarchy, we allow modification of the hierarchy without requiring
any changes to the roles already assigned to the subjects and the objects.
Let us assume that the user makes a blog entry saying “I am going to Hawaii
for a conference for vacation” and wants to provide different purpose of his travel
to friends and family. The user tags parts of the blog with different categories to
achieve his purpose using the default interface provided by the xAccess extension. The
modified text is stored in the application’s database and the corresponding categories
in xAccess objects’ database table. By tagging the text with identifiers instead of
the actual roles, xAccess facilitates access modifications on the text objects without
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changing the actual text stored with the application.
For any user accessing this blog, the server side of the application invokes the
filterString() API of the xAccess platform (Table 1) before passing the returned
value to the requesting user. Note that this requires addition of only one line to the
application code. filterString() filters the blog entry by invoking xAccess’ access
control algorithm according to the roles assigned to the individual text objects and
the requesting subject. As we can see from Figure 5, different readers have their
own views of the blog based on their assigned roles. While alice sees the entry as
“I am going to Hawaii for a conference”, charlie can view the whole blog entry as
his Private role is higher in hierarchy to both tags Friend and Family attached to
different parts of the entry.
We use similar text tagging method to control access for structured data that are
text fields, even though the interface provided to the user is different. For non-text
fields such as photos, the categories are assigned to the filenames. The web application
uses the isAccessAllowed() API to verify if access is allowed, before passing these
entities to the requesting seeker.
2.3.2 Performance Estimates
xAccess does not impose a substantial burden on the performance of the web applica-
tions. Without being able to deploy the framework to a real-world application setup,
it is difficult to accurately predict the impact of our design on the performance of
these applications as perceived by the users. To get a rough estimate of the cost of
supporting the xAccess design and the overhead involved in our system, we conducted
some experiments with our sample applications, measuring the latency introduced by
added security provided by xAccess’ access control mechanisms.
In our experiments, the xAccess server is hosted on a 2.4GHz Intel Quad Core
2 machine with 4GB of RAM. The requests are made from Firefox 3.5 browser on
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Table 2: User latency of various operations in typical web applications with xAccess.
Application Component Operation Number of
Latency
access checks Mean Std Dev
User Profile (structured) Read 12 37.1ms 0.83ms
Blog Entries (unstructured) Read 5 16.9ms 0.60ms
Wiki Entries (unstructured) Read 5 1.8ms 0.18ms
Wiki Entries (unstructured) Write 5 5.8ms 0.46ms
a 2.33GHz, 2GB RAM, Pentium Core Duo laptop. Each test was run 10 times
and measurement values were averaged. We define user latency as the difference
in the time when the request is made at the browser and the time at which the
response is received by the browser. Table 2 shows the latency introduced for various
user interactions for the sample applications. Each interaction performs a different
amount of processing based on the number of access control checks made for the
interaction. For example, the number of checks required for the user profile is fixed
at 12, one each for every profile field. On the other hand, the filtering of the blog
(or the wiki) depends on the number of different access control tags added by the
user in the unstructured blog (or wiki) entry. In our tests, each of the sample blog
and the wiki entry had 5 such access checks. Our results show that the user latency
for applications employing xAccess for providing access control is still considerably
low: when averaged over the number of access checks, the latency is about 3.1ms for
structured user profile fields and 3.4ms for the unstructured blog. For the open-source
wikipedia application, providing access control for the unstructured wiki incurs an
average latency value of 0.4ms for read and 1.2ms for write operation.
Studies have shown that acceptable user latencies fall in the range of 50–150
ms [119]. All user latencies observed in our experiments currently fall within this
range. However, the latency increases with the number of checks added by the user.
We emphasize that our prototype implementation is written in JavaScript with no
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emphasis on optimization. There are many opportunities for improving the perfor-
mance in our system, by optimizing the database queries or by utilizing server-side
caching. Moreover, on a cluster of commercial servers with much better computational
capacity, these values will be even smaller. Although it is not possible to precisely
determine the cost of our approach without a large scale experiment, both the details
of our design and the results from these experiments, support the conclusion that
xAccess design imposes additional latency within acceptable limits.
2.4 Discussion
The support for both structured data (e.g., user’s profile) and unstructured data
(e.g., blogs) improves the ability of our framework to be acceptable in more diverse
applications and environments. As previous research has suggested [64], ability to
apply user-defined policies to a more finer grained level, such as words or phrases
in blogs, satisfies a key access control requirement in the Web 2.0 paradigm. Other
potential applications of our framework include email communication and newsgroups
where a sender is passing messages to multiple receivers, either to anonymous groups
or to unmanageably huge lists. Our framework allows the sender to attach desired
access control tags to different parts of a message without explicitly identifying each
receiver and creating separate individual messages. The filtering in turn is done by
the sender’s email server.
It might be argued that our design of pushing the access control models to the
user’s client might limit the mobility of the data owner, i.e., the ability to retrieve his
access control preferences from the browser of any machine. However, the solution
to this limitation could be trivial: since the web application is already storing the
roles and role hierarchy for the user, it can allow downloading of such preferences to
the user’s client after login. Moreover, this is only required if the user wants to use a
new machine to modify his access control preferences. In case no such modifications
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are desired by the user, he can normally browse the web application with no need for
xAccess’ browser extension.
While our abstraction model of access control can simulate a wide range of access
control models and, in consequence, the variations of these models [42, 86, 87, 141],
there is still a possibility that our design might restrict some other models that cannot
be mapped directly to the abstractions presented by our framework. While xAccess’
design relies on the abstraction provided by the base model, it has the flexibility to
accommodate an improved abstract model. This work is a first attempt to design a
unified, single-point, user-centric access control framework and can certainly benefit
from further research in the field of access control.
2.5 Summary
We presented a generic access control framework, called xAccess, that allows users
to control how they want their data to be accessed. On one hand, xAccess is generic
enough to enable users to choose their own access categories and on the other hand,
it also supports integration of other access control models to further increase the
diversity of policies available to the users. Our framework allows users to utilize a
single unified access control across multiple web applications. From an application’s
prospective, it enables the application to support different access control models de-
ployed by its users using a single model abstraction.
We developed a working prototype of the system and showed its viability by in-
tegrating two sample applications with our framework using the xAccess APIs. The
blogging application was developed in-house and represents a typical web applica-
tion with need for providing access control to its users [23]. We also integrated our
framework into a popular open-source wikipedia application [16].
Our system shows promise in supporting potentially valuable future access control
models that could be targeted by individual users to control access to their data. Since
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no change is required to deploy a new model after the one-time installation of our




PRIVACY PRESERVING DESIGN FOR WEB
APPLICATION PLATFORMS
In the last chapter, we presented a framework to enforce user-defined access control
policies for user data contributed to trusted applications. This chapter extends our
enforcement solution to include untrusted third-party applications. We use social
networking as our representative example for our solution; similar design is applicable
to other web application platforms.
Social networking sites have transformed the way people express themselves on
the Internet and have become a door to the social life of many individuals. Users are
contributing more and more content to these sites in order to express themselves as
part of their profiles and to contribute to their social circles online. While this builds
up the online identity for the user, it also leaves the data vulnerable to be misused,
as an example, for targeted advertising and sale.
More private data online has lead to growing privacy concerns for the users, and
some have faced extreme repercussions for sharing their private information on these
networking sites. For example, students have been fined for their online social behav-
ior [103]; a mayor was forced to resign because of a controversial Myspace picture [118].
There are numerous such cases, and these incidents clearly underline the importance
of privacy control in social networks.
With the advent of Web 2.0 technologies, web application development has be-
come much more distributed with a growing number of users acting as developers
and source of online content. This trend has also influenced social networks that
now act as platforms allowing developers to run third-party content on top of their
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framework. Facebook opened up for third-party application development by releasing
its development APIs in May 2007 [80]. Since the release of the Facebook platform,
several other sites have joined the trend by supporting Google’s OpenSocial [19], a
cross-site social network development platform.
These third-party applications further escalate the privacy concerns as user data
is shared with these applications. Typically, there is no or minimal control over
what user information these applications are allowed to access. In most cases, these
applications are hosted on third party servers that are difficult to monitor. As a
result, it is not feasible to police the data being leaked from the application after the
data is shared with the application. There have been several reported cases where
users’ private information was leaked by the applications, either due to intentional
leaks [67] or due to vulnerabilities in the application [92].
Most social networking platforms, such as Facebook, currently provide the ap-
plications with full access to user profile information. This permission is granted in
Facebook when the user adds the application, which requires the user to make a trust
decision. Setting fine-grained access control policies for an application, even if they
were supported, would be a complex task. Furthermore, access control policies are
not sufficient in enforcing the privacy of an individual: once an application is permit-
ted by a user’s access control policy, it has possession of the user’s data and can freely
leak this information anytime for personal gains. For example, a popular Facebook
application, Compare Friends, that promised users’ privacy in exchange for opinions
on their friends later started selling this information [132].
In this work, we are concerned with protecting the users’ private information
from leaks by third-party applications. We present a mechanism that controls not
only what the third-party applications can access, but also what these applications
can do with the data that they are allowed to access. We propose and implement
a new framework called xBook that provides a hosting service to the applications
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and enforces information flow control within the framework. xBook provides three
types of enforcement that encapsulate the privacy requirements in a typical social
network setting: (1) user-user access control (e.g., access to only friends) for data
flowing within one application, (2) information sharing outside xBook with external
parties; and (3) protection of the application’s proprietary data. While (1) and (2)
protects the privacy of a user from information leaks, (3) prevents the application’s
proprietary data or algorithm from being leaked to the application users.
The third-party applications are redesigned in such a way that they have access
to all the data they require (allowing them to perform their functionality) and at
the same time, not allowing these applications to pass this data to an external entity
unless it is approved by the user. Our framework enforces that the applications make
these communications explicit to the user so that he is more informed before approving
an application.
There are several challenges associated with the design of our xBook framework:
Confinement. The execution of application code needs to be confined. This prob-
lem needs to be dealt with independently on the client side within the browser and
on the server side in the web server. We use “the web server” as a conceptual entity
to represent one or more servers.
Mediation. All communication from and within an application needs to be mediated
by the xBook platform for permissible information flow. To this end, we developed a
labeling model that enforces user-defined security policies. High-level policies speci-
fied by the user are converted to low-level labels enforced by xBook.
Programmability. The programming abstraction to the application writers should
be practical and easy to use. xBook provides a set of simple APIs in line with the
existing social networking platforms.
Portability. The requirements imposed by xBook on the application design should
not break the existing applications. In other words, it should be feasible to port most
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functionality of typical applications to xBook with little effort.
We show the viability of our framework design by implementing a working proto-
type of our xBook system and porting some of the popular applications from existing
social networks, such as Facebook, on top of the framework. We also demonstrate
a practical deployment strategy of our system by porting our framework itself as an
application on Facebook. We evaluate the security of our platform by illustrating
some possible application scenarios, and how xBook ensures privacy control in such
cases. We also create some synthetic attacks that attempt to exploit the platform to
leak information. Our results illustrate that xBook can successfully prevent all such
attacks. Our performance results further demonstrate that xBook’s privacy control
mechanism incurs negligible overhead for typical social networking applications.
Chapter Organization. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 motivates our work by analyzing some privacy issues with the current social
networking platforms. We present an overview of our xBook framework in Section 3.
Section 4 and 5 discuss the implementation details of xBook’s client-side and server-
side components, respectively. Our labeling model is described in Section 6. Section
7 presents the evaluation results. We discuss the limitations of our work in Section
8. Finally, Section 10 provides a summary of the work.
3.1 Background
3.1.1 Social Networking Platforms
Social networks are the backbone of the online social life of many Internet users.
These networks have expanded their development scope by allowing third-party de-
velopers to write their own applications, which in turn can be accessed and executed
via the social network. An application is an entity that provides some value-added
service to the user, and it requires user’s profile data to perform its functionality. For





Figure 6: Application architecture for: (a) current platforms. (b) xBook platform.
(c) xBook on Facebook.
birth information.
Facebook is one popular network that has pioneered the concept of the social
network as a platform. The applications bring value both to the platform and its
users in providing new features. Applications are deployed on their own servers and
Facebook only acts as a proxy for integrating the applications’ output to its own pages.
The growing popularity of applications on Facebook has enticed other networks, such
as Google’s Orkut, to start supporting applications. The Orkut platform model is
based on the OpenSocial framework [20]. OpenSocial provides a set of APIs for its
partner sites (which it refers to as “containers”) to implement. An application that is
built for one container should be able to run with few modifications on other partner
sites. The APIs allow third parties to have access to the social graph and personal
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user data.
For the rest of the chapter, we use the Facebook case as an example; similar
concepts apply to other social networking platforms.
3.1.2 Privacy Issues with Current Designs
Facebook supports customized policies for user-user access control, but currently pro-
vides no control on what user profile data can be accessed by third party applications.
Applications run on their own servers that have no control administered by Facebook
(Figure 6(a)). Applications need data to perform their functionality; they can request
user data from the social platform and store it at their own servers. Facebook discour-
ages storing user data on the application’s own servers by barring it in their license
agreement [10], but there is no way of enforcing it in Facebook’s current architecture.
Application developers have access to a user’s data even when they are not friends
with the user. Unlike a regular friend relationship, this relationship is neither sym-
metric nor transparent: the application developer has access to the user’s information,
but the user does not necessarily know who the application developer is.
Before adding an application, the users are required to agree to a service agreement
that allows the application to have access to their profile data. This general agreement
is presented for every application, and no other specific information is provided about
the application. Since a majority of the applications are known not to exploit users’
personal data, the users tend to add any application, effectively defeating the purpose
behind the service agreement. Additionally, second-degree permissions that allow
applications to have access to the profiles of the users’ friends add another layer of
complexity.
There have been several reported incidents where users’ information was leaked
due to a vulnerability in the application [92]. The platform is trusting all third party
developers, but the trust is misplaced since there is no restriction on who is allowed to
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develop an application. One of the most popular Facebook applications, TopFriends,
had a vulnerability that allowed any user of TopFriends to see the profile of another
user, even if they are not friends with each other [92]. Private information of some high
profile users was leaked. Facebook’s response to this controversy was that they expect
third party applications to follow their policies, which is not acceptable considering
that there is no effective way to police the application developers.
User data has a lot of commercial value to marketing companies, competing net-
working sites, and identity thieves. Therefore, it is not surprising that many ap-
plications have been observed to intentionally leak user data to external parties for
profit [67]. Other surveys have also discovered similar violations based on an appli-
cation’s externally-visible behavior [55]. The situation could be even worse as it is
not feasible to determine how many other applications violate the user’s privacy with
internal data collection.
Social networking sites have a responsibility to protect user data that has been
entrusted to them. The current approach is to legally bind the third parties using a
Terms of Service (TOS) agreement [9]. However, it is not possible to monitor the path
of information once the information has been released to these parties. Therefore,
social networks can not rely on untrusted third parties following their TOS agreements
to protect user privacy. Instead, privacy policies should be enforced by the platform
and applied to all data that has been entrusted to the social networking site. Our
platform design, xBook, is one step forward in this direction.
Felt et al. [55] have proposed a solution to proxy the user information in the form
of tags to the third-party applications. These applications do not have access to user
data and instead use pre-defined tags to format their output being displayed to the
user. Their solution limits the capability of some important and popular applications,
such as the horoscope application, that perform processing on user data beyond just
displaying it. Our work enforces no such restriction on the application behavior.
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3.2 xBook Overview
xBook is an architectural framework for building social networks that prevents un-
trusted third-party applications from leaking users’ private information. The appli-
cations are hosted on xBook’s trusted platform (Figure 6(b)), and xBook provides
complete mediation for all communication to and from these applications.
In a social network setting, an application might communicate with entities outside
the xBook system, called external entities, to perform specific tasks. For example, the
horoscope application may communicate with www.tarot.com to receive horoscopes
for every sunsign. The application also encapsulates its own data or algorithm that
needs to be protected from untrusted users.
In the xBook framework, applications are designed as a set of components; a
component being the smallest granularity of application code monitored by xBook.
A component is chosen based on what information the component has access to and
what external entity it is allowed to communicate with. In the horoscope application,
one component communicates with www.tarot.com and has no access to user data.
Another component has access to user’s birthday, but does not communicate with
any external entity.
From an end user’s perspective, the applications are monolithic as the user does
not know about the components. At the time of adding a particular application,
the user is presented with a manifest that states what user profile data is needed
by the application and which external entity will it be sharing this data with. For
example, horoscope’s manifest would specify that it does not share any information
with any external entity. Note that the horoscope application does not need to reveal
that it communicates with www.tarot.com as no user information is being sent to
www.tarot.com. The user can now make a more informed decision before adding the
application. Admittedly, the user will need to make a trust decision with respect to
the parties with which the application shares user data, but these external parties
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Figure 7: Typical life cycle of an application in xBook.
can be expected to be larger and better branded entities providing internet services,
such as Google for ads, Yahoo for maps, etc.
Figure 7 shows a typical life cycle of an application. The developer of an appli-
cation decides on the structure of the components for that application and during
the application’s deployment on xBook, he specifies the information required by each
component and the external entity a particular component needs to communicate
with. xBook uses this information to generate the manifest for the application. As
shown in the figure, a manifest is basically a set that specifies all of the application’s
external communications (irrespective of the components) along with the user’s pro-
file data that is shared for each communication. Additionally, the xBook platform
ensures that all of the application’s components comply with the user’s privacy policy
and the manifest approved by the user. We discuss this further using the case study
of an example application in Section 3.5.3.
The division of an application into multiple components allows the application
writer to develop different functionality within an application that rely on different
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Figure 8: xBook architecture shown along with sources of potential leaks.
pieces of the user profile. For example, let us consider an application that requires a
user’s information to generate a customized profile for the user. It also requires his
address information to be passed to Google to generate a map showing the address.
In the application design of current social networks, the application would be able
to pass all information about the user to Google. In the xBook framework, the
application would be split into two components: the first component presents the
customized profile of the user, has full access to the user’s data and is not allowed
to communicate with Google; the second component encapsulates the user’s address
(with no mapping to the user’s profile) that is passed to Google to generate the map.
We discuss some example applications in Section 3.6.1.
Figure 8 shows a high-level design of our xBook framework. There are two parts of
the xBook platform, one that runs on the server-side and another that executes on the
client-side in the user’s browser (Figure 8). The application components, in turn, are
also split into client-side and server-side components. The components are written in
a safe subset of JavaScript, called ADsafe [2], which facilitates confinement of these
components in our xBook implementation. Any communication to and from the
components occurs by using xBook APIs, thereby allowing all such communication
to be mediated by xBook. Each component is associated with a privilege level or
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label that is derived from the application’s manifest. The platform mediates the
information flow between the components based on these labels (Section 3.5).
Both client-side and server-side components communicate with server-side storage
to retrieve data. There are two types of storage in xBook system: one for storing
xBook data that includes user profiles, and second for the data stored by the appli-
cation. While the structure of xBook data is known, the semantic of the application
data is internal to the application and hence unknown to the platform. All data fields
are labeled to control access by application components. These labels are assigned
based on high-level user-defined policies, such as a policy allowing access to only the
user’s friends, and the manifest approved by the user (Figure 7).
To store application data with unknown structure and semantics, xBook contains
a group of storage pools, where data is stored as a set of name-value pairs. An
application can have multiple storage pools, which could be for each user or for user-
independent data.
3.2.1 Leakage Prevention by xBook Design
In the current platform designs, a user’s information can be leaked in three major
ways: (1) applications can share user’s information with any third party, including
advertisers, or fraudulent parties [67], and as shown in Figure 6(a), there is no way
such a leak can be monitored in the current designs; (2) an application can pass
information of one application user to another user, breaking free from the platform
restriction that only friends can view a user’s profile. The reported vulnerability in
TopFriends allowed such a leak [92]; (3) the application can recreate the social graph
of all its users by connecting common friends as edges in the graph.
xBook’s design enforces complete mediation of all communication with the exter-
nal entities (Figure 6(b)), thus preventing these applications from leaking information,
effectively preventing (1) by design. A separate application instance is created for
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every user, and that instance only has a view of the data accessible to that user.
Data access is restricted to allowed user policies, such as access to friends. We medi-
ate any direct or indirect communication between the components of two application
instances, thereby deterring (2). (3) is prevented as no single component of an appli-
cation can have direct access to the data of all its users: a component can only access
an anonymized view of this data set (Section 3.4.2).
xBook, by design, solves most of the leakage problems of the current platforms.
However, there are still some potential mechanisms to leak information in our system.
We enumerate these possible threats in our formal model and address these threats
one by one throughout the chapter.
3.2.2 Formal Requirements
We present a formal model in this section that generalizes xBook’s mediation of
untrusted third party applications. We use this model to analyze possible attacks,
in terms of potential data leaks, under an adversary that deploys an application for
collecting users’ private data. We also identify a list of requirements that our system
should satisfy in order to defeat such attacks. These formal requirements drive the
design and architecture of our system.
Consider an application A consisting of a set of client-side components and a set
of server-side components. Let U be the set of all users of the platform and Y be
the set of all external entities. Suppose the application is allowed to communicate
to a set of external entities X ⊆ Y and a set of users Fu ⊆ U for a particular user
u ∈ U who is using the system. Now, we divide the set of all data items D into
three categories. First, there is a set of proprietary data or code of the application
represented as dA ⊆ D. Second, the set of data items du→x belonging to the user
u ∈ U that the application can transfer to the external entity x ∈ X . This set could
be in the form of user’s age, interests, photos, etc. Third, for an application instance
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of user ui ∈ U , the set of data items dui→uj is what the application can transfer to a
user uj ∈ Fui .
The platform wants to monitor the occurrence of a set of events E that can pass
information outside an application component. Any event e ∈ E is actively monitored
by intercepting the information flow path between the point of the event occurring and
the point where the event is handled. The platform monitors the content information
Ie contained in the event. We express the response of the platform when the particular
instance of the event has potential leaking information as R(Ie), which may include
filtering the content, blocking the communication, etc.
We can identify several sources of potential leaks in the xBook system (Figure 8).
The first class of attacks (A1) bypasses the active monitoring by the xBook platform
to leak private information from one client-side component to another, by creating a
prohibited flow. Such attacks exploit some of the abstract features of the development
language and the browser to leak information maliciously. In other words, A1 occurs if
response R(Ie) is not triggered even if the Ie contains private information content that
is being leaked. Similar leaks (A2) are possible on the server-side where application
components can break out of the sandbox to create a prohibited channel with other
components. In addition, some attacks (A3 and A4) can occur during a component’s
access to data store, where the component gains access to restricted user or application
data. Leaks (A5) can also occur in the communication between client-side and server-
side components. Other attacks (A6 and A7) leak private information to entities
outside the system. The leaks could be to an x ∈ Y that is prohibited (x /∈ X), or it
could be leaking restricted piece of information d ∈ D to an entity via communication
that is allowed by the system, i.e., for x ∈ X, d /∈ du→x for a user u ∈ U .
We completely forbid cross-application communication, effectively preventing leaks
across applications. We also prevent direct communication between server-side com-
ponents, only allowing them to communicate via storage, thereby preventing attacks
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of type A2. We mediate other communication paths based on the labels of the com-
municating parties (Section 3.5). We address all other identified classes of attacks in
Section 3.6.3. The requirements of an ideal social networking platform that guides
the xBook design are as follows:
• Response R(Ie) is invoked if Ie contains prohibited private information. In
other words, the platform should be able to monitor any event that might be
potentially leaking information, and should take action to prevent such leaks.
• Applications can invoke an event e iff e ∈ E, i.e., applications are restricted to
a limited set of events for passing information to external entities.
• Application component having access to user u’s private data d can send infor-
mation to an external entity x ∈ Y iff x ∈ X and d ∈ du→x. In other words,
the platform should enforce user policies by limiting the communication to only
allowed external parties and passing only allowed information to these parties.
• Application component having access to user ui’s private data d can send in-
formation to another component acting for user uj iff uj ∈ Fui and d ∈ dui→uj .
This means that the applications should inherit the user-user access control
policies of the platform.
• Application component x can access dA only if x ∈ S, i.e., only server-side
component of the application should have access to application’s proprietary
data.
We do not cover attacks against the browser in this work and assume that the
browser behaves non-maliciously. Although phishing attacks can entice the user in
choosing policies that might leak user information, we do not consider such attacks
here. This work enforces the policies specified by the user, and does not consider
social engineering attacks against the user.
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Figure 9: Client-side components in xBook design. C0, C1 and C3 correspond to
various components of a sample application.
3.3 Client-side Components
The client-side of the xBook platform and the client components of the applications
run within the web browser. The components are further divided into two parts: the
user interface (UI) part that is visible as part of the page to the user, and the non-UI
part that provides communication interfaces with the external parties and with the
server side. There is a one-to-one mapping between the non-UI and the UI parts, i.e.,
for every non-UI part, there is a corresponding UI part visible to the user (Figure 9).
A component is allowed to create another component. Information can flow dur-
ing the component creation and this opens up the possibility of an information leak.
We prevent such leaks by allowing components to create other components that are
at least as restricted as the creating component. This principle prevents the cre-
ating component from leaking information out of the system via a less restrictive
component.
At the front end, the creating component needs to delegate some screen space
to the created component. One challenge is to isolate the third-party application
components within the Document Object Model (DOM) of the webpage. A DOM
is a platform- and language-independent standard model for representing HTML or




The components of an application encapsulate different levels of private information
for the users. Therefore, these components need to be isolated from each other in
order to prevent information leaks. On the client side, the components form a part of
the DOM of the web page. The web page’s DOM may include multiple components
from one or multiple applications, apart from the platform’s DOM objects.
In the current browser specifications, any script in a page has intimate access to all
of the information and relationships of the page. As a result, the components are free
to access information about the DOM objects of other components. In order to confine
the components within their own control domain, we limit the application code to be
written in an object capability language called ADsafe [2]. In an object capability
language, references are represented by capabilities and objects are accessed using
these references. Other alternatives to ADsafe, such as Caja [91], are also available;
we decided in favor of ADsafe due to its simpler design and easier feature addition
and customization to meet our system needs.
ADsafe. ADsafe defines a subset of JavaScript that makes it safe to put guest
code (such as third-party scripted advertising or widgets) on any web page. ADsafe
removes features from JavaScript that are unsafe or grant uncontrolled access to
browser elements. Some of the features that are removed from JavaScript are global
variables and functions such as this, eval and prototype. It is powerful enough to
allow guest code to perform valuable interactions, while at the same time preventing
malicious or accidental damage or intrusion. The ADsafe subset can be verified
mechanically by static tools like JSLint [14].
ADsafe was initially developed to host untrusted advertising content safely on a
webpage. xBook’s isolation mechanism is designed with the code base taken from an
earlier version of ADsafe. We customized ADsafe by adding code for our component
confinement model and mediation based on our labeling model, to prevent information
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Figure 10: DOM wrapper implementation with sample functions.
leaks from the “sandboxed” application components. A recent version of ADsafe have
since implemented some of our features, but still would require changes to be useful
for our system.
One such example is that ADsafe runtime supports only a single level of confine-
ment: all subtrees of the untrusted guest applications exist as children of the trusted
web page code. One guest application does not have another guest application as a
child to its subtree. In contrast, xBook design requires nested DOM subtrees that
need to be isolated from each other. Figure 9 shows an example of a nested subtree,
where component C3 is a child of component C1, which in turn is a child of C0.
Our requirement is to restrict an application component to within a set of con-
nected DOM elements that form the component. In the current DOM specification,
any DOM element can parse through the tree of the page via its parent, children or
siblings. We enforce confinement by providing the component elements only with a
partial view of the page’s DOM and only indirect access to the DOM objects.
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Confinement Rule 1. One DOM element belonging to an application compo-
nent should only access another DOM element of the page (that includes accessing
its properties, adding a new element to it, etc.) iff they both belong to the same
component.
As part of the implementation, xBook associates each component with a unique
DOM wrapper object at the time of creation. Figure 10 shows the partial code of our
DOM wrapper implementation. Before deploying an application, xBook verifies that
each component code is ADsafe compliant. The code must be wrapped in a <div>
element having an identifier, which forms the root of the component. xBook ensures
that this identifier is unique to the application page. The ADSAFE.go method gives
the component code access to the API object that maps to our DOM wrapper object.
The ADSAFE code ensures that the second parameter passed to the createDOMWrapper
function is equal to the identifier of the encapsulating <div> element, effectively
preventing the developer from faking the identity of the components. It also ensures
that the DOM wrapper instance gets the right identity of the component’s root node.
The wrapper allows an untrusted component to view DOM nodes simply as inte-
ger handles; the component has no direct access to the real DOM. To read or modify
the DOM, the component code passes the appropriate handles to the wrapper DOM
object using the xBook APIs, which in turn interacts with the real DOM. Addition-
ally, element creation and modification are administered using this component-specific
wrapper object. For example, createTextNode method in Figure 10 would return an
integer handle. Since a wrapper instance is identified by its root element <div> that
is unique, the DOM wrapper object restricts the untrusted component code to inter-
acting only with the portion of the document tree that belongs to that component.
All direct accesses to any real DOM elements are forbidden: the wrapper is the only
interface for accessing the elements and it is mediated by the xBook platform.
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3.3.1.1 Event Handling
Another possibility of an application breaking the confinement mechanism originates
from the way event handling is designed in the current DOM specification.
Every event has a target, i.e., the XML or HTML element most closely associated
with the event. An event handler is a piece of executable code or markup that
responds to a particular event. Any element of the DOM can register an event
handler to receive a particular event type. Since an event generated from within a
component can be received outside the component, the flow of events within a DOM
needs to be controlled by the xBook platform for any potential leaks.
In the current DOM implementation, it is possible to assign multiple handlers for
a given event. It allows a DOM element to capture events during either of the two
phases in the event flow. The event flows down from the root of the document tree
to the target element in the first phase called capture, then it bubbles back up to the
root in the bubbling phase. An element can receive the event only if it lies in the path
between the document root and the event target.
One of the goals of our event handling model is to keep the functionality of the
current DOM model (including preserving the concept of the two stages). Therefore,
we specify our event flow model as follows: for any application component, an element
can receive an event iff it lies in the path between the root of the component and the
target element for the event. We still need to restrict this access to a single component
so that no outside component can receive the event; we provide such a restriction by
the following confinement rule:
Confinement Rule 2. A DOM element belonging to an application component
can receive an event iff the event target belongs to the same component.
We implemented our event handling model using the DOM wrapper object intro-
duced in the previous section. As shown in Figure 10, the object makes a wrapper
to the event handling interface available to applications. The wrapper receives the
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event from the browser’s DOM implementation and filters the information presented
in the received event object before passing the event to the applications. Any infor-
mation about the real DOM elements, such as the handler to the target element, is
filtered; this prevents application’s component code from breaking the confinement.
The addEventListener method copies the received event e into new e while trans-
forming the real DOM element references to wrapped integer values. The xBook
platform mediates the event delivery and as a result, ensures that an event can only
be received by elements that belong to the same component that contains the target,
thereby enforcing the second confinement rule.
3.3.2 Communication with External Entities
It is common for the applications to communicate with external parties to perform
specific tasks. One typical example is the use of Google map APIs to generate maps
of some address known to the application [15]. In other cases, a user’s date of birth is
used by applications to contact external providers to generate horoscopes [7]. What
we achieve in our architecture as compared to the existing social networking platforms
is that we enforce the applications to make these communications explicit so that more
informed decisions can be made. The user or the platform can decide on the policies
regarding which external entities are allowed to receive what piece of the user’s private
information. These policies could be coarse-grained for all applications of a user or
fine-grained specific to each application. xBook ensures that the information flows
from a specific application component to an external entity according to the defined
policies.
There are two kinds of communication flows that can happen in our system:
Symmetric communication in which the response is received by the requesting
component. This is a typical case for most client-server communication in which
there is a two-way exchange of information between the two parties.
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Asymmetric communication in which the response is not received by the compo-
nent that made the request, but is handled by another component of the application.
Our motivation for supporting this type of communication is to enable some specific
application scenarios. One motivating example is the advertising scenario where ad-
vertisements are generated by external parties based on the information passed to
them: Google generating advertisements based on the address passed to it. These
external party advertisements are typically in the form of links that users click to
access the related site. If we design this scenario using symmetric communication,
these advertising links would not work, since the receiving component has been re-
stricted to communicate only with Google and not any other party. In order to solve
this problem, we can create another application component that is considered part of
Google’s trust domain; since Google servers are unconfined or public from xBook’s
point of view, the created component is also unconfined. We do not allow any other
application component to peek into this new component or disrupt its integrity. Since
we are only showing Google’s view in this component and the application is not al-
lowed to change this component, this component maintains the trust level of Google.
The new component is placed in an iframe with its own DOM and hence cannot
communicate with any other component. However, since the component is uncon-
strained, it is allowed to communicate with any external entity and as a result, the
advertising links would work.
3.3.3 Communication between Components: Message Passing Interface
xBook exposes a one-way message passing API that the components use to pass
messages to other components. We implement this interface using the DOM wrapper
object as shown in Figure 10. The platform mediates this communication and ensures
that the information flow model is enforced. Since each component is associated with
a unique wrapper object that is used to send the message (Section 3.3.1), the sending
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component of the message can not fake its identify to fraudulently pass the informa-
tion flow checks: as seen in Figure 10, the value of currentUser and sender’s compID
are implicitly provided by the wrapper object to xBook’s sendMessage function. A
component can register a message listener with the platform through the xBook API.
Any message intended for a particular component is delivered to its message listener.
Since the platform knows the identity of each component, it makes sure that the
message is delivered to the right component.
The purpose of our message passing interface is to allow xBook-mediated commu-
nication among untrusted components of an application, while still preventing cre-
ation of any hidden channels. To this end, we needed to evaluate some of the features
of JavaScript that gives application writers alternatives to pass hidden information
in the messages.
JavaScript is a weakly typed language and allows any property to be added to any
object. For example, an object message can take a property foo using message.foo
= value; where value could be a number, string or any other object type. Since all
application components run in the same scope, a component can pass information to
another component if it has access to an object of that component. Let us assume that
a component C1 is allowed to talk to another component C2 as per the information
flow policies, but C2 can not communicate to C1. Effectively, we have a one-way
communication channel from C1 to C2. If C1 passes the object message to C2, the
platform can observe message, but cannot identify the object handler foo being
passed. C2 can pass information to C1 by writing to this handler.
We counter such leaks by limiting the message passing to being a JSON con-
tainer [13], that is pure data. A JavaScript JSON container is a collection of key/value
pairs or an array of values. These key/values are limited to pure data types such as
string or numbers. We make a copy of the JSON object and pass the copy to guar-
antee that there are no additional properties in the passed object. This solution is
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also effective against attacks by a message sender that use getters and setters.
The simplest way of designing the message passing interface is to pass messages
from a source to a destination in a single thread of execution. This option opens up
the possibility of a covert communication channel from a more restricted to a less
restricted component. For example, let us consider that a less secret component C0
is passing multiple messages to a more secret component C1. Because of the single-
threaded non-preemptive nature of JavaScript, C1 will complete processing the first
message before the control goes back to C0. This creates a covert timing channel
from C1 to C0. The amount of time taken by C1 can be observed by C0 and C1 can
change this time to pass the desired information bits to C0.
We reduce the effect of this timing channel by making the message passing in-
terface asynchronous. We achieve asynchronous behavior by implementing a global
queue for message passing that is shared among all the components of an applica-
tion. The receiving components register listeners with the platform in order to receive
messages. A timer event dequeues an available message and delivers it to the mes-
sage listener of the target component of the message. Note that addressing all covert
channels in our system is beyond the scope of this thesis; we discuss this further in
Section 4.4.
3.4 Server-side Components
The server-side of the application contains the main functionality for typical appli-
cations. It follows a familiar web server model where a server-side component is
instantiated for every client request.
Besides the regular user-specific components on the server side, there are certain
components that are user independent and works on non-user data or user public
data. These components perform two tasks: First, they communicate with external
parties to provide functionality independent of the user data. Second, they handle
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statistical aggregation on user data sets. We discuss declassification based on data
anonymization in Section 3.4.2.
The server components also protect application proprietary data that needs to be
declassified before sending it to the client. The threat model is reversed in this case:
the applications do not trust the user for their data, so they protect their internal
data from being leaked to the users. For example, an application might be giving
horoscope predictions to users based on their birth date, but it wants to protect the
data or algorithm used for such predictions.
There is no direct communication between the server-side components: all such
communication happens via application-specific storage. The platform ensures that
the information flow is enforced while accessing the database. The platform also
administers the communication with external parties and client-side as allowed by
the labeling system.
3.4.1 Component Confinement
The server-side components need to be isolated from each other. The server-side of
xBook mediates all communication flowing in and out from these components. There
are several options available for server-side isolation. Operating system isolation
mechanisms [25, 104] can be used to sandbox the application components. Another
option is a language level confinement similar to the client-side isolation with options
like Caja (JavaScript) [91], ADsafe (JavaScript) [2] and JoeE (Java) [59] available.
We use ADsafe on the server-side in order to have the same language for developing
application components for both client and server.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to port ADsafe to the server
side. We had to make some modification to the ADsafe object to implement our
server-side xBook APIs and to perform checking of the information flow labels. Each
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server-side component holds a unique handle to the modified ADsafe object, and ac-
cess is restricted to the set of APIs provided by the modified ADsafe object. The
modified ADsafe object is conceptually similar to the DOM wrapper object on the
client side, but is customized to work in the server-side environment. The plat-
form verifies the validity of the information flow before any access is granted. The
JavaScript execution environment is provided by Helma [11], a popular open source
web application framework.
3.4.2 Anonymized Statistics
xBook ensures that no user data is leaked against the user’s policies. A particular
instance of an application can only have access to profile data that belongs to the
user and only his friends. Different instances of the applications cannot share data
due to the restrictions posed by xBook’s labeling system.
It is desirable for some applications to have a view of all its users so that some
statistical results can be published for the whole application. In other words, a
component of the application needs to receive data of all the application users and still
should be able to share these statistics as output to all users, crossing the boundary
of friends.
In order to facilitate this case, we are exploring a three-step anonymization algo-
rithm that provides conservative access to data for the applications. Currently, case
1 and 3 have been implemented, case 2 will be explored as part of our future work.
Case 1. If an application component requests a single field of user information for all
application users, it is given access to the requested set in an unmodified form, but
in a random order of sequence.
Case 2. If an application component requests multiple fields of user information for
all application users, it is given access to the requested set in a form generated by
anonymizing the original dataset and then randomizing the resulting tuples’ order
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of sequence. We plan to leverage some of the existing work [40, 89, 112] to generate
the anonymized statistics. We acknowledge that providing security in anonymity and
statistical queries is a challenging problem and has its own limitations [30, 89]. Ad-
dressing these limitations is orthogonal to our work and is not the focus of this thesis.
Case 3. Applications can also request the xBook platform for statistics on unanonymized
data. This gives the applications more accurate statistics as compared to case 2, where
some fields might be filtered or altered to preserve anonymity. xBook provides a lim-
ited list of such operations, including aggregation, maximum and minimum value over
one or multiple fields.
Discussion. Anonymizing the data might limit some applications that rely on
the original data for their functionality. One such example is an application that
plots the location of a user’s friends on Google maps, and would need to pass names
and addresses of the user’s friends to Google. The application also makes subsequent
queries to Google (for example, to build a Google calendar of friends’ birthdays).
If the data is anonymized, the application might not produce completely accurate
results.
On the other hand, if Google is provided with unanonymized data, it can use the
data to cross-reference and identify the friends. This is a conflict between privacy and
functionality. If functionality is preferred and unanonymized information is passed
to external entities, user’s personal information can be leaked. In such a case, our
xBook design, at the minimum, enforces the applications to explicitly declare all
external communication (including the data that will be transferred). Based on such




The xBook platform tracks and enforces information flow using a labeling system
defined based on existing models [51,82,98,140]. All system abstractions are layered
on top of two types of entities – active and passive. Application components represent
active entities that actively participate in label compatibility checks; database entries
are passive entities. Every active entity corresponds to a principal and a label; passive
entities only have a label.
We do not enforce information flow at the language level [98], but instead at the
level of application components and database entries. There are multiple reasons for
this choice: (1) it is simpler for the application programmers as they do not need
to learn a new language or perform fine-grained code annotations, (2) information
flow on a language like JavaScript with dynamically created source code may not
be feasible, and (3) run-time information flow at fine-grained language level would
probably be expensive as compared to a much coarser level of components.
The label specifies the secrecy level of an entity. It represents what information
is contained in a passive entity and what information the active entity currently has
or will read. The entity’s principal defines whether the entity has declassification
privileges over the label. xBook labels originated along the lines of the language
based labels in Jif [98]. Labels represent the confidentiality or secrecy level of an
entity in the system. Integrity labeling is not the focus of this work since we are
focusing on privacy.
A label L is represented as a set of tags, with each tag having one principal as
owner o and another set of principals called readers R(L, o). The owner is the principal
whose data was observed in order to construct the data value. The readers represent
principals to whom the owner is willing to release the information. An example of a
typical label is L = {o1 : r1, r2; o2 : r2, r3}, where O(L) = {o1, o2} denote the owner
set for the label and readers sets are R(L, o1) = {r1, r2} and R(L, o2) = {r2, r3}.
61
In the xBook system, principals represent the identities of various entities in the
labeling model. There are five types of principals in our system:
• C(ai, uj) and S(ai, uj) represents the client-side and server-side components for
an application ai specific to a user uj.
• C(ai) and S(ai) represents user-independent client-side and server-side compo-
nents for an application ai.
• uj represents the entities that the user uj is in complete control of. Once the
user uj is logged into the xBook system, the user’s browser is assigned the
principal uj.
• ⊤, ⊥ where ⊤ is highest priority principal in the system and is allotted to
the xBook platform. For the sake of completeness, ⊥ is the least privileged
principal.
• External entities also have principal names that contain the hostname and op-
tionally the scheme and port (like in URLs). For example, https://www.examp-
le.com:8888 represents one such principal.
Our model assumes static labels for the entities and information flows from one
entity to another if allowed by the label comparison of the end points. Information
can flow from one label L1 to another label L2 only if L2 is more restricted than L1
denoted as L1  L2.
Restriction. L1  L2 ⇐⇒ O(L1) ⊆ O(L2) and ∀o ∈ O(L1), R(L1, o) ⊇ R(L2, o)
3.5.1 acts-for Hierarchy
To facilitate easier conversion of user policies to low-level labels, system entities are
statically labeled. We decided on immutable labels since it improves usability of
the application programming model from the perspective of the application program-
mer. Unexpected runtime failures can occur when labels of components change at
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Figure 11: Label hierarchy in xbook.
runtime [82]. With immutable labels one can statically verify that all the communi-
cation dependencies with respect to other components, external entities, storage will
be satisfied.
Some principals have the right to act for other principals and assume their power.
The acts-for relation is transitive, defining a hierarchy or partial order of princi-
pals [51]. The right of one principal to act for another is predefined by the platform.
Figure 11 presents the acts-for relationship within the xBook system. This hierarchy
defines the priority of different principles in the system. The reasoning behind the
defined hierarchy is as follows:
• ⊤ defines the xbook platform and has the highest security label. As a result, it
can declassify any label.
• Any data sink or source that is not explicitly defined by xBook is modeled as
an unprivileged entity with label ⊥.
• The client-side components are given lower priority than server-side compo-
nents, because intuitively server-side components residing on xBook servers
are more trustworthy than client-side components. For example, S(a0, u0) has
higher priority over C(a0, u0) for application a0 and user u0. The server-side
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Algorithm 2 Label Compatibility Check Algorithm.
eL1 = (entity1 is a database) ? L1 : maxDeclassify(L1, P1)
eL2 = (entity2 is a database) ? L2 : maxRestrict(L2, P2)
if eL1  eL2 then




Figure 12: Algorithm to check if the information flow from entity1 to entity2 is
allowed.
components can declassify an application’s proprietary data, which has been
labeled in a manner such that it cannot be directly read by client-side compo-
nents.
• User-independent principals are at a lower priority than any user-specific prin-
cipal. This allows user-specific components to read user-independent data gen-
erated by an application, also effectively allowing users to read statistical data
generated for the whole application.
• Principals representing the end user are higher than the corresponding client-
side principals since the user controls the client.
3.5.2 Flow Enforcement
Information flows within the xBook system if the label of source is less restricted
than that of destination. Such flow restrictions have been proposed earlier in classical
information flow control models [34]. We introduce the concept of endpoints similar
to the Flume model [82]. Instead of changing the labels of the entities, for every
communication the source and the destination create an endpoint each to facilitate
the flow. The entity, based on its principal, can restrict or declassify its label and
allocate it to an endpoint for communication. While restricting a label means adding
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Figure 13: Typical Flows in xBook system with the corresponding labels. For every
component, the first parameter is the principal and the second is the label associated
with the component.
more owners and removing readers, declassification either adds some readers for an
owner o or removes the owner o. This relabeling can be done only if the principal of
the entity is higher than an owner o in the hierarchy.
Figure 12 shows our flow enforcement algorithm, where maxRestrict and maxDe-
classify are defined as:
• maxRestrict(L, P). O(L) = O(L) ∪ descendent(P ); ∀o ∈ descendent(P ):
R(L, o) = {}
• maxDeclassify(L, P). ∀o ∈ O(L): if (o ∈ descendent(P )) then O(L) =
O(L)− {o}
where descendent(P ) represents all descendents of a principal P in the acts-for hier-
archy, O(L) is the set of owners for label L and R(L, o) represents a set of readers
in label L for owner o. Intuitively, the communicating end points support the com-
munication with the sender declassifying its label to the maximum possible using
maxDeclassify and the receiver restricting its label using maxRestrict. Since the
information can only flow from a less restricted to a more restricted component, these
functions facilitate the flow of information.
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Some typical flows in the xBook system are depicted in Figure 13. To demonstrate
the validity of our algorithm, let us consider the example of the flow between the
client-side component C1 and the server-side component S1. For the flow from S1 to
C1,
eL1 = maxDeclassify({S(a0) :;⊤ : C(a0, u0)},
S(a0, u0)) = {⊤ : C(a0, u0)}
eL2 = maxRestrict({⊤ : C(a0, u0)}, C(a0, u0))
= {C(a0, u0) :;C(a0) :;⊤ : C(a0, u0)}
Recollecting the definition of restriction, we can see that eL1  eL2 , therefore S1
can send data to C1. Considering the reverse flow from C1 to S1,
eL1 = maxDeclassify({⊤ : C(a0, u0)}, C(a0, u0))
= {⊤ : C(a0, u0)}
eL2 = maxRestrict({S(a0) :;⊤ : C(a0, u0)}, S(a0, u0))
= {S(a0, u0) :;S(a0) :;C(a0, u0) :; (a0) :;
⊤ : C(a0, u0)}
We can see that eL1  eL2, i.e., C1 can send data to S1. Effectively, there is a
two-way communication between C1 and S1.
3.5.3 Case Study: Horoscope Application Lifecycle
An application’s lifecycle consists of three steps: the application being hosted by
xBook, a user adding the application and then the user accessing it.
Hosting. Before xBook accepts a new application, the developer needs to provide
the following information:
• The application provides the components to be deployed, in each case specifying
if the component is client-side or server-side and if it is user-dependent or not,
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what user data would the component require and which external entities and
other components will it communicate with. In our horoscope example, there
are three components: S0 communicates with www.tarot.com and requires no
user data; S1 requires user’s birthday; C1 is on the client-side and also requires
user’s birthday.
• The application also states that there are user-independent or user-dependent
storage pools and each is named declaratively by the application. This ensures
that the storage pool names do not leak any user information, as the applica-
tion has no user information at this time. For example, horoscope application
declares a storage pool for storing its application data generated by S0.
Based on the label of the user data, xBook derives the labels and the principals of
the components. The birthday field has a label {⊤ : C(ai, uj)}, therefore the following
labels are allocated to the horoscope components:
• S0 Principal: S(ai), Label: {S(ai) : }
• S1 Principal: S(ai, uj), Label: {S(ai) : ;
⊤ : C(ai, uj)}
• C1 Principal: C(ai, uj), Label: {⊤ : C(ai, uj)}
The principals define if the component is server-side or client-side, and if it is
user-dependent or not. The labels allow S1 and C1 to read the birthday field. S0’s
label allows it to declassify itself to be public to communicate with www.tarot.com,
and write to the storage pool that is given S0’s label. The storage pool label prevents
any of the client-side components (C1) from viewing this data, thereby protecting
application data from untrusted users. S1 is allowed to read from the storage pool.
The labels of S1 and C1 correspond to the labels of S1 and C1 respectively in Figure 13,
where i = 0 and j = 0. As we have observed in the last section, the labels of S1 and C1
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effectively allow a two-way communication channel. Thus, S1 can pass the results to
C1 that, in turn, can present a formatted form of the horoscope to the user’s browser.
Application Addition. When the user is adding the application, he is pro-
vided with a manifest that declares what information is passed to which external
entity. xBook derives the manifest from the component information provided by the
application developer. For example, since none of the components of the horoscope
application share any user information with any external entity, horoscope’s manifest
would specify that it does not pass any information to any external entity. Since the
user’s birthday is not shared with any external entity, the application does not need
to declare its need to access the birthday information.
Application Access. When the user is accessing an application, all user-specific
components are instantiated for that user, replacing the user wildcard in the template
of labels and principals with the user identifier. This enforces access control across
multiple users: access is only granted if it is aligned with the user’s privacy policy,
for example, access is granted to only user’s friends.
3.6 Evaluation
3.6.1 Prototype System and Example Applications
We developed a working prototype of the xBook system, which includes platform code
and APIs for developing third-party applications. We also implemented the labeling
model that enforces information flow control for the data flowing through the system
and prevents any information leaks. Our xBook platform consists of about 4300 lines
of JavaScript code.
We developed two sample applications using the xBook APIs (given in Table 5) to
show the ease and viability of application development in xBook. These applications
are similar in functionality to two popular Facebook applications: Horoscope [7] and
TopFriends [22].The horoscope application produces a user’s daily horoscope based
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on his birthday information. The utility application based on TopFriends produces a
customized profile for the user based on his complete profile information. It also gen-
erates a Google map showing the user’s home location on the map. The applications
are written in JavaScript using xBook APIs, with the horoscope application having
about 180 lines and the application based on TopFriends having around 480 lines of
code. We tested these applications against a series of synthetic scenarios, where these
applications tried to leak the user’s private information. Our tests showed that the
xBook system was successful in detecting and preventing all such leaks.
3.6.2 Porting xBook on Facebook
In order to show the practical viability of the system and to demonstrate that our
system can be incrementally deployed, we ported the xBook platform as an applica-
tion on Facebook. Since Facebook allows any application to have access to user data,
including their friends’ data, of any user adding the application, xBook as an “appli-
cation” is able to receive the data of the users agreeing to use the xBook platform.
Applications developed using xBook APIs can execute on top of xBook, while still
running on xBook servers. Since xBook act as an application for Facebook, xBook’s
response would be rendered as part of Facebook’s web page. Since the third party ap-
plications are encapsulated in the page forming xBook’s response, the output of these
applications would also be effectively rendered on Facebook (Figure 6(c)). Facebook
provides the data feed to xBook, which then enables access to this data for xBook
applications in a controlled manner through xBook APIs. Facebook’s user identity is
maintained within xBook.
We envision xBook to be assimilated into the Facebook platform with Facebook
providing two levels of application service. First, the current applications based on
current Facebook design would be supported. Second, applications that are developed
using xBook APIs are supported, with added privacy protection advantage. Users
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can be given the discretion to choose between the two options, and the users’ choice
can drive new application development on xBook.
3.6.3 Security Analysis
Our analysis shows that xBook prevents the applications from leaking any user infor-
mation. All of the documented leaks in the current social networks are prevented in
the xBook system. For example, the TopFriends leak [92] cannot happen in our sys-
tem because a separate application instance is created for every user. Each instance
only has view of the data accessible to that user and xBook mediates all cross user
data accesses.
We evaluated the privacy protection ability of our system in three steps. First,
we analyzed the security of the xBook design in view of the potential leaks specified
in the formal model (Section 3.2.2). Second, we developed a set of synthetic attacks
targeting the xBook framework and performed experiments to show that our proto-
type successfully prevents these attacks. Finally, we prove that xBook’s information
flow model ensures that information leaks cannot happen in the xBook design.
We first analyze the security of our prototype and show that all the attacks dis-
cussed in Section 3.2.2 will not succeed against our design. Attack type A1 is pre-
vented due to the various mechanisms developed in our system for client-side con-
finement (Section 3.3.1), such as component isolation, event handling, etc. A2 is
prevented by server-side confinement of application components, only allowing them
to communicate via storage. Leaks via A3 and A4 are inherently prevented by me-
diating the information flow from the database to application components with label
enforcement based on user-defined policies, and also by anonymizing data for sta-
tistical purposes (Section 3.4.2). A5 is also prevented by label enforcement before
the client-side request is passed to the server-side component and before response is
returned. Enforcing the confinement model to mediate the external communication,
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Leaks via the message passing interface A1
√








Client component retrieves more restricted infor-
mation from the server
A5
√
Leaks to an unknown external entity A6/A7
√




both in synchronous and asynchronous communication scenarios, prevents A6 leaks
(Section 3.3.2). Following the same lines, A7 is prevented on the server-side.
Second, we tested the ability of our prototype by creating synthetic exploits that
try to break out of xBook’s information flow control model to leak user information.
We developed a sample application to launch these attacks against our prototype; if
successful, these attacks allow the application to leak information to entities outside
the system. Table 3 contains the results of testing our prototype against a wide range
of these synthetic attacks. In all our experimental tests, xBook successfully prevented
the leaks before the information could be passed outside the system.
We can also prove that if xBook’s confinement mechanism is correctly enforced,
the information model ensures that no user information is leaked to external entities
(Theorem 1) and to any other user (Theorem 2) outside the user-defined policies.
Theorem 1. Given a set of policies P = D×X, where the application can pass user’s
information field d ∈ D to external entity x ∈ X, and assuming that the intended
confinement is enforced, the information flow model ensures that there is no possible
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leak outside the xBook system. In other words, if (d, x) /∈ P then ∀Ci : Ci 9d x,
where Ci are application components and Ci 9
d x shows that Ci can not pass data
item d to x.
Proof. Let C0, C1, · · ·Ck represents the information flow path of a data element d
from the xBook database to external entity x.
We present the proof by contradiction. Let us assume that C i can pass any
information (represented by ∗) to x, illustrated as C i ∗−→ x. This communication is
monitored by our xBook platform, but the platform does not know the semantics of
the information being passed.
Also, ∀i ∈ [0, k] : C i−1 ∗−→ C i =⇒ Li−1  Li (flow is a restriction)
C i
∗−→ x =⇒ Li  Lx
Therefore, Li−1  Lx =⇒ C i−1 ∗−→ x
Continuing this by induction, C0
∗−→ x
In our labeling model, the computational granularity is at the component level.
Therefore, we consider that ∀Ci : Output(Ci) = ̥(Input(Ci)) for any computation
̥.
For component C0, Input(C0) = d, Output(C0) = ∗ =⇒ ∗ = ̥(d)
Since the input to C0 is supplied by the xBook platform, and since (d, x) /∈ P,
C0 9∗ x.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, C i 9∗ x.
By definition, ∗ represents any information (including d). Therefore, C i 9d x.
Theorem 2. Given a set of user policies P (x) = D × U , where the application can
pass user x ∈ U ’s information field d ∈ D to another user y ∈ U , and assuming that
the intended confinement is enforced, the information flow model ensures that user-
user access control is enforced in the xBook system. In other words, if (d, y) /∈ P (x)
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Table 4: Performance results of various operations in typical xBook applications.
Application
User Server Time for label checks Over-
latency processing time (Number of checks) head
Horoscope 183.1ms 128.8ms 7.7ms (6) 4.2%
Map utility 111.4ms 51.2ms 3.5ms (2) 3.1%
then ∀Ci(x), Cj(y) : Ci(x) 9d Cj(y), where Ci(x) and Cj(y) are components of ap-
plication instance for user x and y, respectively.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 1.
3.6.4 Performance Estimates
xBook does not impose a substantial burden on the performance of the third party
applications. With an architectural framework of developing applications, it is dif-
ficult to accurately predict the impact of our design on the performance of these
applications as perceived by the user. To get a rough estimate of the cost of sup-
porting the xBook design and the overhead involved in our system, we conducted
some experiments with our sample applications, measuring latency at the user end
and overhead imposed by the mediating design of xBook.
The xBook server side is hosted on a 2.4GHz Pentium 4 machine with 512MB of
RAM. The requests are made from Firefox 3.0 browser on a 2.33GHz, 2GB RAM,
Pentium Core Duo laptop. Each test was run 10 times and values were averaged.
We define user latency as the difference in the time when the request is made at the
browser and the time at which the response is received by the browser. Table 4 shows
the time required by xBook’s information flow control in comparison to the user’s
overall latency. Server processing includes the application’s logic, database access to
retrieve required user data, and xBook flow checks, and is independent of the network
latency experienced by the application. We instrumented our code to derive the time
for performing label checks in the system, and measured overhead as a function of the
73
label checking time over the total latency experienced by the user. Our results show
that the overhead introduced by xBook’s label checks is considerably small: about 4%
for the horoscope application and 3% for the map utility marking user’s hometown
location on Google maps.
On a cluster of commercial servers with much better computational capacity, these
values will be even smaller. Although it is not possible to precisely determine the cost
of our approach without a large scale experiment, both the details of our design and
the results from these experiments, support the conclusion that xBook design would
not substantially increase the latency experienced by users.
3.7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the limitations of the application design in xBook and
address some of the challenges arising from the new requirements imposed by our
design.
Our xBook design imposes no limitations on applications that follow a “pull
model”, i.e., xBook would preserve the functionality of applications that only re-
ceive data from external entities without passing any private information to these
entities. Our horoscope application is an example of such as application: one public
component of horoscope pulls horoscope data from www.tarot.com and does not pass
any of the user’s profile information. Note that the xBook platform does not need
to sanitize the request parameters (in both GET and POST requests), as the com-
ponent making such requests has no user information that can be leaked. Another
component, which has access to the user’s birthday information, uses the data to
calculate the daily horoscope corresponding to the particular user. This component
has no communication with any external entity.
On the other hand, our design might limit some of the applications that require
data to be sent to external entities for receiving user-specific information. One typical
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example is the use of Google APIs to generate maps: it requires a location to be passed
to Google before the map is generated. In many cases, we expect these external
entities to be larger and well branded entities, such as Google, Yahoo, etc. Such cases
could be whitelisted after explicit approval from the user. Note that xBook makes no
recommendation about which websites can be trusted, including Google and Yahoo;
such trust decisions are made by an individual user from his own knowledge and
experiences. Our xBook system can keep track of these approvals across applications
for every user, so the users need to approve an interaction only once.
Any social networking application would follow either the pull model or the push
model to get data from external entities. In both cases, our platform enforces the
applications to make all such interactions explicit and allows the user to make a more
informed decision based on the information available. We argue that an application
using the pull model would be more acceptable to the users as it requires minimal
trust decisions from a user’s perspective. It is possible to transform many of the
current social networking applications that use the push model to start using the pull
model. We acknowledge that such a transformation would require some changes to
the application design, and in some cases, such transformations might not be practical
due to large download size of the required data. However, if enough users decide not
to use the application in view of privacy concerns, it would motivate the developers
to consider such a transition.
Our system also suffers from classical covert channels, e.g. timing, memory, pro-
cess, etc. However, in general these channels have limited bandwidth and viable
approaches such as randomizing the time (for example, the delivery time of our mes-
sage queue discussed in Section 3.3.3) can further limit their utilities. We plan to
study some of these channels as part of our future work.
Scalability of the applications is not a concern in our system: applications hosted
on clusters outside xBook would now be hosted on clusters inside the xBook platform.
75
The application developers are already paying for hosting their applications, in most
cases to third-parties or cloud owners like Amazon EC2 [3]. Thus, instead of the
developers paying to these parties, they would be paying to xBook for the hosting
service. xBook, in turn, can outsource the hosting to third-parties, still assuming
control of the hosted applications.
We also propose a hybrid model where only the application components that
require access to xBook’s private data needs to be hosted at the xBook servers.
Other public components can be controlled by the application developers on their
own servers. Such an approach is useful for many applications as research has shown
that a large number of applications do not use any private data to perform their
functionality [55].
3.8 Summary
We presented a novel architecture for a social networking framework, called xBook,
that substantially improves privacy control in the presence of untrusted third-party
application. Our design allows the applications to have access to user data to preserve
their functionality, but at the same time preventing them from leaking users’ private
information.
We developed a working prototype of the system as an application on Facebook.
We showed the viability of our system by developing sample applications using the
xBook APIs: these applications are similar in functionality to the applications on
existing social networks.
Our system shows promise in designing potentially valuable future applications,
that would require user data to provide more customized service to the user. The
growing popularity of social networks would attract increasing attention from attack-
ers because of the value of user information available in these networks. This user in-
formation not only has commercial value, but when combined with some anonymized
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public data such as medical records, might leak more sensitive information [99, 126].
The current design of social networking applications poses a serious threat to the
privacy of individuals that needs to be mitigated; the xBook platform is a major step
in protecting user privacy in social networking applications.
The concepts and designs provided in this chapter for social networking platforms
would similarly apply to other application platforms. Any effective solution to enforce
user-defined security and privacy needs to cover both the trusted applications and
untrusted third-party applications. Our two frameworks described in the last two
chapters, xAccess and xBook, together provide a comprehensive solution for user-
specified security policies and enforcement.
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Table 5: Set of xBook APIs exposed for application development.
createComponent(compId, size,
nodeHandle)




destroy the specified component
sendMessage(destCompId, message) send message to the destination component
addMessageListener(listenerFunction) add a message listener to the component
contactExternal(entityURL,
nodeHandle)
invoke the given URL with response received
as a child to the given node
readFromAppDB(attrName) get the value of the given attribute specific to
the application








returns the results of statisticsType operation
on fieldName
getAnonymizedStats(fieldNameList) returns the anonymized values of field-
NameList
createTextNode(text) create a text node
appendChild(nodeHandle,
childHandle)
add a child node to the specified node
removeChild(nodeHandle,
childHandle)
remove the child node of the specified node
getFirstChild(nodeHandle) returns handle of the first child of the specified
node
getLastChild(nodeHandle) returns handle of the last child of the specified
node
getNextSibling(nodeHandle) returns handle of the next sibling of the spec-
ified node
getPreviousSibling(nodeHandle) returns handle of the previous sibling of the
specified node
getParentNode(nodeHandle) returns handle of the parent node of the spec-
ified node
getElementById(elementId) return the virtual handle to the element node
only if it is within the component
createElement(elementTag) create a DOM element of the specified type
setAttribute(nodeHandle, attrName,
attrValue)





add an event listener to the given node with
specified arguments
hasChildNodes(nodeHandle) specifies if the given node has any child node
within the component
getNodeType(nodeHandle) returns the type of the specified node
getNodeName(nodeHandle) returns the name of the specified node




The security of client-side software, specifically the web browser, is critical to achieve
effective end-to-end security of web content. However, new security challenges emerge
for the web browsers as a result of the new developments behind Web 2.0. Web
browsers have gradually evolved from an application that views static web pages to
a rich application platform on which mutually distrusting web site principals co-exist
and interact [75, 128, 129]. Along the way, the browsers’ access control policies have
also been evolving, but unfortunately this happened in a piecemeal and ad-hoc fashion
alongside the introduction of new browser features (such as AJAX) or resources (such
as local storage). There have been no principles or invariants that a new access control
policy must follow or maintain. Consequently, numerous incoherencies in browsers’
access control policies exist, presenting hurdles for web programmers to build robust
web applications.
In this chapter, we examine the current state of browser access control policies,
uncover and analyze the incoherencies in these policies, and measure the cost of
eliminating them in today’s web.
An access control policy configures how a principal accesses certain resources. This
involves defining how principals are identified, how resources are labeled with princi-
pal IDs, and how these labels may be changed and handled at runtime. Unfortunately,
browsers often mismanage principals, resulting in access control inconsistencies. We
focus on three major sources of these problems: inconsistent principal labeling, inap-
propriate handling of principal label changes, and disregard of the user principal.
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Inconsistent principal labeling. Today’s browsers do not have the same prin-
cipal definition for all browser resources (which include the Document Object Model
(DOM), network, cookies, other persistent state, and display). For example, for the
DOM (memory) resource, a principal is labeled by the origin defined in the same
origin policy (SOP) in the form of <protocol, domain, port> [111]; but for the cookie
resource, a principal is labeled by <domain, path>. Different principal definitions
for two resources are benign as long as the two resources do not interplay with each
other. However, when they do, incoherencies arise. For example, when cookies be-
came accessible through DOM’s “document” object, DOM’s access control policy,
namely the SOP, undermines some of cookie’s access control policies (Section 4.1.3.1
gives a more detailed analysis).
Inappropriate handling of principal label changes. A web application is al-
lowed to change its principal’s label at runtime through the use of the document.domain
DOM property. Nevertheless, the access control state is often kept static and such “ef-
fective” principal IDs set by document.domain are disregarded. This leads to access
control incoherencies.
Disregard of the user principal. In this work, we introduce the concept of
a user principal in the browser setting. The user principal represents the user of a
browser. Sometimes, the user principal is disregarded in existing browsers’ access
control policies. Certain resources should belong to the user principal exclusively.
They include the user-private state such as clipboard and geolocation, user actions
like navigating back and forward in browsing history, and a browser’s UI including
the current tab. These resources should not be accessible by web applications without
user permission; otherwise, a web site could impersonate the user and violate user
privacy. Unfortunately, today’s DOM APIs expose some of these resources to web
applications.
To systematically analyze and uncover the incoherencies created by these three
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problem areas, we have devised a set of coherency principles and constructed tests to
check major browsers (including Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Google Chrome) for
violations of these principles and to uncover the incoherencies that ensue.
A major goal of our work is to evaluate the compatibility cost of removing un-
safe browser features that contribute to the incoherencies. To this end, we have
builtWebAnalyzer, a scalable, crawler-based browser-feature measurement framework
that can inspect a large number of web pages by rendering them in instrumented
browsers. WebAnalyzer captures the DOM interactions of a page by interposing
between the JavaScript engine and the DOM renderer, captures the protocol-level
behavior through an HTTP proxy, and analyzes the visual appearance of a page by
extracting its page layout.
Armed with WebAnalyzer, we have conducted measurements on the prevalence
of unsafe browser features over the most popular 100,000 web sites as ranked by
Alexa [27]. Our results pinpoint some unsafe features that have little backward com-
patibility cost and are thus possible to remove from current browsers without breaking
many sites. For example, we find that most APIs controlling user-owned resources, de-
scendant navigation, and incoherencies in XMLHttpRequest’s principal labeling have
low compatibility costs, whereas a substantial number of sites depend on “dangerous”
functionality provided by document.domain or transparent cross-origin overlapping
frames. Overall, we believe that by estimating the prevalence of unsafe features on
the web, our measurements can guide future browsers to make better security vs.
functionality trade-offs.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• A systematic, principal-driven analysis of access control incoherencies in today’s
browsers.
• Introduction of the user principal concept for the browser setting.
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• A comprehensive, extensible compatibility measurement framework.
• The first large-scale measurements on the compatibility cost of coherent access
control policies.
Chapter Organization. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 4.1 presents our systematic analysis of today’s browser access control policies and
enumerates access control incoherencies. Section 4.2 discusses our measurement mo-
tivation, tools, and infrastructure. Section 4.3 presents our measurement results and
gives recommendations on which unsafe policies can be eliminated with acceptable
compatibility cost. Section 4.4 discusses limitations of our approach, and Section 4.5
concludes.
4.1 An analysis of browser access control incoherencies
In this section, we present our systematic analysis of today’s browser access control
policies and enumerate their incoherencies.
4.1.1 Methodology
For a systematic analysis, we establish the following access control coherency princi-
ples to guide our search for incoherencies:
1. Each shared browser resource, i.e. a resource shared among multiple principals,
should have a principal definition (labeling of principals that share the resource)
and have an access control policy.
2. For each non-shared browser resource that is explicitly owned by a single prin-
cipal, the resource should have an owner principal with a specific label or be
globally accessible.
3. When two resources interplay, both resources should have the same principal
definition.
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This is because when two resources have different ways of labeling principals and
when they interplay, their respective access control policies can be in conflict.
4. All access control policies must consider the runtime label of the principals,
namely, the “effective” principal ID.
5. The user principal’s resources should not be accessible by web applications.
This is because when the user principal’s resources are accessible by web appli-
cations, the user’s privacy may be compromised or a web application could act
on the user’s behalf without the user’s knowledge.
We look for violations of these principles and check for incoherencies when viola-
tions take place. The pseudocode below illustrates our manual analysis process.
0 foreach (browser resources) {
1 if exists (access control) {
2 if !considers (effective principal ID)
3 check improper principal ID changes
4 } else
5 check if lack of policy is appropriate
6 }
7
8 foreach (pairs of resources) {
9 if (they interplay &&
10 the principal/owner labeling differs)
11 check resource interplay incoherencies
12 }
83
For each resource, we check whether it has an access control policy. If not, we
check whether the lack of policy is appropriate (line 5, for example, Section 4.1.5
illustrates on how some resources that belong to the user principal lack access control
considerations). If yes, we further check whether the access control policy considers
the effective principal ID that sites can change dynamically at render-time. If it does
not, then we check for incoherencies there (line 3, Section 4.1.4).
In addition, we go through all pairs of resources; if they interplay and if they have
the different principal definitions, we check for incoherencies (line 11, Section 4.1.3).
Careful readers may wonder what happens to the interplay of more than two resources.
Coherency in this context is a transitive property. That is, if a Resource 1 and
Resource 2’s access control policies are coherent (namely have the same principal
definitions) and that of Resource 2 and Resource 3 are coherent, then the access
control policies of Resource 1 and Resource 3 are also coherent since their principal
definitions should also be the same.
The enumeration of resources is done by manually browsing through IE’s source
code (more in Section 4.1.2). Our incoherency checks are done through test programs
on major browser versions.
Despite our effort to be comprehensive, it is possible that we miss some browser
resources or miss some interplays among the resources. We hope our work to be a
start for a community effort on mapping out the full set of browser access control
policies.
4.1.2 Browser resources
In this section, we enumerate all types of browser resources. A browser resource may
be shared among (some definition of) principals or may not be shared and is explicitly
owned by some principal. Table 6 shows the shared resources and their respective
principal definitions. Table 7 shows non-shared resources and their respective owners.
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Table 6: Shared browser resources and their respective principal definitions. *Display
access control is not well-defined in today’s browsers.
Shared resources Principal definition




display SOP origin and dual ownership *
Table 7: Non-shared browser resources and their respective owner principal. *Access







We now describe each resource, their principal or owner definition, and its access
control policy in turn.
A DOM object is a memory resource shared among principals labeled with SOP
origins, namely, <protocol, domain, port>. The access control policy of DOM objects
is governed by SOP [111], which mandates that two documents from different origins
cannot access each other’s HTML documents using the Document Object Model
(DOM), which is the platform- and language-neutral interface that allows scripts to
dynamically access and update the content, structure and style of a document [52].
A cookie is a persistent state resource. The browser ensures that a site can only
set its own cookie and that a cookie is attached only to HTTP requests to that
site. By default, the principal is labeled with the host name and path, but with-
out the protocol and the port number [60, 81], unlike SOP origins. For example,
if the page a.com/dir/1.html creates a cookie, then that cookie is accessible to
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Table 8: Access control policy for a window’s landlord and tenant (being a different
principal from the landlord) on Gazelle, IE 8, Firefox 3.5, and Chrome. RW*: The
URL is readable only if the landlord sets it. If the tenant navigates to another page,
landlord will not see the new URL. W*: the landlord can write pixels when the tenant







position (x,y,z) RW RW RW RW
dimensions (height, width) RW RW RW R RW R
pixels W* W* RW RW RW
URL location W W RW* RW RW RW
a.com/dir/2.html and other pages from that dir/ directory and its subdirectories,
but is not accessible to a.com/. Furthermore, https://a.com/ and http://a.com/
share the cookie store unless a cookie is marked with a “secure” flag. Non-HTTPS
sites can still set “secure” cookies in some implementations, but cannot read them
back [31, 76, 138]. A web programmer can make cookie access less restrictive by set-
ting a cookie’s domain attribute to a postfix domain or the path name to be a prefix
path.
Local storage is the persistent client-side storage shared among principals defined
by SOP origins [72].
Session storage is storage for a tab [72]. Each tab has a unique set of session
storage areas, one for each SOP origin. The sessionStorage values are not shared
between tabs. The lifetime of this storage is the same as that of the tab.
Display does not have a well-specified access control policy in today’s browsers and
standards (corresponding to line 5 in our pseudocode). Our earlier work Gazelle [129]
specified an access control policy for display (and Gazelle further advocated that
this policy be enforced by the browser kernel, unlike existing browsers). In Gazelle’s
model, a web site principal delegates its display area to another principal in the form
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of cross-domain iframes (or objects, images). Such an iframe (window) is co-owned by
both the host page’s principal, called landlord, and the nested page’s principal, called
tenant (both labeled with SOP origins). Principals other than the landlord and the
tenant have no access permissions for the window. For the top-level window, the user
principal owns it and plays the role of its landlord. Gazelle’s policy further specifies
how landlord and tenant should access the four attributes of a window, namely the
position, dimensions, pixels, and URL location. This specification guarantees that
the tenant cannot interfere with the landlord’s display, and that the tenant’s pixels,
DOM objects, and navigation history are private to the tenant. Gazelle’s policy is
coherent with SOP. In Table 8, we summarized the access control matrix for Gazelle,
IE 8, Firefox 3.5, and Chrome 2. The access control of the URL location attribute
corresponds to the navigation policy of a browser. Descendant navigation policy
allows navigating a descendant window regardless of its origin; this was advocated
and implemented over several browsers [32]. Gazelle’s policy is child navigation policy.
(We elaborate in Section 4.1.3.3 that the descendant navigation policy is at conflict
with DOM’s SOP.) Our tests indicate that Firefox 3.5 and Chrome 2 currently support
the child policy, while IE 8 supports the descendant policy. All major browsers allow
any window to navigate the top-level window, while Gazelle only allows top-level
window navigation from the top-level window’s tenant and the user.
XMLHttpRequest allows a web site principal to use scripts to access its document
origin’s remote data store by issuing an asynchronous or synchronous HTTP request
to the remote server [134]. XMLHttpRequest2 [135] and XDomainRequest have been
recently proposed and implemented in major browsers to allow cross-origin commu-
nications with remote servers, where HTTP authentication data and cookies are not
sent by default. These networking capabilities are not shared and strictly belongs to
a web site principal labeled with a SOP origin.
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PostMessage is a recently proposed client-side cross-origin communication mecha-
nism that is now implemented in all major browsers. This is also a web site principal’s
capability which is not shared with any other principals.
The last three resources in the non-shared resource table, namely clipboard,
browser history, and geolocation, all belong to the user principal, and web appli-
cations should not be able to access them directly. However, they are all accessible
by scripts through the DOM API, causing problems that we describe in Section 4.1.5.
4.1.3 The interplay of the resources
From the enumeration of the resources and their respective principal or owner defini-
tion in the above section, we derived the following problematic pairs of resources,
where the two resources interplay and their principal or owner definitions differ:
DOM-cookie, cookie-XMLHttpRequest, and DOM-display. We elaborate on these
interplays below.
DOM and cookies interplay because scripts are able to create or modify cookies
by using the document.cookie property in the DOM API.
With no protocol in cookie’s principal definition, cookies are vulnerable to infor-
mation leaks. A cookie intended for a secure HTTPS principal can be passed over
HTTP and be exposed to network attackers. This can be prevented by setting the
cookie with the “secure” flag. However, a ”secure” cookie can still be set by an
HTTP response and be accessed by scripts belonging to an HTTP page as long as
their domains are the same. Additionally, different services running on different ports
of the same domain can access each other’s cookies. Moreover, the path protection
of cookies becomes ineffective as a script from a different path can access the cookie
based on SOP.
88
Figure 14: Incoherency arises from the interplay between the access control policies
of DOM and cookies
4.1.3.1 DOM and Cookies
The interplay between DOM and cookies also allows the scripts to set the effective
domain of a cookie to any suffix of the original domain by setting the domain attribute
of the cookie. This can lead to inconsistencies in the current browsers. Figure 14
shows a scenario in which such inconsistencies lead to an undefined behavior in the
browsers. In this example, a cookie named “stockCookie” with value “buy” is stored
in the cookie store for the domain a.com. A script injected into a compromised page
belonging to x.a.com can create another cookie with the same name but with a
different value “sell” while setting its domain attribute to a.com.
While this leads to a compromised state in the current browsers, different browsers
deviate in their behavior creating further inconsistencies in the web applications sup-
porting multiple browsers. Firefox 3 sets this cookie with a domain value of .a.com
resulting in multiple cookies with the same name in browser’s cookie store. The
browser attaches both cookies (genuine cookie with domain a.com and evil cookie
with domain .a.com) to any server requests to a.com. The server only receives the
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cookie’s name-value pair without any information about its corresponding domain.
This results in the server receiving two cookies with the same name. Since server-side
behavior is not defined in case of duplicate cookies [138], it leads to inconsistent state
at a.com’s server. In case of IE 8, the original cookie value is overwritten and only
the wrong cookie value is received by the server.
4.1.3.2 Cookies and XMLHttpRequest
Cookies and XMLHttpRequest interplay because XMLHttpRequest can set cookie
values by manipulating HTTP headers through scripts. XMLHttpRequest’s owner
principal is labeled by the SOP origin, while cookie has a different principal definition
(Section 4.1.2).
If a server flags a cookie as “HttpOnly”, the browser prevents any script from
accessing (both reading and writing) the cookie using the document.cookie property.
This effectively prevents cookies being leaked to unintended parties via cross-site
scripting attacks [93].
The purpose of HttpOnly cookies is that such cookies should not be touched by
client-side scripts. However, XMLHttpRequests are created and invoked by client-
side JavaScript code, and certain methods of the XMLHttpRequest object facilitate
access to cookies: getResponseHeader and getAllResponseHeaders allow reading
of the “Set-cookie” header, and this header includes the value of HttpOnly cookies.
Another method, setRequestHeader, enables modification of this header to allow
writing to HttpOnly cookies.
Some of the latest browsers have tried to resolve this issue with varied success.
IE 8 currently prevents both read and write to cookies via “Set-cookie” header, but
still allows access via “Set-cookie2” header [73]. Firefox has also recognized and fixed
the issue for cookie reads: their fix prevents XMLHttpRequest from accessing cookie
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headers of any response, whether or not the HttpOnly flag was set for those cook-
ies [97]. This is a bold step taken by Firefox, as our results show that a considerable
number of web pages still read cookie headers from XMLHttpRequest (Section 4.3).
However, we have still observed the writing issue with HttpOnly cookies using Firefox
3.5. A script can set a cookie with the same name as the HttpOnly cookie and can
have a different value set using the setRequestHeader method. This results in a
duplicate cookie being sent to the server, thus creating an inconsistent state on the
server side.
4.1.3.3 DOM and Display
One incoherence takes place on URL location of a window. The descendant navigation
policy (Section 4.1.2) is at conflict with DOM’s SOP. Descendant navigation policy
allows a landlord to navigate a window, a resource created by its descendant through
a DOM API, even if the landlord and the descendant are different principals. This
gives a malicious landlord more powerful ways to manipulate a nested, legitimate sites
than just overdrawing: with overdrawing, a malicious landlord can imitate a tenant’s
content, but the landlord cannot send messages to the tenant’s backend in the name
of the tenant. As an example attack, imagine that an attacker site nests a legitimate
trading site as its tenant. The trading site further nests an advisory site and uses a
script to interact with the advisory window to issue trades to the trading site backend
(e.g., making a particular trade based on the advisory’s recommendation shown in
the URL fragment). With just one line of JavaScript, the attacker could navigate the
advisory window (which is a descendant) and create unintended trades.
Another conflict lies in the access control on the pixels of a window. DOM objects
are ultimately rendered into the pixels on the screen. SOP demands non-interference
between the DOM objects of different origins. However, existing browsers allow inter-
mingling the landlord’s and tenant’s pixels by overlaying transparent tenant iframes
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Figure 15: Lack of effective principal ID consideration in cookie’s access control
policy
on the landlord, deviating from the non-interference goal of SOP. This enables an
easy form of clickjacking attacks [46]. In contrast, Gazelle advocates cross-principal
pixel isolation in accordance with SOP (Table 8, row “pixels”).
4.1.4 Effective Principal ID
Browsers allow cross-principal sharing for “related” sites by allowing sites to change
their principal ID via the document.domain property [111]. This property can be set
to suffixes of a page’s domain to allow sharing of pages across frames. For example,
a page in one frame from x.a.com and a page from www.a.com initially cannot com-
municate with each other due to SOP restrictions. This is one of the few methods for
cross-origin frames to communicate before the advent of postMessage [24]. However,
changing document.domain violates the principle of least privilege: once a subdo-
main sets its domain to its suffix, there is no control over which other subdomains
can access it.
Furthermore, almost no existing access control policies of today’s browsers take
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such “effective” principal IDs into consideration. In the following subsections, we
examine how the disregard of effective principal IDs leads to dual identities and
incoherencies exploitable by attackers. In our attack model, an attacker owns a
subdomain (through third-party content hosting as in iGoogle or by exploiting a site
vulnerability). As we will show in the following sections, the attacker can leverage
document.domain to penetrate the base domain and its other subdomains.
4.1.4.1 Cookie
Any change of origin using document.domain only modifies the effective principal
ID for DOM access and does not impact the domain for cookie access. Figure 15
shows an attack to exploit this inconsistent behavior of browser policy design. In this
scenario, a page 1.html in domain x.a.com changes it effective domain to a.com. As
a result, it can access the DOM properties of other pages belonging to a.com, but it
can no longer access the pages of its original domain x.a.com. However, since the
effective domain does not change for cookie access, the page still maintains access to
the cookies belonging to its original domain. This inconsistent dual identity possessed
by the page acts as a bridge to access cookies from both the original domain and the
effective domain.
In order to launch the attack, an attacker (after owning a subdomain page) first
assumes the identity of a.com and subsequently injects a script into the page 1.html.
This injected script can now read and write the cookies belonging to x.a.com in-
cluding any cookies created later. Effectively, if the attacker can compromise a page
in one of the subdomains, he can access the cookies of any other subdomains that
change their effective origin to the base domain.
4.1.4.2 XMLHttpRequest
Change of origin for scripts does not change the effective principal ID for XML-
HttpRequest usage. This enables a (malicious) script in a (compromised) subdomain
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Figure 16: Lack of effective principal ID consideration in XMLHttpRequest’s access
control policy
to issue XMLHttpRequest to the servers belonging to the base domain and its other
subdomains. The attack scenario is illustrated in Figure 16. Page 1.html has changed
its effective domain value to a.com from the original value of x.a.com. With no effect
on XMLHttpRequest usage, scripts in 1.html can still make requests to the server
belonging to x.a.com. This again gives a script a dual identity – one for DOM ac-
cess (a.com) and another for XMLHttpRequest (x.a.com). Therefore, an attacker
compromising any subdomain can inject a script into 1.html via DOM access, and
this script can then make XMLHttpRequest calls to the original domain of the page.
Since a well-crafted XMLHttpRequest can change the server-side state for the web
application, and this state might be shared between other pages within the domain
x.a.com, such attack can possibly impact all pages belonging to x.a.com.
4.1.4.3 postMessage
postMessage also ignores any document.domain changes: if x.a.com changes domain
to a.com and sends a message to y.b.com, y.b.com still sees the message’s origin
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Figure 17: Lack of effective principal ID consideration in postMessage
as x.a.com. Also, if y.b.com changes its domain to b.com, x.a.com still has to
address messages to y.b.com for them to be delivered. This gives the attacker (with
a compromised subdomain) an opportunity to send messages while masquerading
under the identity of another subdomain (Figure 17).
4.1.4.4 Storage
Based on our tests, IE 8 does not take any document.domain changes into consid-
eration for both local storage and session storage. Firefox 3.5 also ignores effective
principal ID for local storage. However, for session storage, any domain changes
via document.domain are considered: the old session storage is lost for the original
domain and a new session storage is created for the effective principal.
Inconsistency arises when document.domain changes are ignored (for both session
storage and local storage in IE; for only local storage in Firefox). An attacker (being
able to inject a script into one of the pages of any subdomain, say x.a.com) can
change its origin to the base domain a.com and can successfully inject a script into
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the DOM of the base domain or any other origins (e.g., y.a.com) that change identity
to the base domain. Since access control checks on storage rely on original domain
(i.e., y.a.com), the malicious script can now freely access the storage belonging to
y.a.com.
4.1.5 The User Principal
In this work, we introduce the concept of the user principal in the browser setting.
The user principal represents the user of the browser. Unfortunately, it has often
been neglected in browser access control policies.
While a web application does manage the user’s data and experience for that
particular application (e.g., a user’s banking data at a banking site), certain browser
resources or data belong to the user exclusively and should not be accessible by any
web site without user permissions. Such resources include: user’s private data, such
as clipboard data and geolocation; user actions, such as clicking on the forward and
back button; devices, such as camera and microphone; and browser UI, including the
current tab window (top-level window).
Unfortunately, in today’s browsers, some of these resources are directly exposed
to web applications through the DOM API. This breaks the fundamental rule of
protecting resources belonging to different principals from one another, as the user
principal’s resources can be accessed and manipulated by site principals. This can
result in privacy compromises, information leaks, and attacks that trick users into
performing unintended actions. In this section, we examine the user principal re-
sources and describe our findings on how they may be accessed improperly by web
applications.
4.1.5.1 User actions
The focus and blur properties of the window object allow web sites to change focus
between the windows that they opened irrespective of the origins. This enables an
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attacker site to steal focus or cause the user to act on a window unintentionally.
The window object has a history property with an array of user-visited URLs.
Browsers have been denying any site’s access to this array to protect user privacy, but
they do allow a site to navigate the browser back and forward in history through the
back() and forward() methods [60]. Worse, our tests indicate that Firefox 3 and
Google Chrome 2 allow any child window to navigate the top-level window back or
forward in history irrespective of the origin. In many cases this is just a nuisance, but
some properly-crafted history navigation by a malicious application can lead to more
severe damage. For example, the user might be tricked to make multiple purchases
of the same product.
We have also investigated synthetic event creation. The DOM API allows a site to
generate synthetic mouse or keyboard events through the document.createEvent()
method (or document.createEventObject() in IE). In IE, a programmer could di-
rectly invoke a click() method on any HTML element to simulate user clicks. These
techniques are useful for debugging purposes. To our delight, all major browsers are
careful not to let a web site to manipulate another site’s user experience with these
synthetic user events. Note that it is benign for a site to simulate the user’s actions
for itself, since loading and rendering site content can by itself achieve any effects
of simulating user actions (e.g., simulating a mouse click is equivalent of calling the
onclick function on the corresponding element).
4.1.5.2 Browser UI
An important part of the browser UI is the current tab window, or top-level window.
In today’s browsers, any web site loaded in any window is able to reposition and
resize a top-level window through the moveTo, moveBy, resizeTo, and resizeBy
properties of the top-level window. Resizing the currently active top-level window
effectively resizes the browser window. Firefox 3 allows an application to resize a
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browser window even in the presence of multiple tabs, while IE 8 and Chrome 2 do
not allow this. A site can also open and close a top-level window using open and
close methods. The use of open method has been mitigated through built-in popup
blockers. IE 8 allows any frame to close a top-level window irrespective of the origin,
while Firefox 3 and Chrome 2 prevent this from happening. These capabilities allow
an attacker site (even when deeply nested in the DOM hierarchy, say a malicious ad)
to directly interfere with the user’s experience with the browser UI.
Some of the other loopholes in browser UI have already been fixed. For example,
the status bar can no longer be set by a web site.
4.1.5.3 User-private state
Jackson et al. have shown that a user’s browsing history can be exposed by inspecting
the color of a visited hyperlink [78], raising privacy concerns. The hyperlink’s color
is intended for the user, and it is not necessary for web sites to be able to read it.
The clipboard data also belongs exclusively to the user principal. All versions of
IE since 5.0 support APIs to access clipboard data. A web site can get contents of
a user’s clipboard by successfully calling window.clipboardData.getData("Text").
Depending on the default Internet security settings, the browser may prompt user
before getting the data. However, the prompt does not identify the principal mak-
ing the request (simply using the term “this site”). As a result, a malicious script
embedded on a third-party frame may trick the user into giving away his clipboard
because he thinks that such access is being requested by the trusted top-level site.
Geolocation is one of the latest browser features that allows a site to determine
the client’s location by using the navigator.geolocation [72] interface. At the time
of writing, Firefox 3.5 is the only stable production browser supporting this HTML5
feature. Geolocation is user-private data. Today’s browsers do ask user permission
before accessing it. However, issues arise when a site embeds content from multiple
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principals (i.e., in frames), and more than one origin needs access to geolocation
information. The geolocation dialog is active for only one origin at a time; if there is
a request to access geolocation from b.com while the dialog for a.com is still active, it
is ignored — the principal that succeeds in invoking the geolocation dialog first wins.
Therefore, if a malicious party manages to embed a script (or a frame) on the page, it
can prevent the main site from triggering the geolocation dialog by invoking the dialog
first. As a result, the malicious party can create denial-of-service against the main
site, preventing it from retrieving a user’s geolocation information. Additionally, it
could trick the user into giving away location to itself rather than the main site (e.g.,
using phishing domain names like www.gooogle.com).
Changing document.domain also generates inconsistencies. The geolocation prompt
is designed to work only with the original principals, and even if a site changes iden-
tity, the prompt still displays the original domain as the requesting domain. For an
example site good.a.com that changes its document.domain to a.com, this causes the
following problems:
• If an attacker site evil.a.com changes its document.domain to a.com, it can
steal position information from good.a.com, if good.a.com has stored or dis-
played this information in a place that is accessible via the DOM (e.g., using
parent.document.getElementById( "coords").innerHTML).
• If another site evil.a.com also changes its domain to a.com, it could imperson-
ate good.a.com, by using parent.navigator.geolocation .getCurrentPosition,
which would trigger the access prompt using good.a.com, instead of evil.a.com.
4.2 The WebAnalyzer Measurement Framework
To achieve consistent browser access control policies, browser vendors need to remove
or modify the features that contribute to incoherencies. For example, disallowing
domain-setting for cookies, eliminating document.domain, and removing support for
99
Figure 18: High-Level Architecture of IEWA.
accessing user principal resources are steps towards secure new browsers. However,
this begs the question of what the cost of these feature removals is and how many web
sites will break as a result. In today’s highly competitive browser market, backward
compatibility with the existing web is paramount.
To help browser vendors balance security and compatibility, we set off to build a
measurement system to measure the cost of security. Many previous web compati-
bility studies have been browser-centric: they have evaluated the degree to which a
given browser supports various web standards or is vulnerable to attacks [74, 139].
In contrast, we take a web-centric perspective and actively crawl the web to look for
prevalence of unsafe browser features on existing web pages. Compared to existing
crawlers, however, static web page inspection is insufficient. Dynamic features such
as AJAX or post-render script events require us to actively render a web page to
analyze its behavior at run time. Moreover, the incoherencies we identified in Sec-
tion 4.1 require analysis of not just a page’s JavaScript execution [137], but also DOM
interactions, display layout, and protocol-layer data.
To address these challenges, we have constructed a scalable, execution-based
crawling platform, called WebAnalyzer, that can inspect a large number of web pages
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by rendering them in an instrumented browser. The platform consumes a list of
URLs (defined by a human operator or generated by a traditional web crawler), and
distributes them among virtual machine workers, which renders them using IEWA, a
specially instrumented version of Internet Explorer. IEWA provides dynamic media-
tion for all browser resources, and detects when a resource invocation matches one
of preset policy rules. Even though our framework is extensible to a large variety of
browser policies, we concentrate on “unsafe feature” rules derived from our analysis
in Section 4.1.
To build IEWA, the central piece of our measurement platform, we leverage public
COM interfaces and extensibility APIs exported by Internet Explorer 8. Figure 18
shows the architecture of IEWA, which centers around three major interposition mod-
ules: (1) a script engine proxy, which provides JavaScript and DOM interposition,
(2) a network proxy based on Fiddler [84], and (3) display dumper, which enables
custom analysis of a page’s layout as it is visible to the user. Next, we discuss each
module in turn.
Script engine proxy. We build on our earlier system in MashupOS [128] to
implement a JavaScript engine proxy (called script engine proxy (SEP)): SEP is in-
stalled between IE’s rendering and script engines, and it mediates and customizes
DOM object interactions. SEP exports the script engine API to IE’s renderer, and
it exports the DOM and rendering interfaces to IE’s script engine. Each DOM ob-
ject is interposed by a corresponding object wrapper. When IE’s script engine asks
for a DOM object from the rendering engine, SEP intercepts the request, retrieves
the corresponding DOM object, associates the DOM object with its wrapper object
inside SEP, and then passes the wrapper object back to the original script engine.
Any subsequent invocation of wrapper object methods from the original script engine
passes through SEP. SEP is implemented as a COM object and is installed into IE
by modifying IE’s JavaScript engine ID in the Windows registry.
101
Network interposition. In addition to SEP, we route the browser’s network
traffic through a proxy to monitor all HTTP/HTTPS requests and analyze cookie
transfers as well as network APIs like XMLHttpRequest. Our network proxy is im-
plemented using the FiddlerCore interfaces provided by the public-domain Fiddler
web debugging proxy [57, 84].
Display analysis. In order to evaluate display policies, it is necessary to analyze
a browser’s visual output as seen by the user. For this purpose, we use a customized
version of IE’s rendering engine that exposes COM interfaces to extract a textual
representation of a particular page’s visual layout at any stage of rendering. In our
current evaluation, we use these COM interfaces to save a snapshot log of IE’s display
after a page has fully loaded. Because some pages have post-render events that alter
layout, we wait an additional 5 seconds before taking a display snapshot. Snapshot
logs provide a mapping between a page’s objects and their layout properties, such as
position, dimensions, or transparency. They can be analyzed offline for the presence
of unsafe frame overlapping behavior or other dangerous page layouts.
Navigation. To facilitate automatic analysis for a large number of URLs, IEWA
includes a URL navigation engine, which utilizes IE’s extensibility interfaces, such
as IWebBrowser2, to completely automate the browser’s navigation. In addition to
pointing the browser to new URLs, this module also cleans up state such as pop-ups
between consecutive URLs, detects when sites fail to render (e.g., 404 errors), and
recovers from any browser crashes.
Visiting a site’s home page is sometimes insufficient to invoke the site’s core func-
tionality. For example, a feature may be accessed only when the user clicks on a link,
types search queries, or causes mouse event handlers to run.
It is difficult and time-consuming to fully automate a site’s analysis to study
all possible features and pages that could be invoked using all combinations of user
input. Instead of aiming for complete coverage within a particular site, we enhanced
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our navigation engine with simple heuristics that simulate some user interaction.
After rendering a site’s home page, IEWA will find and simulate a click on at most
five random links, producing five random navigation events. In addition, IEWA will
check for presence of a search form, fill it with random keywords, and submit it. We
restrict all simulated navigations to stay within the same origin as a site’s home page.
These simple enhancements maintain our ability to examine a large number of
sites while adding the ability to properly handle many (but not all) sites with home
pages that do not invoke the site’s main functionality. For example, we can navigate
to a random article on Wikipedia, a random video on YouTube, a random profile on
MySpace, a random Twitter feed, and a random search query on Google. We evaluate
the success of this methodology against a user-driven browsing study in Section 4.3.7
and discuss its limitations in Section 4.4.
Performance. We deployed our system on several desktop machines, each with
an Intel 2.4 GHz quad-core CPU and 4 GB of RAM. Our IEWA workers run inside a
Windows Vista VMware virtual machine to prevent malware infection. We executed
multiple workers in each VM, isolating them from one another using different UIDs
and different remote desktop sessions.
On such a setup, one IEWA worker is able to analyze about 115 typical web sites per
hour. Each site’s processing time includes the home page, five random link clicks, and
one form submission, as well as overheads introduced by IEWA’s three interposition
modules. We found that we could execute up to eight parallel workers in one VM,
for a throughput of 900 sites per VM, before saturating the CPU. Optimizing this
infrastructure for performance was not a goal of this thesis and is left as future work.
4.3 Experimental Results
Our analysis in Section 4.1 provides an understanding of the security characteristics
of the current access control policies in browsers. In this section, we complete the
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other half of the equilibrium by using the measurement infrastructure presented in
Section 4.2 to study the prevalence of unsafe browser features (analyzed in Section 4.1)
on a large set of popular web sites. By presenting both sides, we enable the browser
vendors to make more informed decisions about whether or not to continue supporting
a particular unsafe feature based on its real-world usage.
4.3.1 Experimental overview
4.3.1.1 Choosing the sites for analysis
Instead of randomly crawling the web and looking for unsafe features, we decided to
focus our attention on the “interesting” parts of the web that people tend to visit
often. Accordingly, to seed our analysis, we take the set of 100,000 most popular web
sites ranked by Alexa [27], as seen on November 9, 2009, as our representative data
set. The data collection and analysis were completed in the last week of February
2010.
4.3.1.2 Defining the compatibility cost
We define the cost of removing a feature to be the number of Alexa-ranked, top
100,000 sites that use the feature.
We conservatively assume that disallowing a feature will significantly hinder a
site’s functionality, whereas it could simply cause a visual nuisance. A more detailed
analysis on the effect of policy changes on page behavior is promising but is left as
future work.
4.3.1.3 High-level results
We obtained our results by rendering each of the 100,000 seed links using WebAn-
alyzer, saving all interposition logs for offline analysis. This way, we were able to
obtain data for 89,222 of the 100,000 sites. There are several reasons why no data
was produced for the rest of sites. First, some sites could not be accessed at the time
104
Table 9: Usage of various browser features on popular web sites (February 2010).
Analysis includes 89,222 sites.
Measurement Criteria
Total instances Unique sites
(count) Count Percentage
document.cookie (read) 5656310 72587 81.36%
document.cookie (write) 2313359 68230 76.47%
document.cookie domain usage (read) 2032522 59631 66.83%
document.cookie domain usage (write) 1226800 41327 46.32%
Secure cookies over HTTP 259 62 0.07%
Non-secure cookies over HTTPS 15589 4893 5.48%
Use of “HttpOnly” cookies 33180 14474 16.22%
Frequency of duplicate cookies 159755 4955 5.55%
Use of XMLHttpRequest 19717 4631 5.2%
Cookie read in response of XMLHttpRe-
quest
1261 265 0.30%
Cross-origin descendant navigation 6043 61 0.07%
(reading descendant’s location)
Cross-origin descendant navigation 0 0 0.00%
(changing descendant’s location)
Child navigation 22572 6874 7.7%
(parent navigating direct child)
document.domain (read) 1253274 63602 71.29%
document.domain (write) 8640 1693 1.90%
Use of cookies after change of effective
domain
295960 1569 1.76%
Use of XMLHttpRequest after change of
effective domain
225 87 0.10%
Use of postMessage after change of effec-
tive domain
0 0 0.00%
Use of localStorage after change of effec-
tive domain
42 10 0.01%
Use of local storage 1227 169 0.19%
Use of session storage 0 0 0.00%
Use of fragment identifier for communi-
cation
5192 3386 3.80%
Use of postMessage 6523 845 0.95%
Use of postMessage (with no specified
target)
0 0 0.00%
Use of XDomainRequest 527 125 0.14%
Presence of JavaScript within CSS 224266 4508 5.05%
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of our analysis due to failed DNS lookups, “404 Not Found” errors, and other similar
access problems. Second, some sites timed out within our chosen threshold interval
of 2 minutes, due to their slow or continuous rendering. We decided to drop any such
sites from our analysis. Finally, some sites did not contain any JavaScript code, and
as a result they did not trigger our event filters. Nonetheless, we believe that we have
been able to analyze a sufficiently large set of sites with a reasonable success ratio,
and our data set and the scope of measurement is much larger than that used by
earlier related studies [137].
Tables 9, 10, and 11 present the results of our analysis, showing how frequently
each feature we analyzed earlier is encountered. Next, we organize our findings accord-
ing to our discussion in Section 4.1 and discuss their implications on future browser
security policies.
4.3.2 The interplay of browser resources
4.3.2.1 DOM and Cookies
Cookie usage is extremely popular, and so is their programmatic DOM access via
document.cookie, which we found on 81% web sites for reading and 76% of web
sites for writing cookie values, respectively. The use of the cookie’s domain attribute
is also widespread (67% of sites), with about 46% of sites using it to actually change
the domain value of the cookie. As a result, the issues described in Section 4.1.3.1
cannot be solved by simply deprecating the usage of this attribute and changing the
principal definition of cookies. One possible approach to solve the inconsistency issue
with cookie handling is to tag the cookie with the origin of the page setting the cookie.
This information should be passed to the server to allow the server to differentiate
between duplicate cookies.
Section 4.1.3.1 also identified inconsistencies pertaining to cookies and HTTP/HTTPS,
which we now support with measurements. First, 0.07% of sites alarmingly send
secure cookies over HTTP. This effectively tampers with the integrity of cookies
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that may have been intended for HTTPS sessions [31]. Fortunately, it appears that
this functionality can be disallowed with little cost. Surprisingly, a much larger num-
ber of sites (5.48%) sent HTTP cookies over HTTPS. The HTTP cookies cannot be
kept confidential and are accessible to HTTP sessions. Our recommended solution to
this problem is that the “secure” flag should be enforced for any cookies passed over
an HTTPS connection even if the web developer fails to set the flag. This would still
enable the HTTPS site to access the cookie for its own functionality and any sharing
with the HTTP site should be done explicitly.
We found a large number of sites (16.2%) using HttpOnly cookies, which is an
encouraging sign — many sites appear to be tightening up their cookie usage to better
resist XSS attacks.
4.3.2.2 Cookies and XMLHttpRequest
Our measurements show that the issues arising from undesirable interplay of XMLHttpRequest
and HttpOnly cookies (Section 4.1.3.2) can possibly be eliminated, since very few sites
(0.30%) manipulate cookie headers in XMLHttpRequest responses.
4.3.2.3 DOM and Display
Section 4.1.3.3 argued that the descendant navigation policy is at conflict with SOP
for DOM. We observe iframe navigations on 7.7% of sites and all of them are child
navigation (regardless of the origin). The absence of descendant navigation in the
top 100,000 sites indicates a potentially very low cost to remove it.
In addition, we have analyzed the visual layouts of all sites to determine whether
there are dangerous pixel interplays between windows of different principals (Sec-
tion 4.1.3.3). Our results are summarized in Table 101. We found that 41% of sites
1Our display analysis was performed in December 2009, separately from script engine and network
analysis that we performed in February 2010, causing a slight difference in the number of successfully
rendered sites in Tables 10 and 9.
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Table 10: Summary of display layouts observed for the top 100,000 Alexa web sites
(December 2009). 89,483 sites were rendered successfully and are included in this
analysis.
Sites containing at least one <iframe> 36549 (40.8%)
Average number of <iframe>’s per site 3.2
Sites with at least one pair of overlapping frames 5544 (6.2%)
Sites with at least one pair of overlapping cross-origin frames 3786 (4.2%)
Sites with at least one pair of transparent overlapping frames 1616 (1.8%)
Sites with at least one pair of transparent overlapping cross-
origin frames
1085 (1.2%)
Table 11: Prevalence of resources belonging to the user principal on popular web
sites. Analysis includes 89,222 sites.
Measurement Criteria
Total instances Unique sites
(count) Count Percentage
Setting top-level window’s location 55759 2851 3.20%
Change focus of window 5221 2314 2.59%
Reading color of hyperlinks 82587 1560 1.75%
Accessing browser’s history 1910 721 0.81%
Use of defaultStatus (write) 1576 241 0.27%
Reading user’s Geolocation 251 149 0.17%
Use of resizeTo 339 134 0.15%
Use of defaultStatus (read) 528 108 0.12%
Use of moveTo 258 100 0.11%
Close a window 130 86 0.10%
Access to user’s clipboard 24 17 0.02%
Blur a window 54 13 0.01%
Use of resizeBy 13 8 0.01%
Use of moveBy 4 1 0.00%
Use of outerWidth 2 1 0.00%
Use of outerHeight 4 1 0.00%
embed at least one iframe, and the average number of iframes embedded on a partic-
ular page is 3.2. Overlapping iframes appear to be common — 6.2% of sites contained
at least one overlapping pair of iframes — but only 29% of these overlaps involved
transparent iframes. Most (68%) overlapping scenarios involve different principals.
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The most dangerous situations occur when a transparent frame is overlaid on top
of a frame belonging to a different principal (Section 4.1.3.3). We identified 1,085 sites
(1.2%) that contained at least one pair of transparent, cross-origin overlapping iframes.
We observed that most of these overlaps involved domains serving ad banners, so
the main site functionality might remain unaffected if the dangerous transparency is
disallowed.
Summary. We found that interplays between DOM and cookies have a high com-
patibility impact, while removing the interplays between cookies and XMLHttpRe-
quest would affect only 0.30% of sites. For interplays related to display, we found
that descendant navigation can be disallowed with no cost, while disallowing overlaps
between transparent cross-origin frames would affect 1.2% of sites.
4.3.3 Changing effective Principal ID
In Section 4.1.4, we showed that document.domain is an unsafe and undesirable part
of today’s web, as observed by others as well [138]. Unfortunately, we found its
usage on the web to be significant: 1.9% of sites change their effective domain via
document.domain.
We mentioned certain features which become incoherent when combined with
document.domain. Cookies are accessed by about 1.76% of the sites after a change
in effective domain, making it difficult to enforce a unified effective domain for cookie
access (Section 4.1.4.1). Only 0.08% of sites use XMLHttpRequest after an effective
UID change (Section 4.1.4.2), so it appears possible to make XMLHttpRequest respect
effective domain with little cost. The same holds true for postMessage — we found
no sites using postMessage after an effective UID change. The new local storage
abstractions are not widespread — only 0.19% of the sites were using localStorage
(0.01% after an effective domain change), and no sites were using sessionStorage —
so we anticipate that origin-changing weaknesses that we outlined in Section 4.1.4.4
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can be removed with little compatibility cost.
Summary. Overall, while disallowing document.domain completely carries a sub-
stantial cost (1.9% of sites), browsers can eliminate its impact on XMLHttpRequest,
local storage, and postMessage at a much lower cost (0.19% of sites total). On the
flip side, browser vendors have to make a much tougher choice (affecting 1.76% of
sites) to prevent effective UID inconsistencies pertaining to cookies.
4.3.4 Resources belonging to the user principal
Table 11 shows the results of our analysis for the cost of protecting user-owned re-
sources discussed in Section 4.1.5. The cost of tightening access control for user
resources appears to be low with the exceptions of link-color access (1.8%), the focus-
changing functions (2.6%), and setting top-level window location (3.2%).
Interestingly, 149 sites (0.17%) already use the new Geolocation primitives [72].
This number seems low enough for browsers to take actions to tighten its access
control.
Overall, we found that 12 of the 16 user-principal APIs we examined can be
removed while collectively affecting only 0.80% of unique sites.
4.3.5 Other noteworthy measurements
We measured prevalence of some primitives for cross-frame and cross-window commu-
nication, which are critical for cross-principal security. Fragment identifier messaging
is most popular, being found at 3.8% of sites. A non-negligible number (0.95%) of
sites have already adopted postMessage, and all sites use its newer definition that
requires specifying the target window [32]. Another safer alternative for cross-domain
communication, XDomainRequest, is also being slowly adopted (0.14%).
Using JavaScript within CSS has long been considered dangerous [138]. We found
this pattern in use on about 5% of the sites.
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Figure 19: A CDF for prevalence of cross-frame communication mechanisms accord-
ing to the ranking of sites that use them.
4.3.6 Correlating unsafe features and site popularity
Next, we consider how the popularity of sites correlates with prevalence of unsafe
features. A policy is more costly to correct if it is used by very highly ranked sites,
since more people would visit them and encounter broken functionality. Fortunately,
we found that most features do not exhibit a significant popularity bias, behaving uni-
formly with no regard to a site’s popularity. Nevertheless, we found some exceptions.
Figure 19 shows a CDF of the usage of various mechanisms that could be used for
cross-frame communication according to the sites’ ranking. Interestingly, fragment
identifier messaging has little dependence on popularity, document.domain tends to
be used more by higher-ranked sites, and postMessage is found more on lower-ranked
sites, with very little use in the top 2000 sites. This went against our hypothesis that
higher-ranked, high-profile sites would likely be written using the latest and safest
web standards. A possible explanation could be that the top sites are motivated to
use features compatible with the largest number of browsers and client platforms.
As another example, Figure 20 diagrams the prevalence of resources belonging
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Figure 20: A CDF for prevalence of user-owned resources according to the ranking
of sites that use them.
to the user principal according to the ranking of the sites that use them (a dot is
displayed for every site using a particular feature). Some features, such as resizeBy or
clipboard access, are only found on very low-ranked sites and are thus good candidates
to remove with little impact. Only a handful of features appear in the top 100 sites,
where compatibility cost is very high for any site.
4.3.7 Methodology validation using user-driven analysis
In the previous sections, we examined sites by visiting their home pages and relying
on WebAnalyzer’s heuristics (see Section 4.2) to simulate a few basic user actions
to invoke additional functionality that may be hidden behind “splash” home pages.
However, our methodology may miss site functionality that requires user login forms
(e.g., on Facebook), other more sophisticated user event handlers (e.g., mouse move-
ments), or following many links away from the home page. In general, it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to simulate user actions that open access to representative
features of an arbitrary site.
To evaluate the limitations of our heuristics-driven approach, we conducted a
user-driven examination of the top 100 Alexa sites. To do this, one of the authors
manually visited these sites with IEWA and used his best judgement to invoke the site’s
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Table 12: Comparison of user-driven analysis vs. WebAnalyzer for the top 100





document.cookie (read) 93 86
document.cookie (write) 86 76
document.cookie domain usage (read) 78 70
document.cookie domain usage (write) 59 59
Secure cookies over HTTP 0 2
Non-secure cookies over HTTPS 11 8
Use of “HttpOnly” cookies 27 30
Frequency of duplicate cookies 17 8
Use of XMLHttpRequest 32 28
Cookie read in response of XMLHttpRequest 0 0
Cross-origin descendant-navigation (reading descendant’s
location)
0 0
Cross-origin descendant-navigation (changing descendant’s
location)
0 0
Child navigation (parent navigating direct child) 1 2
document.domain (read) 78 59
document.domain (write) 18 19
Use of cookies after change of effective domain 18 19
Use of XMLHttpRequest after change of effective domain 4 2
Use of localStorage after change of effective domain 2 1
Use of session storage 0 0
Use of local storage 4 3
Use of fragment identifier for communication 0 1
Use of postMessage 1 1
Use of XDomainRequest 1 2
Presence of JavaScript within CSS 16 27
Setting top-level window’s location 1 2
Change focus of window 2 2
Reading user’s Geolocation 3 9
representative functionality. For example, for analyzing Facebook, the author logged
into his Facebook account, browsed through several profiles, and invoked several
applications such as photo viewing or messaging.
We then compared the results obtained through this manual analysis to those
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obtained using WebAnalyzer for the same sites. Table 12 summarizes the results of
our comparison. We observe that the numbers of sites using a particular feature are
mostly comparable, providing confidence that our heuristic-driven navigation engine
in WebAnalyzer works well in practice. Some features have higher prevalence with
the user-driven analysis, as expected, but there are only a couple of outliers. For
example, Geolocation was found on nine sites, all found on multilingual versions of
maps.google.com. In manual analysis, the user invoked maps on each of the nine
versions of the Google site, where WebAnalyzer randomly picked and followed the
link to Maps on three of these sites. On the other hand, on several occasions, Web-
Analyzer also found features that were missed by manual analysis, as can be seen in
higher prevalence for features like reading document.domain. This can happen when
WebAnalyzer navigates to a link that the user did not examine as part of represen-
tative functionality on a given site. Overall, we felt our heuristics-driven approach
achieved good coverage, though larger-scale user-driven measurements would still be
very valuable in complementing WebAnalyzer measurements.
4.4 Discussion and limitations
Benefits of heuristics-driven automated crawling. In our original design, We-
bAnalyzer visited only the top-level page of each site we studied. We quickly realized
that this analysis failed for sites that hide much of their functionality behind “splash”
home pages. This became most apparent when studying the original results for Ta-
ble 12. We observed that for many sites, clicking on a link or filling out a search form
on the home page would expose a noticeably larger (though still not complete) set of
functionality. Thus, we augmented WebAnalyzer with simple heuristics that imitate
this user behavior (see Section 4.2).
As an example, our original system saw XMLHttpRequest calls on only 13 pages
of the top 100 pages, whereas the new one identified 32 such pages (see Table 12).
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One of the reasons is that many search sites use XMLHttpRequest to auto-complete
the search string as users type it; our old system did not trigger this behavior, whereas
our new system triggered it when auto-filling the search textbox. Many other features
showed a similarly dramatic jump in prevalence.
Limits of automated crawler-based measurements. Although we believe
that our resulting measurements provide a good representation of the use of browser
features on popular web sites, it is likely that we missed certain features because
the code path to invoke them was not triggered in our analysis. For example, sites
like Facebook or banks require a user to sign in, game sites require particular mouse
gestures to invoke certain behavior, and numerous sites require appropriate text (such
as stock symbols or user’s personal data) to be entered into forms. Even if we could
solve some of these problems, for example by enumerating all events registered on
a page or using a database of dummy usernames and passwords [5], automatically
invoking certain features, such as buying products on shopping sites, is inappropriate.
This ultimately limits our ability to explore all features invoked on today’s web.
We also did not try to exhaustively crawl each site. Even in our user-driven
analysis (Section 4.3.7), we did not attempt to enumerate and invoke all gadgets on
every page of each site. Thus, the results we collect for a particular site cannot be
used as a list of all features the site might have. Our aim was to favor breadth over
depth and obtain good coverage for the representative features of 100,000 sites we
tested. While our infrastructure could also be used for exhaustively crawling each
site, we would need to dramatically scale up our current infrastructure to cover a
comparable number of sites, and we leave this as future work.
Picking the right browser. Some sites check the client’s browser version (using
the user-agent header) before deciding to invoke a particular code path. Although not
a base requirement, we developed WebAnalyzer with IE as the underlying browser.
This could prevent code invocations that are intended for non-IE browsers, thereby
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leading to missed features. For example, XMLHttpRequest2 [135] is currently not
supported by IE, and it would be missed by WebAnalyzer if the site invokes it only
after verifying browser support.
A related problem is fallback code that invokes an alternative implementation
of a feature that a browser doesn’t support. For example, a site could first check
whether the browser supports postMessage for cross-frame communication, and fall
back on fragment identifier messaging if it does not. Because we use IE 8, we will log
that this site uses postMessage, but older browsers would utilize fragment identifier
messaging.
The compatibility cost of features invoked in browser-dependent code paths de-
pends not only on the number of web sites using a feature, but also on the number
of visitors utilizing a particular browser that relies on such code. Evaluating the sec-
ond part of this cost is orthogonal to our goals in this thesis: rather than exploring
prevalence of features on web sites, it asks how many of a web site’s clients rely on a
particular browser. Web server operators can easily answer this question by profiling
“user-agent” strings in incoming HTTP requests. As future work, we can integrate
other browsers into WebAnalyzer, or we can modify IEWA to render a site with a set
of user-agent strings representing other browsers; this would capture a more complete
set of the site’s code.
Studying other web segments. Our focus on the top 100,000 sites represents
a particular segment of the web with a good balance of the very top sites and some
of the less popular “tail”. However, this still covers only a tiny fraction of the billions
of pages on today’s web. In addition, our analysis excluded intranet sites, which are
hidden from traditional crawlers, and which can influence backwards compatibility




In this chapter, we have examined the current state of browser access control policies
and analyzed the incoherencies that arise when browsers mishandle their principals by
(1) inconsistently labeling resources with principal IDs, (2) inappropriately handling
principal identity changes via document.domain, and (3) neglecting access control for
certain resources belonging to the user principal. In addition to pointing out these
incoherencies, we have developed a web compatibility analysis infrastructure and
measured the cost of removing many unsafe policies we identified for a large set of
popular web sites. Overall, this work contributes to the community’s understanding
of browser access control policies, and it provides the much-needed answer to the
browsers’ compatibility vs. security dilemma by identifying unsafe policies that can
be removed with little compatibility cost.
117
CHAPTER V
END-TO-END CONTENT INTEGRITY POLICIES
The same-origin policy [111] (SOP) is the key access control policy for the web and
browsers. This policy has essentially defined a principal model where web sites are
mutually distrusting principals [128,129], and where one site’s script cannot access an-
other site’s content. However, the authenticity of the principal and the integrity of its
content are often at question since much of the web is delivered over HTTP rather than
HTTPS. Consequently, network attackers can carry out man-in-the-middle attacks
and undermine browsers’ access control, even if browsers flawlessly implement the
enforcement of the same-origin policy. Such attacks are highly practical today with
the prevalence of wireless hotspots and insecurity in the DNS infrastructure [61]. The
web requires end-to-end security to allow meaningful SOP enforcement in browsers.
HTTPS [109] has the potential to prevent network attacks, but its universal adop-
tion is hindered by its uncacheability at intermediate servers, such as content distri-
bution network (CDN) servers and HTTP proxies, and its performance cost.
Web caching offers significant benefits to web sites and users. It enables web sites
to save bandwidth costs and reduce latency for users by outsourcing infrastructure
to CDNs and offloading requests to CDN servers. Although CDNs do offer services
for HTTPS content [26], this is at the cost of trusting CDN servers to be man-in-the-
middle and losing end-to-end security. Furthermore, such services come with a hefty
charge of up to $3,000 per month plus bandwidth costs [50]. Web cache proxies can
also deliver web content significantly faster to large user communities behind gateways
or firewalls, such as mobile users. HTTPS content cannot take advantage of these
proxies at all today. We observe that much of the web is cacheable (Section 5.3.1), and
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we expect significant growth in cacheable web content as rich media proliferates [6].
To achieve an end-to-end secure web, HTTPS is definitely not the complete answer.
In terms of performance, although GMail has recently demonstrated the ability of
serving HTTPS content with low overhead using commodity hardware (1% CPU load,
less than 10KB of memory per connection and less than 2% network overhead) [83],
a general applicability of their solution to other SSL setups is not clear [8]. Due
to differences in HTTPS deployments, it might not be trivial for other web sites to
replicate Gmail’s performance improvements. Even if the SSL’s server overhead is
successfully reduced, it still suffers from lack of in-network caching, thus limiting the
performance benefits for the clients.
Fortunately, end-to-end security, cacheability, and performance are not at conflict
inherently. End-to-end security encompasses (1) end-to-end authentication (i.e., con-
tent comes from the right origin1) (2) end-to-end content integrity (i.e., content is not
tampered), and (3) end-to-end content confidentiality (i.e., content is kept private).
For the browser platform to meaningfully enforce its access control policy, both au-
thentication and integrity are needed, but confidentiality is not required. Without
confidentiality, the content is cacheable at intermediate web servers. HTTPS provides
all three properties simultaneously and is hence not cacheable.
In this work, we propose HTTPi as a protocol to support only end-to-end authen-
tication and content integrity. We advocate that web sites use HTTPS for requests
that require end-to-end confidentiality, and HTTPi for all other requests.
HTTPi revives the signature mode of operation from SHTTP [110], which was a
proposal that unsuccessfully competed with SSL and HTTPS. In our work, we give a
practical and comprehensive design and implementation of such a content-signature-
based protocol. While HTTPi requires both browser and server-side modifications,
our design does not require changes at intermediate nodes, such as proxies, for caching
1Client authentication is at the discretion of web sites.
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HTTPi content (Section 5.1.1). Our design also ensures that progressive content load-
ing in browsers is not hindered by HTTPi, and that this incurs minimal overhead in
both computation and bandwidth (Section 5.1.1). Because signatures can be com-
puted offline and cached for static content, HTTPi has a much lower computational
cost compared to HTTPS for web servers.
We further discover that a significant portion of existing HTTPS content can be
shared and cached across users (Section 5.3.1). This indicates that much of existing
HTTPS content can be safely turned into HTTPi content to have better performance
and the ability of being offloaded to other servers without any loss of security. In fact,
many existing HTTPS sites contain HTTP content including scripts and images. Such
mixed-content pages often contradict the intent of web sites to defend against network
attackers. This is precisely due to the cost of enabling HTTPS for such existing
HTTP content. It is much easier to turn HTTP content contained on HTTPS sites
into HTTPi content, which will achieve the end-to-end security desired by these sites.
Although we envision a next-generation web with only HTTPi and HTTPS con-
tent, HTTP content will undoubtedly exist for a long time. We also provide web
developers with an easy way to specify policies of how the three types of content can
be safely mixed together (Section 5.1.2). Furthermore, we observe that the default
isolation policy for HTTPi, HTTPS, and HTTP content of the same domain and port
does not need to be as strict as the same-origin policy. To this end, we design a new
default policy to allow useful interactions across different protocol schemes without
sacrificing security (Section 5.1.3).
End-to-end authentication also requires binding a public key to an origin. Today,
such bindings are established through Certificate Authorities. Recent observations
have shown weakness in such CA-based binding [53]. DNSSec can potentially offer a
more natural and safer way of binding a domain name to its public key [29]. We will
not further discuss this topic in this thesis.
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We have built an end-to-end prototype to evaluate HTTPi. On the browser side,
we implemented the HTTPi protocol for Internet Explorer using IE’s Asynchronous
Pluggable Protocol extension mechanism. On the server side, we implemented sup-
port for HTTPi requests using an HTTP proxy sitting in front of origin web servers.
Our microbenchmark measurement indicates that HTTPi incurs an acceptable
verification and one-time signing overhead, with our unoptimized implementation.
This cost is quickly amortized over many requests; for example, a typical web server
deployed on Amazon EC2 achieved a 4.06x higher throughput for static content served
over HTTPi (and signed offline) than over HTTPS and HTTPi’s throughput is neg-
ligibly lower than that of HTTP. To evaluate the efficacy of deploying HTTPi for
today’s web sites, we conducted an initial measurement of cacheability of today’s
web and found that both HTTP and HTTPS content on today’s web is significantly
cacheable. We also present our initial findings on the effectiveness of caching proxies
to understand shared caching benefits for web users behind those proxies. Overall,
our evaluation suggests that HTTPi is practical to deploy and can offer compelling
benefits.
Chapter Organization. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 5.1 presents the design of the HTTPi protocol, and Section 5.2 discusses our
implementation. Section 5.3 presents our measurement studies of web cacheability
and an evaluation of HTTPi performance. Section 5.4 provides a brief summary of
the chapter.
5.1 Design
We set the following goals for the HTTPi design:
• Guarantee of end-to-end integrity: Our design ensures that the integrity of the
rendered content is always maintained. For example, a network attacker will
not be able to inject or remove content, or have adverse impact on browser-side
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rendering of content.
• Easy adoption: HTTPi should be easy to adopt by web sites and should fit
seamlessly into the current web infrastructure. In other words, the design should
be transparent to the intermediate web servers (such as CDN servers and HTTP
web proxies) and should involve minimal changes to the core setup of the servers
and the browser.
• Negligible overhead over HTTP: The design should incur negligible overhead
over HTTP in computation, bandwidth, and user-experienced latency.
Note that there could be scenarios where intermediate servers modify web content,
such as for personalization or content filtering in enterprises. Transmitting content
over HTTPi instead of HTTP would prevent such modifications. We argue that the
guarantee of integrity must be end-to-end, and any intermediate modifications should
be explicitly approved by the one of the endpoints (for example, by sharing the private
and public key pair of an endpoint).
To guarantee end-to-end integrity and to minimize latency and overhead, we use
a content signature-based scheme that allows progressive content loading and at the
same time is robust to any injection attacks, as described in Section 5.1.1. In Sec-
tion 5.1.3, we describe the access control policy that browsers should carry out across
HTTPS, HTTPi and HTTP content.
For easy adoption, we use the existing HTTP protocol to implement HTTPi so
that intermediate web servers can cache HTTPi content seamlessly. Web browsers can
show “httpi” in the address bar, but the messages on the wire speak HTTP. We use
a new Integrity header to indicate the use of HTTPi as the protocol. The integrity
header also carries the signature for HTTP headers (excluding the integrity header it-
self, of course). We use the existing Strict-Transport-Security header to prevent
stripping attacks (Section 5.1.1.3) and the existing X-Content-Security-Policy
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header to allow web sites to configure mixed content policies (Section 5.1.2). Signa-
tures for the HTTP response body are in-band in the body itself. HTTPi’s server-side
and client-side implementation is pluggable into the existing setup and uses public
interfaces without any need for modifying the core functionality of the server or the
browser (Section 5.2).
5.1.1 Design Overview
A protocol scheme that ensures message integrity needs to satisfy two requirements.
First, the identity of the server sending the content needs to be authenticated and
second, the content needs to verified for integrity. HTTPi uses a content signature-
based protocol scheme to satisfy these requirements.
In a strawman design, HTTPi could sign the hash of an entire HTTP response:
The server first creates a cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA1) of the whole response and
then signs the hash using the server’s private key. The hash and its signature are then
passed to the client along with the response. At the client side, the browser waits
for the entire response to arrive, calculates its hash, and compares the value with the
signed hash to authenticate the server and verify the response.
A key limitation of this design is that the browser would have to wait for the
entire response to arrive before being able to verify the content integrity and dispatch
the content for rendering. Consequently, this would disrupt the existing progressive
content loading mechanisms in browsers, servers, and the HTTP protocol and the
user would experience much longer delay before seeing any content.
We leverage previous work on content integrity [63, 65] to develop our HTTPi
design that supports progressive content loading through the use of HTTPi segments.
While these earlier efforts focused on designing protocol schemes for verification of
integrity in streaming systems, our scheme is designed to be used with today’s web
applications and browsers. As a result, we solve new problems not addressed in
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prior work, including compatibility with “chunked” transfer encoding (Section 5.1.1.1)
that is widespread on the web, various content replay attacks, and stripping attacks
(Section 5.1.1.3). Moreover, our work presents a detailed, practical implementation
of HTTPi, whereas earlier work focused on theoretical protocol design and offered
no implementation details. Before diving into our design for HTTPi, we first provide
some background.
5.1.1.1 Existing Progressive Content Loading Mechanisms
Current browsers support progressive loading of web content: as soon as some data
arrives from the network, the browser renders it to the user. The amount of data
available at a time is determined by the underlying TCP congestion control and
the network condition as well as server availability. HTTPS content can also enjoy
progressive content loading especially when a stream cipher is selected by web sites.
Complementing browsers’ progressive content loading, servers are also motivated
to reduce user wait time and to start sending the response even before completing the
processing of a request and therefore, before knowing the entire response body. To this
end, servers often use HTTP chunked transfer encoding [58] and encode each piece of
available response data into a chunk. A web server typically uses chunked encoding
in two scenarios: (1) content is static, however, its retrieval (for example, from the
server database) or processing is slow, and (2) content is dynamically generated with
a chunk being a logical unit of content for the application. The chunks are sent in
separate HTTP responses as soon as they are available. Note that the data of a
chunk may not arrive at the client in one shot, but possibly in pieces due to network
congestion. Nevertheless, the browser can consume partial chunks progressively.
5.1.1.2 HTTPi Segments for Progressive Content Loading
In HTTPi, the key challenge in supporting progressive content loading is to configure
the sensible granularity of content verification. This design should meet the following
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goals: (1) it leverages browser-side progressive content loading; (2) it is compatible
with HTTP chunked transfer encoding; (3) it is resilient to the dynamics of the
underlying TCP congestion control, which is unpredictable by servers in an offline
fashion; (4) it must allow cacheability; (5) it incurs low overhead.
We use HTTPi segment to refer to the unit of verification in HTTPi. Let S denote
the size of an HTTPi segment.
Using HTTP chunks as HTTPi segments would still be too coarse-grained. An
HTTP chunk can be arbitrarily large and shares the same problem as the strawman
solution described above.
A question one may ask is whether a server can predict how much data arrives
at its clients. If so, then a server could enable verification for just that data. For
a single, live connection, a server can indeed predict data arrivals on the client by
obtaining the current TCP congestion control window size and the receiver window
size from the network layer. However, because of dynamic network conditions, such
prediction would not work well for requests at different times or from different users
and would defeat cacheability. In light of this observation, S needs to be a constant
value.
We choose to use the typical TCP segment size (1400 bytes) for S. TCP segment
is the unit of TCP transfer. The rationale here is that the browser will need to
wait for at most one packet to arrive to receive a full HTTPi segment, perform the
verification and render the segment. This wait is as minimal as it can get.
Although HTTPi segment is the unit of verification, it does not need to be the
unit of signing. In our design, we amortize the signing cost over multiple segments in
the response body. In more detail, whenever a web server has some HTTP response
data ready (whether it is the entire HTTP response or an HTTP chunk becoming
available), for every S bytes, we take a hash, then we compute the signature for
multiple hashes concatenated in the right sequence. For HTTP headers, we hash
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Figure 21: Protocol Scheme in HTTPi for (a) static content (b) dynamic content.
A1, A2, ..., Am and B1, B2, ..., Bn represent segments for Chunk 1 and 2, respectively.
X1 andX2 represent concatenated hashes evaluated over the segments of Chunk 1 and
2, respectively. XH represents concatenated hashes over the HTTP headers. URLreq
is the requested URL and T is the time stamp.
each header individually and use a single signature over all hashes. Since browsers
do not consume partial header values, we chose not to use the segmented design for
header fields. We further amortize the signing cost by signing the hashes of HTTP
headers along with the hashes of HTTP content using a single signature. We put the
signature together with the sequence of the hashes at the beginning of the response
body. An alternate way is to put the signature and hashes in an HTTP header.
However, our scheme needs to support HTTP’s chunked encoding where chunks after
the first chunk do not have header fields. Therefore, we place the signature and hashes
inband with the response body.
The decision on when to sign rests with the application and is made based on
whether the content being signed is known in advance (i.e., static content), or is
generated on the fly (i.e., dynamic content). Figure 21 gives an illustration of our
protocol scheme. As can be seen in Figure 21(a), we amortize the cost of signing
by using a single signature over segments for all chunks generated for static content
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(e.g., X1 and X2 in a single signature). Since the content is known in advance,
the signature and all corresponding hashes can be pre-computed by the server. For
dynamic content, the hashes are computed at the time of content generation. The
signature is calculated over all the segments of a single chunk (Figure 21(b)). The
sequence of hashes for the headers (XH) is placed only in the first signature. We
also place the URL of the requested page (URLreq) in the first signature and the
current time stamp (T ) in each signature as a preventive measure for certain attacks
(Section 5.1.1.3).
Note that signing can be done in an offline fashion for static content. For dynamic
content, this incurs a computation overhead of one SHA1 computation per 1400 bytes,
resulting in the bandwidth overhead of just 1.4% (20/1400). The signature overhead
is one signature per chunk for dynamic content. We will show in Section 5.3 that
much of the web is static and cacheable and HTTPi incurs negligible overhead over
HTTP.
Any segment that fails the integrity check is not rendered. In such cases, we
inform the user about the integrity failure and remove the security indicator from the
page. For JavaScript, we do not perform progressive content loading because today’s
JavaScript engines require an entire script to be received before starting its execution.
5.1.1.3 Security Analysis and Design Enhancements
Out-of-sequence Segments. The segment hashes are arranged in a sequence before
signing. If a network attacker tries to reorder the segments, it will break the sequence
of the hashes and signature verification would fail.
Injection and Removal Attacks. Attacker will not be able to launch injection
attacks successfully because the injected content will not be verified by the browser.
Removal attacks cannot happen to the segment group of a signature for the same
reason.
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Nevertheless, removal attacks can happen across signature groups (a set of chunks
for static content or a single chunk for dynamic content). When HTTP chunks are
used by a server, each signature group will have a set of HTTPi segments and a
signature for them. A network attacker can remove a signature group without being
noticed at the client. To address this issue, we insert the hash of the last segment
of the previous chunk at the beginning of the hash sequence of the current chunk
(Figure 21(b)); and we insert the header hash at the beginning of the hash sequence
of the first chunk.
Content Replay. Network attackers could also mix-and-match old content and
new content to cause disruptions. Such attacks are prevented in our design by placing
time stamp T in each signature. For HTTPi responses that involve multiple signa-
tures, the browser must verify that the time stamp is the same across all signatures.
The network attackers could alternatively replay a completely different response
for requested object. In order to correctly identify the response with the requested
object, the client verifies its own value of the requested URL against the signed
URLreq value.
Stripping Attacks. Both HTTPS and HTTPi are prone to “stripping” attacks
that hijack a user’s initial insecure HTTP request and remove redirects to secure
content. Although it is possible to notice stripping attacks by manually checking
the browser security indicators, users often ignore these indicators [117]. The HTTP
Strict Transport Security protocol (HSTS) prevents these attacks by allowing web
sites to specify a minimum level of security expected for connections to a given server.
The policy can be delivered via HTTP header [71]. To prevent attacks on the user’s
very first visit to the site, the policy can also be delivered via DNSSEC [79]. We
use an extension to HSTS, allowHTTPi, to allow severs to specify HTTPi as the
minimum level of security. The allowHTTPi token is appended to the server’s existing
Strict-Transport-Security policy declaration. Older browsers that do not support
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HSTS will ignore this header, while older browsers that support HSTS but not our
extension will default to HTTPS for all content.
Denial of Service. HTTPi is limited in its capability to handle denial of service
attacks, where a network attacker strips off the integrity header from the response
that requires integrity as specified by the application (Section 5.1.2). As a result,
the content would not be rendered by the browser. Additionally, the attacker can
allow some segments to be rendered, while preventing subsequent segments to arrive
through to the browser. This could potentially corrupt the internal logic of the
application. For example, the attacker can strip off JavaScript that changes the
content of the page and as a result, the page remains rendered in its original form.
One possible countermeasure to this attack is to use a time out for inter-segment
arrival at the client and raise an integrity failure alert after the expiration of the
timer. However, it would require an estimation of the typical inter-arrival time for
each client, which might not always be accurate. In our design, we allow the browser
to wait infinitely for the packets to arrive. If the user clicks on stop, we alert the user
that the content is not complete. Since we do not execute JavaScript till it is fully
received, partially rendered JavaScript would not be an issue for the integrity of the
site.
5.1.2 Mixed Content
The mixed content condition occurs when a web developer references an insecure
(HTTP) resource within a secure (HTTPS) page. Such references create vulnerabil-
ities that put the privacy and integrity of the otherwise secure page at risk, because
the insecure content could be modified in network transit. Scripts are particularly
problematic because they acquire the principal origin of the including page, allow-
ing malicious scripts to read or alter the content that was delivered over the secure
connection. These types of vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly dangerous as
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more users browse untrusted networks and attackers improve upon DNS poisoning
techniques and weaponize exploits against insecure traffic.
Browsers differ in their mixed content handling. Internet Explorer prompts the
user before displaying mixed content, while Firefox and Google Chrome show a mod-
ified browser lock icon. From a security standpoint, the best behavior would be to
block all insecure content in secure pages without prompting the user. The latest
beta release of IE9 enforces this behavior on scripts and stylesheets, but not images;
this policy is similar to the one proposed by Gazelle [129]. However, this option of
automatically blocking insecure content has some serious compatibility implications.
It might potentially confuse the user, since pages that rely on insecure resources could
appear broken. In the worst case, the user might think the broken pages indicate a
bug in the browser and subsequently switch to an older version of the browser or to
a completely different browser to get unbroken pages.
We argue that mixed content vulnerabilities should be fixed by the web developers,
both for security and user-experience reasons. The web developers have a better
understanding of the impact that embedded content can have on the security of their
site. Additionally, they are in much better position to develop a user-friendly fallback
mechanism for their site in case some content fails security checks and hence is not
rendered.
By default, we require that all active content embedded in HTTPi and HTTPS
pages, such as scripts and stylesheets, be rendered over HTTPi or HTTPS. To allow
web applications to customize this default behavior, we use an HTTP header that is
compatible with Content Security Policy (CSP) [125] header to specify the server’s
end-to-end integrity requirements for dependent resources. The CSP policy syntax
is convenient for our purposes as it already allows sites to specify which origins they
want to include content from.





The above example informs the browser that all embedded objects from login.live.com
should be retrieved over HTTPS and content from all other subdomains of live.com
needs to be downloaded over HTTPi. If the servers hosting the embedded content
do not support the corresponding protocol, then the content is considered unsafe as
per the web page’s requirements and hence should not be rendered by the browser.
Our design also supports specification of integrity requirements at a finer level, i.e., at
the level of object types or specific objects themselves. However, the web application
should be careful in specifying such finer policies as it increases bookkeeping at the
server. It also has the potential to break existing interactions within the embedded
content if the policies are not correctly specified.
The CSP syntax provides an ideal mechanism for the web developers to handle
mixed content. It does not require web applications to change their code by explicitly
modifying all insecure references of embedded objects. Even if web developers decide
to modify their code, it might not be sufficient. A secure (HTTPS or HTTPi) URL
can still return a redirect to an insecure resource, which could be difficult to determine
by examining the DOM alone. Additionally, a script delivered over a secure channel
could still make references to insecure content. In our design for HTTPi, the browser
enforces the policies specified by CSP for all statically or dynamically generated URLs.
5.1.3 Access control across HTTPS, HTTPi, and HTTP content
HTTPi content can be embedded in an iframe through the use of the “httpi” scheme,
such as <iframe src=“httpi://a.com/”>, or through the use of an additional iframe
“integrity” attribute, such as <iframe src=”http://a.com/” integrity>. The former
has the consistent presentation with other protocol schemes. The latter has the
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benefit of backward compatibility; on an older browser, HTTPi content would simply
render as HTTP content. Note that no matter what the representation is, the network
messages still speak HTTP to be backward compatible with the existing web caching
infrastructure.
The Same Origin Policy labels the principals with the origin defined as the triple
of <protocol, domain, port> [128,129]. Therefore, content from the same domain and
port number but with different protocol schemes is rendered as separate principals.
They can only communicate explicitly through messages (i.e., postMessage) [32]).
In this subsection, we consider the default interaction and access control model
for HTTPS, HTTPi, and HTTP content served from the same domain and port.
For example, a top-level HTTPi page may embed two iframes, one containing HTTP
content and the other containing HTTPS content; and all three pages are from the
same domain and port. While following the SOP is safe for such scenarios, it disallows
all interaction among HTTP, HTTPi, and HTTPS content. Rather than accessing the
DOM objects directly, developers would be forced to redesign such interaction with
asynchronous postMessage-based protocols, which may be hard to design correctly, as
illustrated by recent flaws found in Facebook Connect and Google Friend Connect [68].
As a result, a developer may be discouraged from converting some content on an
HTTPS site into HTTPi to benefit from its cacheability properties.
As a concrete example, consider an online shopping site that is rendered over
HTTPS to protect users’ private data such as credit card information. The site
presents users with a map to select a site-to-store pick-up location during checkout.
It may be desirable to deliver the store information and map content over HTTPi,
but this raises a problem of allowing the HTTPS part of the site to read the store
selection made by the user, an interaction that would be disallowed by SOP. As a
result, the site’s developers may be forced to refactor their code to use postMessage.
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Figure 22: Interactions in Mixed Content Rendering
to ensure security for such scenarios. Our goal is to allow legitimate communication
while preserving the security semantics, namely the confidentiality and/or integrity,
of the rendered data. Our default communication policies are inspired by the com-
bination of the Bell LaPadula [33, 35] and Biba [39] models. It is important to note
that our goal is not to enforce information flow invariants often associated with those
models (e.g., frames of any origin can already freely communicate via postMessage),
but rather to use these models to determine a secure and convenient default isolation
policy for our setting. We summarize these models as the following set of rules:
Bell LaPadula model (for confidentiality):
• The Simple Security Property: a subject at a given security level may not read
an object at a higher security level (no read-up).
• The *(star) property: a subject at a given security level must not write to any
object at a lower security level (no write-down).
Biba model (for integrity):
• The Simple Integrity Axiom states that a subject at a given level of integrity
may not read an object at a lower integrity level (no read down).
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• The * (star) Integrity Axiom states that a subject at a given level of integrity
must not write to any object at a higher level of integrity (no write up).
In view of these models, we represent the three protocols (HTTP, HTTPS and
HTTPi) by two confidentiality levels (Chigh and Clow) and two integrity levels (Ihigh
and Ilow), which models the high and low requirements for confidentiality and in-
tegrity, respectively. HTTPS can be realized by the tuple <Chigh, Ihigh >, HTTPi by
<Clow, Ihigh> and HTTP by <Clow, Ilow>. Using this model, we define the access
control rules across HTTP, HTTPi, and HTTPS as follows:
HTTPS and HTTP. HTTPS’ confidentiality label Chigh is higher than HTTP’s
confidentiality level Clow, thus resulting in “no read up, no write down” requirement
of the Bell LaPadula model. The integrity levels of HTTPS and HTTP, Ihigh and Ilow
respectively, with Ihigh > Ilow, results in “no write up, no read down” condition of
the Biba model. Combining these two requirements results in no reads or writes to
either side being allowed between HTTPS and HTTP. This derivation is consistent
with the SOP.
HTTPi and HTTP. Since confidentiality levels of HTTPi and HTTP are equal,
only the integrity levels enforce the “no write up, no read down” policy from the
HTTPi content to HTTP resources (Figure 22). Firstly, this means that a script
belonging to the HTTPi principal can write to the HTTP part of the page without
reading its content. One reason to prevent an HTTPi script from reading HTTP
content is to prevent the HTTP input from influencing the logic within the HTTPi
content. However, an HTTPi script might still desire to read the HTTP page to
identify the DOM element to write to. So, our requirement is to allow the read
operation on the HTTP content without allowing the logic of HTTPi content from
being affected. One way to realize this is by performing complete information flow
check in the HTTPi code, which might not be practical. We use an alternative
approach in which the HTTPi content itself writes the code for reading the HTTP
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content, and this code is injected into the HTTP content. This injected code runs
within the HTTP principal and hence can freely read and write to the content. Since
HTTPi relinquishes the transferred code to the HTTP integrity level (Ilow), that code
cannot affect the logic of HTTPi’s own code, though it still can read from HTTPi
content. Secondly, HTTP can read the HTTPi content, but cannot write to it. We
realize this in our design by providing only a shadow copy of the HTTPi content to
HTTP, with no direct reference to real HTTPi objects.
HTTPS and HTTPi. Since HTTPS and HTTPi integrity levels are equal, only
the confidentiality levels force the “no read up, no write down” rule from HTTPS
to HTTPi resources (Figure 22). Both read and write operations can be realized
similarly to the previous scenario. We allow HTTPi content to write to HTTPS since
the code for HTTPi is at the same integrity level as HTTPS content and written by
the same developer (since they have the same domain). HTTPi scripts can write the
code for reading the HTTPS content into the HTTPS’ DOM and effectively, that code
becomes part of the HTTPS principal. This allows reading of the HTTPS code by
the injected code without leaking any of the read data back to HTTPi’s main code.
For reading HTTPi content without allowing any write, a shadow of the HTTPi’s
DOM is provided to the HTTPS. Coming back to the shopping site example earlier
in this section, this rule would allow HTTPS content to read the store selection made
by the user and correspondingly send the merchandise to the selected store.
5.2 Implementation
HTTPi requires both the client browser and the hosting server to adhere to the proto-
col. Accordingly, our implementation consists of server-side and client-side modules.
Figure 23 shows the high-level architecture of our system. Our server-side imple-



























Figure 23: High-Level Architecture of our HTTPi Implementation with the opera-
tional steps to retrieve content over HTTPi as follows: (1) IE makes an initial request
for a specific page. (2) Server-side proxy identifies that the request is for a HTTPi-
enabled resource and appends integrity policy headers to the response. (3) HTML
content filter processes the response by modifying URLs that match STS policies to
point to their corresponding HTTPi links. (4) HTML content filter releases the mod-
ified response to IE’s rendering engine. (5) The HTTPi protocol handler is invoked
for every HTTPi object encountered during rendering. (6) The HTTPi protocol han-
dler makes a HTTP call to the server requesting the object. (7) Server-side proxy
traps the request, makes an independent HTTP call to the backend web server to
get the response, hashes and signs the response, and returns it back to the HTTPi
protocol handler. (8) The HTTPi protocol handler verifies the signature and hashes
corresponding to the different segments in the response. (9) Successfully verified seg-
ments are passed to the rendering engine for progressive loading. The Script Engine
Proxy (SEP) subsequently mediates all mixed-content interactions while a web page
renders.
interactions on the server side, including content hashing, segmentation, and a han-
dler for appending integrity policy requirements to HTTP responses. Our client-side
implementation centers around three modules that we add to Internet Explorer 8:
(1) an HTML content filter that transforms a given page to adhere to integrity pol-
icy requirements, (2) an HTTPi protocol that handles the client-side processing of
HTTPi content, and (3) a module that provides JavaScript and DOM interposition
to enforce our mixed-content access control policies. In this section, we describe each
of these modules and the associated implementation challenges in turn. Overall, our




We explored two options for implementing the server-side component of HTTPi, with
the options differing in their deployment tradeoffs. First, we extended the IIS 7 web
server with a C# module for HTTPi, called HTTPi Transformer, that encapsulates
the functionality to generate HTTP responses with signatures and content hashes
that adhere to the HTTPi protocol. Although we chose IIS, similar module function-
ality is available for other web servers. This option is useful if the server is willing
to immediately integrate HTTPi functionality into their current setup. It also has
obvious performance benefits as the module is closely coupled with the functionality
of the web server.
In our second deployment option, we integrated the HTTPi Transformer into a web
proxy that translates typical HTTP responses into HTTPi responses by embedding all
the hashes and signatures needed by HTTPi. We leveraged the public-domain Fiddler
web debugging proxy [84] and its FiddlerCore [57] extensibility interfaces. This option
is independent of web server implementation and allows servers to continue supporting
HTTP as the delivery protocol for backward compatibility, while switching to the
HTTPi protocol for requests that pass through the proxy. It eases deployment, since
the proxy can be deployed anywhere in the network and guarantees integrity between
the proxy and a compatible browser. This could be desirable for corporations that do
not require integrity checks for intranet users, while ensuring integrity of their sites
for external users.
For our evaluation, we used the latter option of having a network proxy, because
(1) it allowed us to test our prototype against publicly deployed web sites without
having any control of their web servers, and (2) it allowed fair comparison of HTTPi
with HTTPS and HTTP (Section 5.3.2.3) by cleanly switching to a desired protocol
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between the client and the proxy even when the backend server did not support the
protocol.
5.2.2 Client-side Implementation
5.2.2.1 Filtering content to enable HTTPi
We expect that origin servers would generate new content with the right “httpi” URIs
for the content that requires integrity. In any case, our design ensures that mixed
content policies are enforced by verifying the URIs against the policies. Instead of
requiring the servers to change the URIs in their existing content, our implementation
of HTTPi performs the required filtering to enforce the mixed content policies. The
HTML content filter module is invoked for every HTML response received at the
browser that is associated with a Strict Transport Security policy or Content Security
policy. This module modifies HTML content to ensure that it adheres to the minimum
security levels specified in STS and CSP. For example, all object links on a page are
transformed to corresponding HTTPi links by modifying the protocol field in the
URL. Since the HTML content filter is invoked before the page is rendered in the
browser, this design allows the HTTPi protocol handler to be associated with all
such links and hence ensures that the HTTPi handler is invoked when the browser
requests those links during rendering. We implemented this module by using IE’s
public MIME filter COM interfaces [1] and subsequently registered it as a filter for
HTML content.
One limitation of this approach is that it may miss dynamically-generated links
where the URL is constructed by JavaScript at runtime. We are currently working on
solving this by performing HTTPi redirection to the time of actual HTTP requests;




The HTTPi protocol handler encapsulates all client-side handling of HTTPi content
and is automatically invoked by the browser when an HTTPi link is encountered by
the browser’s rendering engine. Upon invocation, it makes an independent HTTP
call to the server to retrieve the content. It then verifies the integrity of the content
in segments using the mechanism described in Section 5.1. Once the integrity of a
particular segment is verified, its content is released to the browser’s rendering engine
for progressive loading.
We implemented this module as an asynchronous pluggable protocol (APP) [1] IE
module associated with the HTTPi protocol. Even though IE provides this generic
protocol extension point, implementing a general-purpose protocol with minimal per-
formance overhead is challenging. IE’s internal logic is well-optimized for HTTP and
HTTPS, which makes a comparably performant web protocol difficult to implement.
A considerable time and effort was spent on making our code as optimal as possible
by parallelizing various operations such as network read and signature verification.
Despite our limited knowledge of IE’s internal optimizations and with the handicap
of using a generic interface, we were still able to achieve acceptable performance as
compared to HTTPS and HTTP (Section 5.3.2.3).
5.2.2.3 Access control for mixed content
Another big challenge for our implementation was to customize SOP to include our
mixed-content access control policies. Unfortunately, IE does not allow changing the
code for SOP with public APIs. As a result, the only alternative was to implement
our solution as an additional layer on top of the existing SOP and then find a way to
enforce mixed-content policies within the limits imposed by the existing SOP logic.
This certainly made our implementation more difficult.
To solve this problem, we use a two step approach. In the first step, we modify
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the security origin (origin is defined as the tuple <protocol, domain, port>) of all
objects on the web page by changing the protocol field to HTTP, i.e., the one with
the lowest integrity and confidentiality level. This is achieved by providing a custom
implementation for the IInternetProtocolInfo interface [12] from within the APP
for HTTPi. Note that changing the security origin of an element does not affect the
URL associated with that element.
As per the SOP, all the objects on the page can now interact without restriction.
Our second step is to enforce access control rules or policies that govern such inter-
actions. We build on our earlier work [123,128] that implements a JavaScript engine
proxy (called script engine proxy or SEP): SEP is installed between IE’s rendering
and script engines, and it mediates and customizes DOM object interactions. SEP is
implemented as a COM object and is installed into IE by modifying IE’s JavaScript
engine ID in the Windows registry. We extend SEP to trap into all invocations (read
or write) across the page’s objects and ensure that our mixed-content access control
polices (Section 5.1.3) are enforced. We use the URLs associated with the accessing
object and the object being accessed in making our access control decision. The two-
step logic that governs the access control enforcement in our implementation can be
summarized as follows:
• If the original origins of the caller and the callee objects differ in domain and/or
port, then the browser would prevent any interactions across them in accor-
dance with the SOP.
• If the original origins of the caller and the callee objects differs in only protocol,
the SOP would allow the objects to interact (as we modify the protocol of the
security origin to HTTP). In this case, we mediate the interaction within our
customized SEP to enforce our access control policies.
The read operation is straightforward: SEP allows the caller to have read access to
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Table 13: Measurement of publicly cacheable web content from the top 1000 Alexa
sites.
Protocol
Total Objects Publicly Cacheable Objects
Count Size Count Size
HTTP 346,629 1532 MB 251,826 (72.65%) 1385 MB (90.41%)
HTTPS 5,036 21.95 MB 3,659 (72.66%) 19.39 MB (88.33%)
the callee’s objects. The write operation could be implemented in a similar fashion;
however, some writes must first access an object to which the write subsequently
occurs. For example, if the caller wants to write content to a specific element on a
callee object, it might need to read the handle to that element using functions such
as getElementById or getElementsByName. However, if the caller only has write
privileges with no read access, it cannot make such calls and hence cannot know
where to write the content.
We solve this problem by introducing a new JavaScript function writeUsingCode,
which is interpreted by our SEP implementation; the browser’s JavaScript engine
does not need to understand this function. Instead of directly making read calls
looking for an element of the callee object, the caller uses the function to pass the
JavaScript code that encapsulates such read calls and the subsequent write call to the
corresponding element. The SEP intercepts this function call and makes calls to the
underlying JavaScript engine to execute the code with the origin of the callee object.
Any unintended feedback mechanism introduced by this code is prevented by SEP’s
access control policies.
5.3 Evaluation
We have implemented a HTTPi system that works end-to-end. We used our proxy-
based implementation as a server-side HTTPi endpoint to verify our system for cor-
rectness against a number of popular web sites, such as Google, Bing Maps, and
Wikipedia. In each case, the browser successfully rendered the web pages and all
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integrity checks were correctly included at the server and verified at the browser.
Any tampering of the web page in the network was correctly detected and failed the
integrity check at the browser. We evaluated the access control interactions for mixed
content by developing a set of custom web pages that included such interactions. Our
system correctly enforced the access control policies for such interactions.
Next, we provide experimental evidence to support our claim that today’s web
sites can benefit from cacheability enabled by HTTPi. To this end, we first perform
a web cacheability study to answer two questions: (1) what web sites have cacheable
content, and (2) what users are taking advantage of shared caches on the web. Next,
we evaluate the performance of our prototype by micro-benchmarking its operations
and by comparing its overhead to that of HTTPS and HTTP.
5.3.1 Study of Web Cacheability
With HTTPi, web sites decide what content uses HTTPi as the underlying mechanism
of transport. Therefore, any content that web sites currently allow to be cached by
intermediate web servers, such as CDNs and web caches, becomes an ideal target for
HTTPi. To better estimate the amount of web content that could benefit from the
use of HTTPi, we performed a cacheability analysis on the top 1,000 Alexa sites that
includes both top-level pages and embedded content on the sites visited. We analyze
the HTTP caching headers, such as Cache-control, Expires, Pragma, etc., to decide
what content is deemed cacheable according to the HTTP specification [58].
Experimental Setup. To facilitate automatic analysis for a large number of
URLs, we used a customized crawler from our earlier work [123], which utilizes IE’s
extensibility interfaces to completely automate the browser’s navigation. To invoke
functionality beyond a site’s home page, the crawler uses simple heuristics that sim-
ulate some user interaction, such as clicking of links and searching form submis-
sions. We restrict all simulated navigations to stay within the same origin as a site’s
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home page. We monitor the browser’s network traffic in a proxy to intercept all
HTTP/HTTPS requests and analyze HTTP headers relevant to web caching. The
proxy is included as a trusted certificate authority at the browser in order to allow it
to intercept the HTTPS traffic and inspect its content [84].
Prevalence of cacheable content. Table 13 shows the results of our web
cacheability experiment. Note that our results only consider content that is marked
as public and excludes any private content that is user-specific and hence is intended
to be cached only at the user’s browser. As we can observe from the table, a large
majority of the web content is rendered over HTTP with more than 98% of the objects
that we observed being HTTP objects. We found that approximately 73% of these
objects are cacheable. The cacheability is higher in terms of content size, with more
than 90% of total HTTP content size (of all objects) being cacheable, indicating that
the web applications typically want larger-sized content, such as images, to be cached
in the network. The limited number of HTTPS objects that we encountered follow
a similar trend with a large number (73%) being cacheable objects. The presence of
a considerable number of public, cacheable HTTPS objects is an indication that web
applications intend to cache objects in the web, but are discouraged by the lack of
security provided by HTTP. They are left with no choice but to trust the CDNs for
this type of content. If only integrity of the content is desired, HTTPi presents itself
as an ideal alternative for these HTTPS objects.
Presence of in-network caches. To see how many users are benefiting from
web caches today, we measured the prevalence of forward caching proxy servers, which
are a significant source of in-network caching. More specifically, we conducted an ex-
periment to determine how the country and the user agent affects whether a forward
network proxy is being used. We used rich media web ads as a delivery mecha-
nism for our measurement code, using the same ad network and technique previously
demonstrated in [77]. We spent $80 to purchase 115,031 impressions spread across
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194 countries. Our advertisement detected forward proxies using XMLHttpRequest
to bypass the browser cache and store content in the network cache. Overall, 3% of
web users who viewed our ad were using a caching network proxy. However, some
countries had a significantly higher fraction of users behind network proxies. Popular
countries for forward proxies included Kuwait (63% of 372 impressions), United Arab
Emirates (61% of 624 impressions), Argentina (11% of 1,875 impressions), and Saudi
Arabia (10% of 4,248 impressions). We also observed higher usage of forward proxy
caches (11%) among mobile users, although these users accounted for only 0.1% of
the total impressions in our experiment.
Relevance to HTTPi. Our results demonstrate that cache proxies are still
prevalent and useful today, particularly for large user communities, such as a whole
country of people behind a single firewall and mobile users behind cellular gateways.
HTTPi can take advantage of these proxies while offering end-to-end security at the
same time.
5.3.2 Performance Evaluation of HTTPi
We evaluate the performance of HTTPi in two steps. First, we perform micro-
benchmarking of various stages of the protocol and analyze the parameters that
determine HTTPi’s performance. Second, we analyze the end-to-end performance
overhead of HTTPi over existing HTTP and HTTPS protocols.
5.3.2.1 Experimental Overview
Ideally, we would run performance experiments on real web sites deployed on the
web. However, current web servers do not understand the HTTPi protocol, and
many servers host an HTTP version of a site but not HTTPS. To overcome this,
we used our modified server-side Fiddler [84] proxy (Section 5.2.1) for proxying all
requests from the client to the backend server, and converting HTTP requests from
the origin server into HTTPi or HTTPS requests to the client, as necessary for our
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experiments. This setup allows us to measure the cost of using HTTPS and HTTPi
for web pages that are currently hosted over HTTP.
We use the end-to-end response time as the measurement criterion, defined as time
between the instance at which a URL is submitted at the browser and the instance
at which the corresponding page is fully rendered. To remove any discrepancies
that might arise from fetching content from the backend server due to inconsistent
network conditions, we deduct the data fetching time at Fiddler from the total end-
to-end response time. This gives us an estimate of the end-to-end response time with
Fiddler acting as the server. For a fair comparison, we also perform similar deductions
for HTTP and HTTPS.
For our experiments, we use SSL certificate size of 1024 bits. Even though there is
a push on the Internet to move towards 2048-bit certificates, many of the popular sites
such as Gmail still use 1024-bit keys. Additionally, it makes HTTPi’s performance
estimates to be conservative in comparison to HTTPS, as HTTPS will perform worse
for 2048-bit keys.
Using the Akma network delay simulator v0.9.129 [17], we simulated various net-
work conditions to understand their performance impact on end-to-end response time.
We simulate the incoming and outgoing connections to have equal bandwidth and
fixed their queue sizes at 20 packets. We run our delay simulator on the server side to
cap the server throughput to a desired bandwidth. We deploy our server-side Fiddler
code on a Windows 7 machine, with an Intel 2.67 GHz Core i7 CPU and 6 GB of
RAM. The client runs on a Windows 7 machine, with an Intel 2.4GHz quad-core CPU
and 4GB of RAM. All experimental results are averaged over 10 trial runs.
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Figure 24: Micro-benchmarking various operations in HTTPi for a 836KB web page,
using 512Kbps network bandwidth.
5.3.2.2 Micro-benchmarks
To understand sources of overheads in our system, we instrumented our HTTPi im-
plementation to measure latencies of various operations, and used a simulated net-
work bandwidth of 512Kbps to load an 836KB HTML page in our HTTPi-enabled
browser, with the size picked to maximize measurable overhead and to observe ef-
fects of HTTPi’s segmentation. Figure 24 breaks down the delays contributing to the
end-to-end response time, which we measured to be 15.7 sec.
We find that a large fraction of the total time is spent reading content from the
network (bar 7 in Figure 24), which is an expected behavior for slower networks. The
overhead costs of hashing all content segments (bar 2) and signing these hashes with
a 1024-bit key (bar 3) on the server side is very small. Here, the RSA signature
is calculated on a fixed-size single SHA1 hash of 20 bytes (Section 5.1); this takes
just 3ms. Since the header value sizes are much smaller as compared to the content
body, both the time to set the header integrity content (hashing and signing) on the
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Figure 25: End-to-end response time as a function of the network bandwidth avail-
able to the client, measured for a 836KB page. Note that these results do not include
performance benefits due to caching for HTTP and HTTPi.
server (bar 1) and time to verify it on the client side (bar 4) is low.2 On the client
side, the signature verification time (215 ms, bar 6) is a more significant source of
overhead. It is considerably higher than the cumulative hash verification time for all
content segments (51 ms, bar 5), supporting our design of using a single signature over
multiple segment hashes. The time to pass data from our client-side HTTPi protocol
handler into the browser’s rendering engine (bar 8) is also considerable; although it is
not specific to HTTPi and would also be incurred by other protocol handlers in the
browser, native protocols like HTTP are more optimized in our browser for this step,
as we discussed in Section 5.2.2.2.
In summary, we find that the major HTTPi components (bars 1-6) constitute only
295 ms (1.8%) of the end-to-end response time for this microbenchmark, with largest
overhead coming from client-side signature verification.
2Note that we do not perform any segmentation for headers. For our measurements, we specify
two headers, Server and Content-Type, to require integrity. This time cost will vary according to
the number of headers for which integrity checksum is set.
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5.3.2.3 Comparing HTTPi to HTTP and HTTPS
In this section, we compare HTTPi’s performance to that of HTTP and HTTPS
and answer two questions: (1) Is the user-perceived latency acceptable for the data
received over HTTPi, and (2) What is the performance impact of running HTTPi
and the hashing and signing load it incurs on a web server?
User-perceived latency. We compared the end-to-end response time for our
836KB test page rendered over HTTPi, HTTPS and HTTP. Figure 25 shows the
results of our experiments performed over different network bandwidth conditions.
Note that the performance results do not include caching, and only evaluates the first
of potentially many requests for this page. Evaluating performance of a particular
cache is not a goal of our experiments and has been previously well studied [130,133].
We see that HTTPi incurs minimal overhead over both HTTP and HTTPS, and
this overhead is consistently within 0.7-2.0 seconds over both HTTP and HTTPS
for different network bandwidths. Since this value does not vary much with network
bandwidth, we believe our implementation is successful in approximately matching
the network optimizations of HTTPS and HTTP. We believe that there is still ample
room for client-side optimization as we discussed earlier in Section 5.2, and this
will certainly reduce the total overhead of HTTPi (since client-side overhead is not
negligible as shown by our micro-benchmarking experiments).
Web Server Throughput. Our server throughput measurements are performed
using httperf [94], an HTTP performance measurement tool. The experiments are
performed using two different setups that closely represent typical real-world web
deployments:
• Our first setup consists of an IIS server that is hosted on a bare-metal Windows
7 machine, with Intel 2.67 GHz Core i7 CPU and 6 GB of RAM. The Linux
client machine running httperf is connected to the server by a 1Gbps network
with negligible latency.
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Table 14: Impact of HTTPi and HTTPS on server throughput in responses/sec.
Experiment HTTP HTTPi HTTPS
Bare-metal Setup 3320 3318 2503
Amazon EC2 Setup 2757 2732 678
• Our second setup is cloud-based; we use a virtual Windows 2008 Server image
on Amazon EC2. At the time, this image was the only publicly available image
that came pre-installed with IIS 7. It is a “high-CPU medium” instance with 5
EC2 compute units with 1.7 GB of RAM (the fastest instance that was available
for this image). This setup mimics a typical EC2 user who wants to host a web
server. httperf is executed from a Linux EC2 instance in the same region, using
EC2-private LAN with negligible network latency.
We use an experimental HTML page of size 4.8 KB, which represents a typical
size of a page with no embedded links. We arrived at this page size based on the web
estimates that put total page size at 170KB (median) and number of objects per page
at 37 (median) [107]. For each page, we increased the offered load on the server until
the number of sustained sessions peaked. We found that the server was CPU-bound
in all cases. Each session simulated one request to the web page.
Table 14 shows a summary of our results. HTTPi incurs negligible degradation
(less than 1%) of throughput compared to the original HTTP page. In comparison,
the throughput drop was substantial when using HTTPS, with our bare-metal ex-
periment reporting 25% and EC2 experiment showing 75% drop in the throughput.
This drop is attributed to the heavy CPU load for the SSL handshake. Our bare-
metal experiment shows a lesser drop since it has a considerably faster CPU, which
handles the load better. Overall, these results demonstrate that web servers can have
a significant performance incentive to use HTTPi instead of HTTPS.
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5.4 Summary
We envision HTTPi to complement HTTPS to bring end-to-end security to the entire
web. Only when there is end-to-end security, the browser platform and the web are
able to have a collectively secure overall system.
We advocate the part of web that does not have end-to-end security today to
adopt HTTPi which incurs negligible performance overhead over HTTP and enjoys
the benefit of CDNs and cache proxies just as HTTP. For existing HTTPS content, our
study indicates that its significant portion is cacheable and can also gain significant





Access control is defined as any mechanism by which a system grants or revokes the
right to access some data, or perform some action. It is a well established area of
research and previous work in this field range from creation of new models [42,51,115]
to improving improving various aspects of these models [86–88, 141]. In this thesis,
our focus is not on creating yet another all-purpose access control model but is on
developing a generalized framework to allow such models to be integrated into web
applications (Chapter 2).
Access control for web applications and services is an area that has been well
studied in the literature [43,49,90]. While such centralized solutions are well suited to
the web applications, their design is limited in the changing Web 2.0 paradigm towards
user-contributed data. Our work is more user centric allowing users to contribute in
defining the access control for their own data.
The need for user-defined policies for user applications is being understood [64,
120]. PinUP is one system that allows users to manage file access of his own applica-
tions in an isolated environment specific to the user [54]. In another work, Simpson
has argued that the users of social networking sites should have the opportunity to
construct fine-grained access control policies that meet their particular requirements
and circumstances [120]. Chinaei et. al proposed a decentralized access control sys-
tem in which corporate policy can allow all health record owners to administer access
control over their own objects [44]. Our work is not specific to any type of appli-
cation and can be integrated into a wide range of web applications, including social
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networks, content sharing sites, and many others.
Gates has proposed use of access control based on the real-world relationships of
users [64]. In agreement with our work, she also favors access control decisions to
be made by the users regarding access to their data. She further argues the access
control policies and relationship groups defined by the user should follow the user,
rather than be redeveloped for each individual site. While her ideas relates to some
of the work described in this thesis, there is no real implementation of the ideas
presented in her work.
There are some proposed solutions that allow inter operability between diverse
web applications by using user-centric identities for access control mechanism. Lockr
is an access control system based on social relationships that lets people manage their
social networks by themselves in one place (e.g., through their personal address books)
while letting web sites and Internet systems be in charge of content delivery only [127].
This eliminates the need for users to maintain many site-specific copies of their social
networks. Similar protection is achieved by the single sign-on decentralized model of
OpenID [18].
6.2 Information Flow Control
Information flow control at the language level has been well studied [45, 98]. Jif is a
Java-based programming language that enforces decentralized information flow con-
trol within a program, providing finer grained control than xBook [98]. In comparison
to these language level techniques that require the applications to be rewritten, the
xBook platform provides a simpler interface to the application programmers: they
do not need to learn a new language or perform any fine-grained code annotations.
Additionally, information flow on a language like JavaScript with dynamically created
source code may not be feasible. Cong et al. [45] presented a technique of writing
secure web applications, which generates JavaScript code on the client side and java
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code on the server side. However, the applications are still written in the Jif language.
There are other systems [82,140] that have utilized the information flow concept to
control data flow at the operating systems (OS) level. Information flows are tracked
at low-level OS object types such as threads, processes, etc. xBook works at a much
coarser level at the applications, with smallest unit of information being an application
component. As a result, run-time information flow in xBook would probably be less
expensive as compared to a much finer granularity level used in these systems. In
order to make these systems useful for a typical social networking environment, it
would require the systems to be installed at a user’s computer because leaks can also
happen at the browser, which might not be feasible. In comparison, xBook runs on
a typical web server without any changes to the OS environment.
Similar to the ADsafe environment, other safe subsets of programming languages,
such as JoeE [59] (for java) and Caja [91] (for JavaScript), allow third-party applica-
tions to provide active content safely and flexibility within the existing web standards.
While we used ADsafe for its simplicity and suitability to meet our system needs, we
expect that it would be similarly possible to develop xBook using these alternatives.
6.3 Browser Access Control Policies
We are not the first to find and analyze flaws in browser security policies. Previous
work has looked at weaknesses in cross-frame communication mechanisms [32], frame
navigation policies [32,129], client-side browser state [78], cookie path protection [100],
protection among documents within same origin [75], display protection [129], and
other issues. Zalewski [138] documents the security design in browsers including some
loopholes. This proposed research complements these efforts by providing a more
systematic approach for identifying incoherencies in browser’s access control policies.
To our knowledge, this would be the first, principal-driven analysis on browsers’ access
control policies.
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DOM access checker [139] is a tool designed to automatically validate numerous
aspects of domain security policy enforcement (cross-domain DOM access, JavaScript
cookies, XMLHttpRequest calls, event and transition handling) to detect common
security attack or information disclosure vectors. Browserscope [4] is a community-
driven project for tracking browser functionality. Its security test suite [74] checks
whether new browser security features are implemented by a browser. In our analysis
of access control incoherency, we will focus on uncovering the incoherencies from
examining the interplay between resources, runtime identity changes, and the user
principal’s resource access control. This focus and methodology differ from these
previous or ongoing work and our analysis not only touches on DOM, but also on the
HTTP network layer and display.
6.3.1 Web Evaluation Frameworks
Compared to previous work, a unique aspect of our proposed research will be our
extensive evaluation of the cost of removing unsafe policies from the current web by
actively crawling and executing web content. Yue et al. [137] also used a crawling-
based, execution-based approach to measure the prevalence of unsafe JavaScript fea-
tures on 6,805 popular web sites. They used a JavaScript interposition technique
that is similar to our script interposition, but they lack any network and display in-
terposition capabilities, limiting the policies they can monitor. As well, we will use a
significantly larger dataset.
Our active crawling infrastructure will build on previous efforts that have analyzed
safety of web pages by rendering them in real browsers running within virtual ma-
chines [95,96,105,106,131]. We will extend these frameworks with additional browser
interposition support to monitor unsafe browser security policies.
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6.4 Content Integrity
Prior work has explored a number of integrity protection techniques. A proposal on
authentication-only ciphersuites for PSK-TLS [41] describes a transport layer security
scheme for authentication and integrity, with no confidentiality guarantees. However,
this proposal requires a shared secret between each client and the server to key the
hash, making it impractical to share the key with all the clients of the application.
Our work builds on SHTTP [110]’s signature mode of operation and additionally
addressed progressive content loading and the associated security.
Web tripwires [108] verify the integrity of a page by matching it against a known
good representation of the page (either a checksum or an encoded full copy of the
page’s HTML). It uses client-side JavaScript code to detect in-flight modifications
to a web page. However, web tripwires have high network overhead (approximately
17% of the page size), which could hinder the end-to-end response time, especially
for slower networks. Moreover, web tripwires can be identified and disabled by an
adversary, and they cannot detect full-page substitutions. In contrast, HTTPi is
cryptographically secure and can prevent any type of integrity breaches. HTTPi also
has a much lower network overhead cost as compared to web tripwire. Finally, web
tripwires focus on detection, while HTTPi focuses on both detection and prevention.
HTTP provides a Content-MD5 header [58] that can carry the MD5 signature
of the complete page. This header could be useful in providing basic page integrity,
but suffers from many weaknesses if used by itself. For example, a network attacker
can modify the header since it is not authenticated, and the attacker can completely
drop the header without the client knowing about it. In contrast, HTTPi provides
authentication by signing content hashes, and since it specifies the requirements for a
page using HSTS in advance, the client can easily detect whether the required integrity
content is dropped by network attackers. Additionally, with HTTPi, integrity is
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evaluated over smaller-sized segments, which has performance benefits over the entire-
page approach used in the Content-MD5 header.
The YURL [47] specification defines an alternative server identification and au-
thentication mechanism that does not depend on centralized authorities like the DNS
or PKI. A YURL identifies a site using the site’s public key fingerprint and the web
site owner owns the CA fingerprint. However, like HTTPS, and unlike HTTPi, the






The Web continues to evolve creating new challenges and requirements for systems
that are currently deployed on the Web. The introduction of new web players, such
as the average users who contribute web content, further impose new requirements.
The available security policies and protection mechanisms continue to be stretched
exposing their limitations and potential vulnerabilities. In this dissertation, we have
addressed this important issue and evaluated the current security and privacy policies
in view of the changing Web requirements. We have also developed enforcement
frameworks that effectively ensure that the security policies specified by different web
players are correctly followed. We have addressed several challenges in view of our
goal to improve end-to-end security for web access and made four unique contributions
pertaining to policy specification and enforcement.
First, we developed xAccess, an application-independent, generalized framework
that allows average users to define access control policies for their contributed data.
The contributions associated with this piece of work are as follows:
• We provided a novel design of an unified access control framework for supporting
diverse user-defined access control policies that empowers the users to choose
their own models and their own access granularity. We also show that our model
is generic to allow simulation of a number of popular access control models on
top of our framework, and provides enormous flexibility to the users in making
access control decisions about the data owned by them.
• We developed a proof-of-concept prototype system for xAccess that provides a
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set of APIs that can be used to integrate generalized access control capability
into web applications.
• We demonstrated the viability of our framework by developing a sample blog-
ging application as our base example and subsequently integrating access con-
trol into the application using the xAccess APIs. We also showed real-world
deployment potential of our framework by integrating xAccess into a popular
open-source wikipedia application.
The next part of the thesis focused on extending the enforcement of user-defined
policies to third-party applications. We developed xBook, a framework that uses
information flow control models to ensure that untrusted third-party applications
only share data within the realms of the user’s privacy policies, thus preventing any
accidental or malicious leaks by these applications. This work made multiple contri-
butions:
• We presented a novel design of a social networking platform for supporting third-
party applications that not only controls what user profile data the applications
are allowed to access, but also mediates what the applications can do with the
user data they can access.
• We developed a proof-of-concept system for xBook that provides a set of APIs
that can be used to develop privacy-preserving social networking applications.
• We showed the viability of our framework by porting the functionality of some
popular Facebook applications to applications developed using the xBook APIs.
• We demonstrated a practical deployment strategy of our system by porting our
platform itself as an application on Facebook.
For the third component of the thesis, the web player of focus was the client-side
software, specifically the web browser. We studied the current state of access control
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policies that browsers use to share resources among their web site principals. We
showed that mishandling of such principals leads to many access control incoheren-
cies, presenting hurdles for web developers to construct secure web applications. In
summary, this work made the following contributions:
• We provided a systematic, principal-driven analysis of access control incoheren-
cies in today’s browsers.
• We introduced the user principal concept for the browser setting.
• We developed a comprehensive, extensible compatibility measurement frame-
work to measure the use of various browser features on the Web.
• We performed the first large-scale measurements on the compatibility cost of co-
herent access control policies. Our methodology and results serve as a guideline
for browser designers to balance security and backward compatibility.
Finally, this dissertation presented a mechanism that enables web applications to
define policies to balance their desired security and performance. We observed that
only end-to-end authentication and integrity are required for the browser platform
to enforce its access control reliably. Without end-to-end confidentiality, content can
be cached. Subsequently, we proposed a novel protocol, called HTTPi, which offers
only end-to-end authentication and integrity and seamlessly works with the existing
web caching infrastructure. This allows web applications to cache their content in the
network while ensuring that the content’s integrity is protected. The contributions
of this work are:
• We presented an end-to-end design and implementation of HTTPi, that does
not require changes at intermediate nodes, such as proxies, for caching HTTPi
content. Our design also ensures that progressive content loading in browsers
is not hindered by HTTPi, and that this incurs minimal overhead in both com-
putation and bandwidth.
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• We performed web measurements to show that a significant portion of existing
HTTPS content can be shared and cached across users. These measurements
demonstrate the importance of HTTPi as they indicate that much of existing
HTTPS content can be safely turned into HTTPi content to achieve better
performance and the ability to offload content to other servers without any loss
of security.
• We developed a mechanism that provided web developers with an easy way
to specify policies on how the HTTPi content can be safely mixed together
with HTTP and HTTPS content. Furthermore, we observed that the default
isolation policy for HTTPi, HTTPS, and HTTP content of the same domain
and port does not need to be as strict as the same-origin policy. To this end,
we designed a new default policy to allow useful interactions across different
protocol schemes without sacrificing security.
7.2 Future Work
While a number of problems regarding the design and enforcement of web security
policies have been addressed in this thesis, the research work has revealed several
other areas to explore and a few open problems that may be worth solving in order
to reach the goal of improving the effectiveness of web security solutions. These
problems and areas are described below:
• Web security for mobile platforms. Mobile devices are limited in their
capability in processing, storage or screen space, and this limitation creates
additional challenges to accessing the Web securely on these devices. On one
hand, the security design of the mobile applications rendering the Web on these
mobile devices is limited; on the other hand, the mobile version of the web
applications create security pitfalls that can be exploited. The mobility of
these devices also brings additional security challenges. Our work on analyzing
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policies in the desktop space can be extended to analyze the effectiveness of
the web security policies in the mobile environment [28] and develop robust,
secure system designs that are more aligned with the requirements of the mobile
web. The associated challenges in the mobile web space need to be further
investigated and explored.
• Cloud-based web application designs. Cloud computing has fast emerged
as a cornerstone technology for enterprises to offload bulk of their processing
and storage needs to the server clouds. This trend has had a noticeable impact
on how users access their applications (such as documents or email): instead
of the users being individually responsible for deploying these applications, the
applications are shifting base to the cloud providers who are now responsible
for the deployment of these applications. This has also resulted in the security
of these applications being shifted from the users to the cloud providers, while
users’ demands for security and data privacy remain unchanged. On one hand,
the cloud providers are hosting large amount of sensitive user data; on the
other hand, they are hosting mutually distrusting applications that seek access
of user data to perform their functionality. This makes the cloud environment
an attractive target for malicious attackers.
The increasing growth of capability-limited mobile devices mixed with a strate-
gic shift towards cloud computing leads to many interesting design possibilities
in the web space. The cloud is moving towards a programming platform model
providing interfaces for applications to utilize the cloud services. The cloud
provider would need to enforce users’ security policies on the data contributed
by the users. At the same time, mandatory security policies need to be devel-
oped and analyzed for the cloud environment.
• User-centric security framework designs. In this thesis, we explored a
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design of a generalized access control frameworks that allow users’ to enforce
their security and privacy policies independent of the underlying application.
We believe that the transition of the cloud to become service providers would
enable such designs. However, certain applications, such as healthcare applica-
tions, would impose additional security requirements due to the sensitivity of
the information involved and the players involved in deciding the security poli-
cies (such as government laws, hospital policies, etc.). Further work is needed
to examine how application-specific requirements impact the design of a gen-
eralized user-centric secure systems and how such systems can be customized
with minimum design changes and deployment hurdles.
• Semantic Web. The next generation of web would involve associating meaning
and description to the web content, a concept often referred to as the semantic
Web [21]. The semantic Web is a vision of information that can be interpreted
by automated processes, so these processes can perform more of the tedious
work involved in finding, combining, and acting upon information on the web
and presenting it in a user-friendly form to the end user. This would create
new challenges in providing privacy protection to users’ personal data and sub-
sequently would require design changes to the mechanisms for enforcing users’
security and privacy policies.
7.3 Closing Remarks
This thesis addressed several research problems with the goal to bridge the gap be-
tween the evolving Web 2.0 environment and the available security policies and mech-
anisms that determine the end-to-end security of web content. We analyzed the ef-
fectiveness of the current security and privacy policies in view of the new challenges
imposed by the dynamic Web. We also developed flexible designs of new security
enforcement frameworks that overcome the limitations of the current web designs in
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providing better security guarantees and effective policy enforcement. Research on
the open problems along this line can improve the effectiveness of end-to-end security
mechanisms on the Web. Looking ahead, similar challenges need to be addressed in
emerging areas of mobile and cloud computing. The Web would continue to evolve
with new additional features and mechanisms. A more organized and systematic ef-
fort is needed to design security policies for such new features in order for them to
be effective and coherent.
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